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ABSTRACT
This dissertation studies a subset of state and local economic policy issues and
their interactions with federal government policy in the United States, in macroeco-
nomic and general equilibrium models. The first chapter examines the transmission
of monetary policy through state and local government public finance. Municipal
bond yields increase by 22bp after a 100bp positive monetary shock, though the
effect varies across states, and by risk and liquidity. To study the effects of these
borrowing cost elasticities on local fiscal policy, I model U.S. localities as small open
economies in a monetary union. Here, local governments conduct fiscal policy in
response to borrowing costs and economic conditions. In a model calibrated to the
U.S., median passthrough of monetary policy shocks to municipal borrowing costs
implies a dampening of transmission to output of over half relative to a case which
ignores the muni market. Realistic cross-sectional differences in borrowing cost re-
sponses result in up to a 50% difference in monetary transmission across localities,
and account for 10-20% of observed monetary transmission differences in U.S. data.
The second chapter, jointly written with Andrew Simon, studies the relative mer-
its of centralized and decentralized policy setting in the context of the minimum wage
in the U.S. A binding policy is optimal if the benefits from redistribution outweigh the
costs from migration, which are relatively steeper for local governments. Centralized
xv
policy, though uniform in practice, reduces horizontal migration externalities, which
improves decentralized minimum wage setting. Our results therefore indicate that
decentralized and centralized policy setting exhibit strategic complementarity; the
extent of which depends on mobility and regional heterogeneity. We then calibrate
a model of the continental U.S. and find that joint policy setting leads to a small
welfare gain over centralization, and closely resembles the social planner’s optimal
policies.
The final chapter explores the savings behavior of U.S. states over the business
cycle. In the U.S., transfers from federal to state governments respond more strongly
to aggregate cycles than state-level cycles. As a result, more U.S. states with more
unique business cycles engage in more precautionary savings. A model in which two
governments enact fiscal policy, the “regional” government has credit constraints,
and the “central” government’s information is imperfect, matches the data and im-
plies a sizable information friction. The central government’s inability to respond
to idiosyncratic shocks implies a role for states in countercyclical policy, despite




Channel of Monetary Policy
1.1 Introduction
State and local government debt is a significant sector in the U.S. economy, with
important implications for monetary policy. In 2019, the market for state and local
government (municipal) bonds was valued at $3.9 trillion, over 1/3 the size of the
corporate bond market and greater than 3% of the valuation of the global bond
market. Additionally, while most state and local governments in the U.S. have mea-
sures in place to prevent an excessive use of debt financing for expenditures, debt
financing is nevertheless a key component of municipal public finance and has been
increasing over time, especially as interest rates have fallen (Figure 1.1). State and
local government debt outstanding is about 100% of state and local government to-
1
Figure 1.1: Municipal Debt and Treasury Rates, 1960-2020
tal expenditures, and interest payments on municipal debt take up around 5% of
annual general fund expenditures. Furthermore, rather than “leaning against” mon-
etary expansions, state and local government spending tends to expand when interest
rates fall1, suggesting the presence of a municipal public finance channel of monetary
policy transmission, by which national monetary policy affects local fiscal policy.
1Appendix A.3.1 present some time series evidence of the responses of some public finance vari-
ables to monetary shocks. A 1 s.d. expansionary monetary shock increases municipal government
spending in the medium term by up to 0.25%, after an initial decrease which is possibly due to
decreases in automatic stabilizers.
2
This paper seeks to be the first to describe and illuminate this “Municipal Gov-
ernment Channel” of monetary policy. To do this, I first outline a framework for
modeling U.S. localities as small open New Keynesian economies in a monetary
union, each with a representative household and fiscal authority. These local fis-
cal authorities choose debt and public goods spending on locally-produced goods,
subject to borrowing costs which are imperfectly and heterogeneously linked to the
risk-free interest rate. The elasticities of these borrowing costs to changes in the
risk-fee rate determine the effect of monetary policy on the local government’s bud-
get; the more the government’s budget relaxes after a monetary expansion, the more
it can engage in stimulative spending. In the empirical section of the paper, I use
time series and panel data to study the size and source of the response of municipal
borrowing costs to monetary shocks, finding that municipal yields decrease (increase)
by 22bp in response to a 100bp decrease (increase) in treasury yields, though there is
sizeable heterogeneity across U.S. states, driven in part by liquidity and default risk
factors. Finally, I calibrate the baseline model to reflect U.S. localities, showing that
realistic municipal borrowing cost elasticities result in a significant departure from
a “risk-free rate” assumption, imply monetary transmission heterogeneity of up to
50% across states, and can account for 10-20% of transmission heterogeneity in the
data.
The paper begins by outlining a model of state and local governments as small
open economies in a monetary union, with local governments facing potentially het-
erogeneous borrowing costs. Each locality is populated by two types of agents,
intertemporal and hand-to-mouth, which work and consume to optimize the repre-
3
sentative household’s utility. Consumption is comprised of tradable and non-tradable
goods; the non-tradable goods are produced locally by a New Keynesian production
market, with Calvo-style price setting. The locality’s representative government re-
ceives a stream of tax revenue, and chooses debt issuance and public goods spending
to maximize household utility, which also depends on public goods consumption on
non-tradable goods. The municipal government does not borrow at the risk-free rate
set by the monetary authority; rather, its idiosyncratic borrowing cost is determined
on an external financial market and is imperfectly linked to the risk-free rate.
When the national monetary authority lowers the risk-free rate, borrowing costs
for the local fiscal authority decrease, relaxing the government’s budget constraint
and incentivizing public spending. Because public spending occurs with non-tradable
goods produced by a New Keynesian market, public spending is stimulative for both
output and employment, amplifying the existing expansionary effects of a drop in
interest rates. Consequently, the extent to which monetary policy passes through to
municipal borrowing costs is of crucial importance for determining the size of this
channel. Heterogeneity in municipal debt pricing could result in significant monetary
transmission differences; it is to the empirical evidence on the response of municipal
bonds to monetary shocks the paper turns next.
To explore the effects of monetary shocks on municipal bond yields, I first use time
series evidence from the yields on a series of S&P municipal bond indices. Yields
on indices of all general obligation bonds in the United States increase 22bp in
response to a 100bp monetary shock, with no difference between state bonds or local
bonds. This response represents a far lower elasticity than that of corporate bonds.
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Additionally, I find evidence of significant heterogeneity across states, which exhibit
coefficients implying responses of 17bp to 40bp. While default risk does explain
responses of municipal bonds to monetary shocks, as high risk indices respond more
strongly, persistently low responses across the board imply a role for illiquidity in
determining these responses.
To investigate the role of illiquidity in municipal bond responses to monetary
shocks, I use transaction-level MSRB data of municipal bonds. An exercise as in
Gilchrist, Yue, and Zakrajs̆ek (2019), who are concerned with soveriegn bonds, sug-
gest liquidity factors play a role in determining municipal yield responses. This
is consistent with literature documenting search frictions, bargaining power, and
transaction costs in the municipal bond market. Decomposing average spreads into
liquidity and risk components also indicates that movements in spreads after a mon-
etary shock tend to occur in the liquidity component. Finally, I connect the bond
microdata for a subset of the sample with annual government finance data, yielding
consistent, but not significant, evidence that smaller governments’ borrowing costs
respond more strongly to monetary shocks; this could be due to risk or liquidity
factors.
Armed with empirical estimates of the average and range of municipal yield
responses to monetary shocks, I calibrate the small open economy to respresent
average U.S. localities, and study the magnitude of the municipal government channel
of monetary policy. Using the main response coefficient from the empirical section, I
show that including the average passthrough of monetary shocks to municipal yields
in the model dampens monetary transmission by over half, relative to a case in which
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one assumes the local fiscal authority has access to borrowing at the risk-free interest
rate. One immediate conclusion, then is that the exact nature of municipal financial
markets are crucial in any model of state and local governments over the business
cycle.
Additionally, realistic heterogeneity over municipal debt pricing results in mean-
ingful differences in monetary transmission. Increasing a locality’s borrowing cost
responses from the low end of empirical estimates to the high end of estimates re-
sults in up to a 50% increase in monetary transmission to output and employment.
Furthermore, the dispersion of peak monetary transmission implied by the state-
level empirical estimates can account for 10-20% of observed dispersion of monetary
transmission across U.S. localities, based on my own estimates and estimates from the
literature. While localities in the U.S. differ on a multitude of dimensions affecting
monetary transmission, the ability of monetary policy to influence their borrowing
costs is a factor policymakers should consider.
Given that I have constructed a model of state and local governments that links
financial markets and business cycles, it is natural to use the model to lend insight
into other macroeconomic questions. I use the model to provide an explanation
for why state and local government spending decreased in the wake of the 2008
recession, the first time it has ever done so. In my model, a real recession induces
fiscal stimulus, but the same recession combined with a lockup of financial markets
sees a fiscal contraction; this result suggests the financial nature of the 2008 recession
placed heavy constraints on the ability of municipal governments to respond. I also
consider a shock to the model representing the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic;
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in the model, quick actions by the Fed to shore up municipal debt markets prevent
a prolonged dampening of government spending.
Related Literature. This paper provides meaningful contributions to a number
of important strands of economic literature. The baseline model is, in most ways, a
canonical open economy New Keynesian model. In this vein, it adds to papers such as
Galí and Monacelli (2008), Beetsma and Jensen (2005), Farhi and Werning (2017a),
Farhi and Werning (2017b), Nakamura and Steinsson (2014a), and Chodorow-Reich
(2019), which study monetary and fiscal policy in monetary unions, by highlight-
ing that interest rates for the member governments of a monetary union may differ
substantially in response to the same monetary policies. Similarly, in showing how
monetary policy works through municipal fiscal policy, this paper merges the mone-
tary union literature with the literature on monetary policy passthrough, exemplified
by Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), McKay, Nakamura, and Steinsson (2016),
and Kaplan, Moll, and Violante (2018). More specifically, although focused on lo-
cal governments, this paper contributes to a literature on international monetary
transmission to small open economies, as in Auer et al. (2019) and Cesa-Bianchi,
Thwaites, and Vicondoa (2016). In contrast to papers which study optimal fiscal
policy for a member of a monetary union, I study the government as an agent in
the model, whose behavior in response to monetary policy is taken as part of the
passthrough effect.
By analyzing a model of a locality in the U.S., this paper enters in to the discus-
sion on regional effects of monetary policy, and macroeconomic models with regions
in general, as in Beraja et al. (2019) and Beraja, Hurst, and Ospina (2019). Other
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papers, such as Seegert (2015), Cashin et al. (2018), and Fisher and Wassmer (2014),
examine the responses of state and local governments to significant macro events; I
use the model in this paper as a playground to study the behavior of state and local
governments in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Finally, the over-the-counter
markets version of the model in Section 1.2.8 builds on the work of Duffie, Garleanu,
and Pedersen (2005), who model OTC markets for financial assets, and Bethune,
Sultanum, and Trachter (2019), who model the issuance side of OTC markets. I
show in the paper how such a model can be connected to a DSGE macro model as a
microfounded explanation for why borrowing costs may differ from the risk-free rate
for local governments.
The results from the empirical section of this paper contribute to a number of
strands of literature. First, and most obviously, this paper adds to recent work on
the effect of U.S. monetary policy on various asset prices. Rosa (2014) does this for
municipal bonds; I expand on his work by including a host of indices and exploiting
a trade-level panel dataset to investigate potential determinants of muni responses
to monetary shocks. Gilchrist, Yue, and Zakrajs̆ek (2019) studies the response of
international sovereign yields to U.S. monetary shocks; I perform similar exercises
to their paper, but in the U.S. municipal bond market. Anderson and Cesa-Bianchi
(2020) study how firm leverage affects corporate bond responses to monetary shocks.
By shedding light on the relationship between municipal bond yields and U.S.
monetary policy, I also add to a robust literature on municipal bond pricing, espe-
cially as it relates to risk and liquidity; mine is the first paper to explore explicitly
the roles of these channels in determining monetary policy responses. Two impor-
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tant papers, Schwert (2017) and Ang, Bhansali, and Xing (2014), debate the relative
importance of risk and liquidity in municipal bond spreads, with the former empha-
sizing risk and the latter liquidity. Another strand of papers (Harris and Piwowar,
2006; Green, Hollifield, and Schürhoff, 2007a; Green, Hollifield, and Schürhoff, 2007b;
Brancaccio, Li, and Schúrhoff, 2020; Garrett et al., 2018; Moldogaziev, 2018) high-
lights explicit frictions in the secondary market for municipal bonds, such as informa-
tion asymmetries and market power, that result in price dispersion over given bonds.
A number of other papers explore determinants of municipal bond prices, from state
laws on bankruptcy (Yang, 2019) to climate change (Painter, 2020). Other rele-
vant municipal bond pricing papers include Gao, Lee, and Murphy (2019), Grigoris
(2019), Adelino, Cunha, and Ferreira (2017), and a host of others.
1.2 A Model of a Municipal Government
In order to examine the effects of the financial market for municipal bonds on munic-
ipal behavior and household welfare, I propose a quantitative heterogeneous agents
DSGE model of municipalities in a monetary union, with municipal government debt
sold on outside markets, subject to financial frictions. The economies in question are
small open economies,2 reflecting the tens of thousands of distinct municipal govern-
ments in the United States. In this model, households choose labor and purchases
of local municipal bonds, financial markets buy and sell bonds, local governments
choose spending debt issuance, and the central government chooses the risk-free in-
2The model builds on the canonical Calvo model found in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2016),
adding the municipal government sector and hand-to-mouth consumers.
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terest rate. Local output is produced by monopolistically competitive firms using
labor from households, resulting in standard New Keynesian features for prices.
This model is able to quantify the effects of financial frictions, which appear here
as a wedge between the risk-free rate and municipal borrowing costs, and may po-
tentially arise from an OTC framework, on local fiscal policy in response to macroe-
conomic shocks. As such, it serves as a contribution to the macro literature on
passthrough of shocks, the fiscal policy literature, monetary unions models, models
of the regional effects of macroeconomic shocks, and (in one possible application)
models on OTC asset pricing. Note that, in this section, as well as in the main
quantitative results, I focus on the problem of a single locality for simplicity.
1.2.1 Environment
The locality is modelled as a small open economy with a representative household and
representative government, each of which maximizes the utility of the representative
consumer. The household is made up of 1 − κ traditional consumers and κ “hand
to mouth,” or HTM, consumers. The traditional, or “Ricardian,” optimizers in
the household choose a consumption bundle comprised of two types of final goods,
tradable (cT ) and non-tradable (cN), as well as labor supply h and debt dH . The
government chooses government purchases of non-tradable goods g and municipal
debt dG, given a tax rate τG on the exogenous stream of tradable goods for the
economy, yT . HTM consumers simply choose labor hH , and consume exactly their
labor income in every period.
Tradable goods and bonds of both agents are traded with the rest of the world,
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where the locality is endowed with an exogenous income of the tradable good in every
period. Non-tradable goods are produced using domestically supplied labor by mo-
nopolistically competitive firms within the region to satisfy demand for non-tradable
consumption and government purchases of public goods. Inflation is induced by
Calvo-style price setting on the part of these monopolistic competitors, who maxi-
mize expected future profits subject to household and government demand, as well
as the expected constraints on price changes.
The aggregate risk-free interest rate in the economy is determined by a central
authority and is exogenous with respect to local variables. Additionally, both the
household and the government are subject to their own “proprietary” interest rates,
rH and rG, which depend on the aggregate rate, deviation of debt from steady state,
and parameters determining the relationship between monetary shocks and the actual
interest rate paid by either the household or the government. Of particular interest
in this project is the response of the government’s borrowing costs to monetary
shocks. The strength of this response will affect passthrough of interest rate shocks to
households, and presents a potential source of heterogeneity of monetary passthrough




The household in the small economy is made up of 1− κ “Ricardian” agents and κ
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Here, tradable consumption and debt are denominated in terms of the “national”
price, which is normalized to unity. Prices pt and wt are prices–of non-tradables
and labor, respectively–relative to the price of the tradable good. τG is the tax on
exogenous tradable good allocation, and Tt is the lump-sum transfers to households
from firm profits. Quantities are in per-person terms, such that total labor supply
from optimizers is given by (1− κ)ht.
1.2.2.2 Optimality Conditions




















V ′(ht) = λtwt. (1.7)
Equation 1.4 is the first order condition for tradable goods consumption, defining
the shadow value of income denominated in the tradable goods price. The condition
for non-tradable consumption, when plugged into Equation 1.4, yields 1.5, which
allocates consumption according to the relative price of the two goods. Equation 1.6
trades off the benefits of borrowing today with the costs of paying it back tomorrow,
and Equation 1.7 equates marginal costs and benefits of labor supply.
1.2.2.3 Hand-to-Mouth Agents
The remaining κ agents in the economy behave in a hand-to-mouth manner. These












The first order conditions for these consumers mirror those of the traditional



















V ′(hHt ) = λ
H
t wt. (1.11)
The total amount of non-tradable consumption in the economy, then, is the sum
(1 − κ)cNt + κc
N,H
t , and likewise with tradable consumption (1 − κ)cTt + κc
T,H
t and
total labor (1−κ)ht+κhHt . This departure from Ricardian equivalence in the model
allows a realistic local government spending multiplier to be calculated.
1.2.3 Local Government
The representative local government uses local fiscal policy to solve the problem 1.13






Other than its choice variables, another key difference emerges for the local govern-
ment: it exerts full market power over its debt. In other words, while the representa-
3Note that fiscal policy in this model is “passive” in the sense that policymakers are concerned
primarily with the efficient provision of public goods. The local policymaker does not factor ex-
plicitly its stimulative effects on the economy. Beetsma and Jensen (2005) shows that such passive
policies in a two-economy fiscal union result in welfare loss relative to centralized optimization or
fiscal policy rules, and Carlino and Inman (2013) finds that indeed U.S. states have the tools to
achieve stabilization policy through deficit spending. However, it is reasonable to think of small
local economies in the U.S. as being more concerned with public goods provision than stabilization
at the level of a fiscal union. In a case in which the local government was optimizing according
to a fiscal rule, or if fiscal policy was coordinated at the union level, its borrowing costs would
not matter for fiscal adjustments. Additionally, these adjustments would “lean against” monetary
policy, which is contrary to the data on local government responses.
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tive household is a price taker with respect to the interest rate, the local government
can only be thought of as a singular agent and the only issuer of its asset. The
government, therefore, must take into account the effect of its debt issuances on
its borrowing costs, both in the current period and in the future. The first order
condition with respect to debt purchases, then, is given by
W ′(gt)
1 + rGt − dGt+1
∂rGt
∂dGt+1












In an analog to the household’s debt decision, the government uses debt issues
to balance government increased spending now with decreased spending from debt
obligations later. When the yields on municipal bonds move strongly with interest
rate shocks, these fiscal policy responses will tend to be greater, while the opposite
is true when responses of yields to monetary shocks are weak.
The condition that the government take into account its effect on interest rates is
not an innocent one. It affects the response of debt to transitory shocks, but it also
has an effect on the steady state of the model. Figure 1.2 presents this as an illustra-
tive example using the functional forms and calibration from the quantitative section
of the paper. Failing to account for the effects of debt on borrowing costs would result
in massive increases in government debt, under the same parameterization.
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Figure 1.2: Steady State Comparison, Local Government Debt
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1.2.4 New Keynesian Production
1.2.4.1 Final Goods Production
The non-tradable good yNt is produced by a final goods producer which buys inter-
mediate goods yNit from a continuum of intermediate goods producers in the local









1− 1µ , (1.14)









Profit maximization on the part of the final goods producer implies the demand









Here, the domestically produced good is used both for consumption–by both types
of agents–and government spending,
yNt = (1− κ)cNt + κc
N,H
t + gt, (1.15)
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so the relevant demand equations become
















1.2.4.2 Intermediate Goods Producers
Intermediate goods firms exist on the continuum [0, 1], and produce differentiate
inputs to the final non-tradable good using household labor:
yNit = h
α
it, α ∈ (0, 1]. (1.17)
The choice variable for these firms is the price for good i, PNit , which determines
demand for the intermediate good as in Equation 1.16. Profit for an individual
intermediate goods firm is given by PNit yNit − (1− 1µ)Wthit, where Wt is the raw wage
and (1 − 1
µ
) is a labor subsidy meant to offset the distortions from monopolistic
competition.
Plugging in the demand equations and production functions, period t profits for





















Prices are sticky according to a Calvo mechanism, i.e., intermediate goods firms may
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only change prices in each period with probability (1− θ). In Appendix A.1, I show
that maximization of expected profits on the part of intermediate goods firms, since
all price-adjusting firms choose the same price, result in choosing the flexible relative









































I also show in Appendix A.1 that inflation dynamics are given by
1 = θ(πNt )










α represents the amount of price dispersion in the intermediate goods





µ/α + (1− θ)(p̃tN)−µ/α, (1.21)
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1.2.5 Financial Sector
As mentioned before, household and government debt are traded on an external
financial market, resulting in two interest rates rHt and rGt . These interest rates
reflect the aggregate interest rate r∗t , debt stock/purchases dt, dt+1, dGt , and dGt+1,













The function fG(mt) is of particular interest in this paper, as it will be a key deter-
minant of the passthrough of monetary policy to local governments. The response
of municipal government borrowing costs could vary based on a multitude of fac-
tors, including trading costs and illiquidity in the muni market, as I will show in the
empirical section.
These pricing functions could arise from a number of financial market specifi-
cations. For example, a common formulation in the international literature is the
debt-elastic interest rates of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003). Below, I will show an-
other alternative to this formulation, which incorporates a standard over-the-counter
asset market model into the model; such a feature serves as a microfoundation for
the functions fH(mt) and fG(mt) and provides intuition into the mechanism working
behind the empirical investigations.
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1.2.6 Aggregation
Thus far I have focused on the problem of a single locality. In a full version of the
model, there are a large number of localities subscripted by s ∈ {1, ..., S}. These
economies exchange tradable goods and debt with each other, as well as with the
rest of the world.4 The nationwide interest rate r∗t is set by the economy’s monetary
authority in response to aggregate output and inflation, which are made up of of
local values:
r∗t = R({yTst}s, {yTst}s, {πst}s). (1.24)
1.2.7 Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium is a set of quantities yNt ,cTt , cNt , ht, gt, dt, dGt , λT , πNt , st,
mrt, mct and prices pt, wt, p̃tN , rHt , and rGt for each locality s satisfying:
(i) The optimizing household problem is solved by Equations (1.4), (1.5), (1.7),
and (1.6)
(ii) Hand-to-mouth quantities satisfy Equations (1.11), (1.9), and (1.10)
(iii) The government’s problem is solved by Equation (1.13)
(iv) Marginal revenue and marginal cost are given by Equations (1.18) and (1.19),
where mr = mc
4The relaxation of market clearing at the union-wide level is essentially a preservation of the
assumption of an external financial market with which households and governments trade. This
allows the monetary authority to easily set r∗t . Such an approach is consistent with the regional
model found in Beraja et al. (2019).
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(v) Aggregate production satisfies yNt = s−αt ((1− κ)ht + κhHt )α
(vi) Inflation and price dispersion evolve according to Equations (1.20) and (1.21)
(vii) Inflation is defined by πNt =
pt
pt−1
(viii) Market clearing in tradable goods implies (1− κ)cTt + κc
T,H





(ix) Interest rates satisfy Equations (1.22) and (1.23)
(x) The risk free rate is set by the monetary authority according to Equation 1.24
given the exogenous processes yTt and initial conditions s−1, d0, and dG0 .
1.2.8 An Over-the-Counter Markets Model for Debt Pricing
While the borrowing cost functions in the model above are presented in a reduced
form way, the finance literature provides a path to a microfounded relationship be-
tween monetary shocks and municipal yields. Specifically, I consider the class of
models for which Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2005) was the seminal work, in
which the trading of assets on secondary OTC markets is modeled carefully. In sum-
mary, municipal bonds are bought and sold to risk-neutral financial firms on primary
markets, then sold on secondary markets to buyers who value the bonds highly but
are subject to trading costs or incomplete market power. This friction in the sec-
ondary market dampens the response of the present value of the asset for financial
firms to changes in the aggregate interest rate, thereby muting the primary market
price response to monetary policy.
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Every period, the municipal government makes debt issues xt. Municipal bonds
pay coupon rate c and mature with probability ν. Governments buy and sell from
risk-neutral financial firms at competitive prices. A mass α of municipal buyers pur-
chase bonds from financial firms; these buyers value the asset above its present value,
at value vH . This high valuation can be thought of as reflecting the tax advantage
in municipals or warm-glow utility from supporting projects in one’s community.5
The value of the bond for the financial firm, vF , then, is the present value of the












The price Pt is the price of the bond on the secondary market, which is determined
by Nash bargaining, as in the OTC literature:
Pt = θv
F
t + (1− θ)vH . (1.26)
θ is a key parameter in the OTC model: it captures the financial frictions in the
market resulting from trading costs or asymmetric information, which can broadly
be described as contributing to illiquidity in munis. Additionally, pt is the probability
that a given muni held by the financial firm–that does not mature–is sold in period
5In support of both of these motivations, Pirinsky and Wang (2011) shows a great deal of market
segmentation in the muni market, wherein household buyers tend to buy munis primarily from their
own geographic areas.
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BFt+1 = (1− psellt )(1− ν)BFt + xt
BHt+1 = (1− ν)BHt + psellt (1− ν)BFt ,
where BFt and BHt are the bond holdings of financial firms and buyers, respectively.
At any time t, we have Dt = BFt +BHt .
For simplicity, assume municipal governments face the competitive price–the fi-
nancial firm’s valuation of the bonds–for their issuances and purchases of municipal
bonds, vF . We can now transform this model into the structure of the full model,
where rGt = fH(dt, dt+1, r∗t ,mt). In the model, the government’s net income from
debt purchases is given by yGt =
dGt+1
1+rGt
− dGt . In the context of an OTC model, this
income is given by yGt = vFt xt−(ν+(1−ν)c)dGt . By setting these terms equal to each






t+1 + (1− ν)(1− c− vFt )dGt
− 1, (1.27)
where vFt is defined as above. Here, monetary shocks work through the term vFt , as
they affect the future path of aggregate interest rates rt.











1.2.9 Elasticities of Interest
A few key elasticities are important for understanding the passthrough of monetary
policy through municipal public finance and its potential heterogeneity using this
model. First, we need to know the effect of borrowing costs on government spend-
ing. Results in Table 1.2 suggest these effects could be quite sizeable, though these
results are merely suggestive and not the main focus of the paper. Additionally, it
is important to know the local government spending multiplier: a helpful review in
Chodorow-Reich (2019) suggests a point estimate of 1.8, suggesting a meaningful
role of fiscal policy at the local level.
Of course, knowing the effects of an aggregate interest rate shock on the borrowing
costs of municipal governments is a crucial piece of studying the potential size of
this channel. Furthermore, any heterogeneity in these yield elasticities will result
in differential fiscal policy responses across municipalities, and therefore different
passthroughs in different localities. In the following empirical section, I investigate in
depth the effect of monetary shocks on municipal bond yields, identifying significant
heterogeneity in responses across government and highlighting a few possible sources.
1.3 The Effect of U.S. Monetary Shocks on Mu-
nicipal Bonds
The key elasticity in the model outlined above is the effect of interest rate shocks on
the borrowing costs of state and local governments in the U.S. The extent to which
these borrowing costs respond to monetary shocks will determine the strength of the
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municipal public finance channel of monetary policy; my baseline estimate of the
response coefficient is 0.22. Additionally, heterogeneity across municipalities in the
responses of their borrowing costs to monetary shocks will imply heterogeneity in
the transmission of monetary policy to households, as shocks will induce dispersion
of borrowing costs. This section documents the average effects of monetary shocks
on municipal borrowing costs, as well as the variance of such effects across state and
local governments. I also investigate whether we can identify root causes of response
heterogeneity, such as liquidity or risk in the muni market. I find evidence for both
possibilities; a transaction-level dataset suggests illiquidity as a key factor, while
high-yield (lower rated) indices respond twice as strongly to monetary shocks than
the most highly rated indices.
I begin the section with a brief description of the municipal bond market, ex-
plaining the similarities and differences between munis and treasuries. Next I present
summary statistics from the muni market, highlight its behavior during the financial
crisis, and discuss the monetary shock identification strategy. I also provide some
brief evidence that municipal bond yields on the secondary market are valid rep-
resentations of municipal borrowing costs; in short, secondary market yields both
reflect primary market prices and have a statistically significant effect on municipal
government behavior. After this, I move on to the main empirical exercises.
The first set of exercises investigate the time series evidence on the effect of
monetary shocks on a set of muni indices; this section is in the spirit of Rosa (2014),
who looks at munis, and Gilchrist, Yue, and Zakrajs̆ek (2019), who study foreign
bond responses to U.S. interest rate shocks. I find that an index of General Obligation
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(GO) municipal bonds responds to a 100bp monetary shock by an average of 22bp;
furthermore, I find evidence of substantial heterogeneity by state, as responses vary
from 17bp to 40bp across space, despite little difference between state and local
bonds. High-risk indices respond more strongly to monetary shocks, as one might
expect, but the coefficients remain persistently low, suggesting a role for illiquidity
in dampening these coefficients.6
The second set of exercises exploits a trade-level dataset of the municipal bond
market, in which liquidity and risk can be explored further as possible drivers of
monetary transmission (or lack thereof). First, I perform an exercise from Gilchrist,
Yue, and Zakrajs̆ek (2019), finding joint significance for some possible indicators of
illiquidity, but not risk. Second, I replicate the main strategy of Schwert (2017), who
decomposes the (tax-adjusted) municipal spread into liquidity and risk components,
and compute the response of each of these spread components to monetary shocks,
finding that the liquidity component of spreads may exhibit a transitory response
to monetary shocks. Finally, I take a sample of munis from the largest state and
local governments, for which I can match annual finance data from the Census of
Governments, finding that correlates of government size tend to lower the response
coefficient, though without much statistical significance. In any case, my overall
results suggest dampened (relative to, say, corporate bonds) but heterogeneous re-
sponses of municipal borrowing costs to U.S. interest rate shocks, with which I can
use the municipal open economy model to evaluate the characteristics of monetary
6The tax-free nature of municipal bonds, in the absence of risk or illiquidity, would imply
coefficients of 1 − τ , where τ is the relevant tax rate. Coefficients lower than this, as I find here,
suggest the presence of illiquidity.
27
passthrough via state and local governments.
1.3.1 The Municipal Bond Market
State and local governments in the U.S. rely heavily on debt markets to finance a
wide range of activities, from covering budget shortfalls to infrastructure investment.
When a government decides to raise funds through a debt issue, it issues municipal
bonds through a financial broker, one of a number of bidders for the rights to issue
the bonds. At the time of issue, the broker sells the bonds on a “primary market”
investors and other broker-dealers.
After the primary market sale, municipal bonds are traded in Over-the-Counter
(OTC) markets, rather than on a central exchange. The OTC nature of the municipal
secondary market requires a specific buyer-seller match for a sale to take place. Harris
and Piwowar (2006) and Green, Hollifield, and Schürhoff (2007b) show that buyer
characteristics, namely size, influence prices on the secondary market, such that
there is price dispersion even on the same day for a given bond; some investors may
have better information and market power than others. Municipal bonds are not
like treasuries in that they are tax-free and not entirely risk-free; additionally, the
OTC market induces and amount of transaction costs into this market. The average
municipal bond is traded every 10 days, suggesting that price adjustment may be
slower in this market than in other markets.
There is a wide dispersion on the yields of municipal bonds in the MSRB data
discussed below, reflecting a high degree of heterogeneity in municipal borrowing
costs. Table 1.1 presents basic summary statistics on these yields, and Figures 1.3
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and 1.4 shows the dispersion of yields conditional on time to maturity for the years
just before and during the financial crisis. As mentioned in the introduction, there
are three main avenues by which yields on municipal bonds might differ from yields
on U.S. treasuries of similar maturities, as well as yields of other municipal bonds:
taxes, risk, and liquidity. There are some differences in marginal tax rates across
locations in the U.S., which may be driving a small portion of these differences, but
as Figure 1.5 shows, the variance of muni spreads varies at a higher frequency than
changes in tax rates. Most importantly, all three of these figures suggest a massive
change in yield dispersion in the wake of the recent financial crisis7.
Returning to Figure 1.5, note the systematic difference in spread behavior in
the aftermath of the financial crisis. In addition to the increase in the variance of
spreads, note that spreads move from negative to positive on average. Despite the
tax advantage of municipals, yields were higher during and after the crisis than com-
parable treasuries; in other words, yields on municipals did not decrease as rapidly as
yields on treasuries during a time of unprecedented monetary expansion. For further
motivation of the importance of market inefficiencies in the behavior of muni yields,
Figure 1.6 shows average daily yields for the same time period, broken out by the
IRC illiquidity measure used in Schwert (2017) and described in Appendix A.2.3.
The bonds recorded as “illiquid” on this measure, i.e., those with high average im-
puted trading costs, saw a bigger increase in spreads during the crisis, despite similar
behavior beforehand. This movement is suggestive that macroeconomic shocks may
have heterogeneous effects on municipal borrowing costs; I return to an experiment
7The yields plotted here are simply the raw trade-level yields in the MSRB data, described in
Appendix A.2.1.
29
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics, Daily Municipal Bond Yields
Mean Variance 25th 50th 75th
Yield, 2005-2019 2.760 2.077 1.630 2.743 3.758
Yield, 2008-2014 2.712 2.494 1.452 2.600 3.754
Spread, 2005-2019 0.4216 1.856 -0.535 0.155 1.147
Spread, 2008-2014 0.9137 2.171 -0.076 0.767 1.774
Note: Each variable is the median of daily trades for each municipal bonds. The sample does
not include a bond on days in which it is not traded. Spreads are calculated as the difference
between a bond’s yield and an interpolated hypothetical U.S. treasury bond of the same length
to maturity in days.
with a financial crisis later in the paper.
Heterogeneity in yields will be important for the upcoming framework, as I will
show that there is also a heterogeneity over the degree to which muni prices respond
to monetary shocks. This heterogeneity in response implies that different types of
governments not only have varying borrowing costs over the long run, but will also
encounter differing changes in borrowing costs after short-run shocks. As a result,
the transmission of shocks through municipal borrowing costs should be expected to
have both level and distributional effects, as governments are affected differentially
by shocks, depending on factors such as trading costs and liquidity.
1.3.2 The Importance of the Secondary Market for Munici-
pal Finance
So far I have described the secondary market for state and local government debt,
i.e., the market in which the yields on bonds which have already been issued are
determined. Of course, the going yield on bond A does not affect the payments of
its issuer, which simply continues to make the predetermined coupon payments to
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Figure 1.3: Muni Yields on FOMC Dates, 2006
Figure 1.4: Muni Yields on FOMC Dates, 2008
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Figure 1.5: Muni Spreads Over Time
whomever is in possession of bond A at the time. In order to argue that yields affect
borrowing costs, one must know that the yield of bond A has an effect on the cost
of issuing bond B in the future. In this section I argue that secondary market yields
not only affect borrowing costs, but the real behavior of state and local governments.
First, consider the association between the secondary market and the “primary”
market for municipal bonds. I define a bond’s “unexplained yield” as the residual ξit
on the regression
Rit = 1 + β1Tit + β2iit + ξit, (1.28)
where Rit is the yield on muni i on day t, Tit is its time to maturity, and iit is a
benchmark treasury rate. This simple distinction yields a high correlation between
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Figure 1.6: Muni Spreads, by Illiquidity
an issuer’s (defined as a 6-digit CUSIP code) unexplained yields on the debt issued
before day t and debt issued on date t: 0.68. This is a strong correlation, suggesting
a strong relationship between the primary and secondary markets.
Secondary markets may be strongly related to primary markets and borrowing
costs, but do they actually affect state and local government behavior? To explore
this question, I connect governments with revenues more than $50 million from the
Census Bureau’s annual survey of state and local governments with CUSIP-6 issuer
codes in the MSRB data. I use this dataset to estimate the regression equation
logGit = 1 + βRit + ΓXit + εit, (1.29)
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Table 1.2: Government Responses to Secondary Market Muni Yields (IV)
log(Debt Issues) log(Current Exp) log(Capital Exp)
Yield (100bp = 1) -5.814 1.122 -0.6605
(2.476) (0.4715) (0.4342)
Note: An observation is a municipality-year pair. The sample includes all municipalities in the Census Bureau’s Annual
Survey of State and Local Government Finances for which average revenues are greater than $500,000 and bonds could
be found on the Bloomberg database from 2005 to 2012. Control variables include GDP, municipal revenues, and
treasury rates. The explanatory variable is instrumented using summed monetary shocks as described below.
where Git represents a few categories of government spending in a year, while Rit is
the average yield of that government’s debt on the secondary market and Xit is a
vector of controls, including the average treasury yield. These yields are instrumented
with an annualized version of the monetary shocks used later in the paper. Results
are summarized in Table 1.2.
A couple of key suggestive results emerge from this exercise. The first, and most
striking, is the apparent massive effect of secondary yields on new debt issues. An
decrease of average annual yields on a government’s debt of 100 basis points results in
a sixfold increase in its new debt issues. Municipalities seem to respond in powerful
ways to borrowing costs. Additionally, note that higher borrowing costs seem to shift
the composition of municipal spending away from debt-financed capital projects to
current expenditures. The secondary market for municipal debt clearly influences
states and localities, both in terms of debt issuance and spending composition.8
1.3.2.1 Monetary Shocks
For the monetary shocks used in the exercise of this section, I use the strategy of Bu,
Rogers, and Wu (2019) to identify monetary shocks on FOMC announcement dates.
8For aggregate time series evidence, see Appendix A.3.1.
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I give a brief overview of the identification strategy here, with a full presentation
in Appendix A.2.2. The BRW method uses the movements of prices of zero-coupon
U.S. Treasury bonds with maturities i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 30} on FOMC announcement dates
to back out the implied monetary shocks on each date. This is accomplished in a
Fama-Macbeth-style (Fama and MacBeth, 1973) procedure, which starts by making
a standardizing assumption that defines the monetary shock as having a one-to-one
effect on the five-year Treasury yield:
∆R5t = α +mt + ηt. (1.30)
Here ∆R5t is the one-day movement in the five-year treasury yield, α is a constant,
mt is the monetary shock at date t, and ηt catches all other factors affecting the
yield. Armed with this equation, we can use the change in the five-year Treasury
yield on FOMC dates as a proxy to back out the monetary shocks mt.
First, we need to estimate the sequence of 30 time series equations
∆Rit = αi + βi∆R
5
t + εit (1.31)
for each zero-coupon bond i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 30}.9 Armed with estimates β̂1, β̂2, ..., β̂30,
shocks can be backed out by regressing the daily yield changes on the set of esti-
mated β̂i on each FOMC announcement date. This requires estimating the following
9In practice, these are estimated with a heteroskedasticity-based IV approach a la Rigobon and
Sack (2004). Details are found in Appendix A.2.2.
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equation for each t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T}:
∆Rit = αt + m̂tβ̂i + εit. (1.32)
The set of estimated m̂t from each of these estimations is taken to be the monetary
shock series.
The Bu, Rogers, and Wu (2019) monetary shock series has a number of desir-
able characteristics. First, it relies completely on publicly available data; the trea-
sury yield is taken from the Federal Reserve website, and the estimated zero-coupon
yields as estimated by Gürkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2006) are found at https://
www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2006/200628/200628abs.html. The pub-
licly available nature of the data allows the shocks to be constructed at no cost,
and the series is quite easy to update through the current date. Furthermore, the
authors argue in the paper that this series is robust to the information critique of
Nakamura and Steinsson (2018), but is nevertheless highly correlated with existing
estimates of monetary policy shocks. Finally, these shocks are able to incorporate
well the unconventional nature of monetary policy in the aftermath of the financial
crisis; this is an especially important feature for this paper, as my sample only begins
in 2005.
1.3.3 Time Series Evidence
The main set of results I use for the calibration of the model are time series estimates
of the response of municipal yields to monetary shocks based on the yields of muni
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indices constructed by S&P.10 The exercise is in the spirit of Rosa (2014), who studies
the effect of monetary shocks on indices of AAA and AA bonds exclusively. I expand
on Rosa’s work by considering indices representing a broader set of munis, as well as
specific geographic and sectoral indices, reminiscent of Gilchrist, Yue, and Zakrajs̆ek
(2019), who study the effects of U.S. interest rate shocks on the sovereign bond
yields of several small open economies. While my results for highly rated bonds are
similar to what Rosa finds, my other results provide a fuller picture of the effect of
monetary shocks on the municipal bond market, especially with regard to potential
heterogeneity.
S&P constructs these indices using a broad selection of bonds issued by state,
local, and regional government entities in the U.S., which are not subject to income
taxes. The bonds must have been issued in 2010 or later, and must have a minimum
of 2 million U.S. dollars par value on the market. The indices are constructed as
value weighted averages of the constituent bonds.11
For each of the indices in question, I am interested in estimating the equation
∆yt = β0 + β1mt + εt, (1.33)
where mt is the Bu, Rogers, and Wu (2019) monetary shock series and ∆yt = yt+1−
yt−1 is the two-day change in the yield to maturity of the asset around the FOMC
10All of these indices are available for download at https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/
index-family/fixed-income/.
11More information is available from S&P for each index; for example, the methodology for the
baseline index is found at https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/documents/methodologies/
methodology-sp-municipal-bond.pdf.
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Table 1.3: Baseline Time Series Results
All GO State GO Local GO S&P 500 All GO State GO Local GO S&P 500
Monetary shock 0.22 0.24 0.22 0.50 0.23 0.23 0.28 0.65
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (0.13) (0.21)
Horizon 2 days 2 days 2 days 2 days 6 days 6 days 6 days 6 days
N 2147 2147 2147 2147 2139 2139 2139 2139
Note: An observation corresponds to one day, around which a window is constructed from the previous day’s price and the price at a given horizon. Each column refers
to a separate time series regression of an index on monetary shocks. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
meeting date.12 The coefficient β̂1 reflects the number of basis points the muni
index yield should increase for every 1bp monetary shock, and is estimated with
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
1.3.3.1 Baseline Results
This section summarizes the average response of municipal bond yields to monetary
shocks. Table 1.3 gives the estimated coefficients of monetary shocks on yields for
three indices of general obligation municipal bonds. These indices group all munici-
pals, state governments, and local governments, respectively, with an index for bonds
from S&P 500 firms for comparison13. I choose to focus on general obligation bonds,
which are backed by the full taxing power of the issuer rather than a specific revenue
source, in order to more closely match the budget situation of the government in the
model. These bonds can be reasonably thought of as representing the borrowing cost
situations of their local governments.
12I follow GYZ in choosing a 2 day window; their alternative window of 6 days produces similar
results.
13Suppose that the tax free nature of municipals were the only difference between munis and
corporate bonds. In this case, the yield on municipal bonds ym would simply be the after-tax
return of corporate bonds, (1 − τ)yc. The link between munis and treasuries, then, would be the




∂r . To the extent the coefficient
on munis is lower than this, I say that the response of munis is dampened relative to corporates,
for reasons other than their tax-free nature.
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This exercise closely mirrors that of Rosa (2014), though my results exhibit
slightly higher responses to monetary shocks than his; the reasons for this will be
explained in part when I break these bonds out by rating. Nevertheless, the coeffi-
cients are quite dampened relative to models in which governments can borrow at
the risk-free rate: municipal bond yields only increase (decrease) by 22 basis points
in response to a 100 point change in the risk free rate, which is less than half of the
response of corporate bonds, and far less than treasuries. This dampened response
cannot be fully explained by the tax-free nature of municipals, and must be composed
of illiquidity and/or risk effects. Models that do not take this dampened response
into account will tend to overestimate the effects of monetary policy on local fiscal
policy.
Interestingly, there does not seem to be much difference, on average, between
the responses of state bonds and local bonds to monetary shocks.14 This result is
somewhat surprising, given the quite different tax and spending obligations between
these two types of governments. Instead, it seems heterogeneity shows up in other
ways, which I show in the next sections.
1.3.3.2 Heterogeneity by State
A natural place to look for heterogeneity across localities is in the presence of geo-
graphic variation. For this section, I estimate Equation 1.33 separately for indices
of GO bonds originating in U.S. states, for which these indices exist.15 Figure 1.7
14Additionally, in Appendix A.3.2 I investigate some alternative specifications. There is no sig-
nificant difference between positive and negative monetary shocks, and including controls for the
stock market does not affect the results.
15A number of states prohibit or limit the use of GO bonds.
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Figure 1.7: Responses of Muni Yields to Monetary Shocks
Note: Darker color indicates a stronger response of municipal yields issued in the state to monetary shocks. Missing states are those
for which an index of GO bonds is not available. Maximum value: 39.81 (KS); minimum value: 17.32 (NY).
summarizes the estimates, highlighting visually the heterogeneity of responses across
the U.S.
A few notes on these results are worth highlighting. First, the range of coefficients
runs from 17.32 for New York to 39.81 for Kansas.16 Second, no immediately obvious
patterns emerge, save the apparent tendency for high-population areas to have muni
bonds which response more weakly to monetary shocks; this tendency is suggested,
16We can reject that New York’s response is 39.81 or higher, though the standard error bands
for the two estimates do overlap. Even though sample size reduces power in this exercise, I inter-
pret these results as evidence of heterogeneity across location given the remarkable consistency of
coefficients for most of the sector-level indices and for state vs. local bonds.
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Table 1.4: Time Series Results by S&P Rating
AAA AA A BBB Band BB Band NR
Monetary shock 0.087 0.062 0.021 0.194 0.218 0.372
(0.078) (0.077) (0.090) (0.099) (0.674) (0.170)
Note: An observation corresponds to one day, around which a window is constructed from the previous day’s price and
the price at a given horizon. Each column refers to a separate time series regression of an index on monetary shocks.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
though not proven by any means, later in Section 1.3.4.4. In any case, the results
suggest that heterogeneity exists across space in the U.S. in the response of municipal
bond yields to monetary shocks, and monetary policy may affect different areas of
the U.S. differently.
1.3.3.3 Heterogeneity by Risk and Sector
In this section, I investigate heterogeneity in yield responses for muni indices broken
out by rating and sector. Lower rated and unrated bonds seem to respond more
strongly to monetary shocks than highly rated bonds, providing an explanation for
why the magnitudes in this paper might differ somewhat from Rosa (2014). There
does not seem to be much explanatory power in examining differences in municipal
bonds broken out by sector.
Table 1.4 shows the coefficient estimates of Equation 1.33 run separately for
indices of bonds in various S&P rating categories, at the 2-day horizon. Although
some of the coefficient estimates are not statistically significant, there is a clear
upward trajectory, i.e., the coefficients on riskier bonds are higher. This is consistent
with a world in which expansionary monetary policy–for example–lowers default risk
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for risky bonds.17 Furthermore, the coefficients on AAA and AA bonds are consistent
with the findings of Rosa (2014), who only looks at low-risk indices. My baseline
estimates, therefore, are higher than his in part because the GO index is not made
up entirely of AAA and AA bonds.
Another way in which municipal bonds may differ from each other is the sector
for which the bond was issued, especially for revenue bonds. Many local government
entities may issue debt: schools, utility authorities, etc. While not directly entering
a local government’s general fund, these bonds do contribute to the overall burden of
debt for local governments in a given places. Perhaps surprisingly, there is not much
evidence of heterogeneity in the responses of these indices by sector, whose results
can be found in Appendix A.3.3. Most of the coefficients, with a small number of
exceptions, are close to and slightly lower than the baseline estimate of around 0.22.
Ultimately, this section has documented the presence of heterogeneity in munic-
ipal bond responses to monetary shocks, which are dampened on average relative
to U.S. treasuries and corporate bonds. The type of government does not seem to
make much difference, though it is possible that smaller and riskier governments
have greater responses to monetary shocks. In the next section, I move from time
series to panel data in order to obtain more evidence on the potential sources of this
heterogeneity, including illiquidity, which is suggested by the consistently low values
of these coefficients.
17It is worth noting that the majority of munis fall in the investment-grade category.
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1.3.4 Panel Evidence: MSRB Data
Clearly, monetary shocks have a dampened effect on municipal bonds, with a fair
amount of heterogeneity across different types of bonds. There is some evidence
that risk may be driving some of this, but time series evidence cannot say whether
liquidity and transaction costs may also be a contributing factor. Additionally, there
may be information about specific local governments that influence the responses of
munis to monetary shocks. Knowing that there is heterogeneity in these responses
is sufficient for the quantitative exercise below, but knowing the reasons for this
heterogeneity may be necessary to begin drawing out policy implications from the
model.
To investigate more fully the sources of heterogeneity in monetary passthrough, I
use a transaction-level dataset of municipal bond trades from the Municipal Securities
Rulemaking Board, hereafter MSRB. These data are available through Wharton
Research Data Services, and are available from 2005 onward. I end the sample on
December 31, 2019 to avoid entanglements with the tumultuous nature of the muni
market in early 2020. I restrict the sample to general obligation (GO) bonds issued
by general governments (as defined by Bloomberg). Appendix A.2.1 provides more
details on the dataset construction.
In this section–with the exception of the Schwert procedure–I estimate the equa-
tion
∆yit = β0 + β1mt + Γ0Xit + Γ1Xitmt + εit, (1.34)
where mt is the same monetary shock as before and Xit reflect bond-specific char-
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Table 1.5: Baseline Panel Estimates
Yield Yield Spread Spread
Monetary shock 0.44 0.63 -0.01 0.16
(0.27) (0.28) (0.17) (0.24)
N 22758 22758 22699 22699
Time to Maturity Controls? N Y N Y
Note: An observation corresponds to an FOMC date-bond pair. Each column refers to a separate
regression. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and are clustered at the date level.
acteristics that might influence a bond’s response to monetary shocks. Here, I allow
a longer adjustment period for yields (and spreads) yit, owing to the sparse nature
of municipal bond trades. My baseline time period of adjustment is two weeks18;
furthermore, I assign a bond’s yield as its most recent daily yield, provided the trade
happened within the last week. Standard errors are clustered at the time level, owing
to the grouped nature of the shock mt.
1.3.4.1 Average Results
Before moving on to other dimensions of heterogeneity, it may be helpful to bench-
mark baseline estimates in the panel data. In Table 1.5, I present coefficient estimates
of β1 from Equation 1.34. These estimates represent four regressions of monetary
shocks on muni yields and spreads, and varying the inclusion of controls for time to
maturity.
Of particular note here is the coefficients on the response of muni yields to mon-
etary shocks. Why are these estimates higher than the baseline estimate in the time
series section? The main reason is the selection inherent in this exercise: in order to
18Anderson and Cesa-Bianchi (2020) use one week for corporate bonds, and I double this window
to allow for more trading to occur.
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properly impute a price to bonds in this data, I only assign prices for trades within
the last week. Trading rates of municipal bonds are quite low, so conditional on
trade, we should expect individual-level responses to be higher. If we include those
bonds which trade before the shock but not after, coding them as ∆yit = 0, the esti-
mates (on yields) are quite close to the baseline 0.22 from the time series section. In
any case, these estimates, should be kept in mind as a baseline as we move through
the rest of the section.
1.3.4.2 GYZ Method
In addition to time series evidence on the effect of monetary policy on sovereign bond
yields, Gilchrist, Yue, and Zakrajs̆ek (2019) also perform an experiment to evaluate
the effects of risk and liquidity on these responses. Specifically, in the context of
Equation 1.34, Xit includes an indicator for whether a bond is investment grade or
not (S&P rating BBB- or above), as well as a series of basic characteristics that the
authors argue may influence liquidity: par value logPARi, age log(1+AGEit), time
to maturity log T2Mit, and coupon log(1 + COUPit). Furthermore, the response
variable is the change in the muni spread rather than the yield.
Table 1.6 reports results from this estimation exercise, along with a joint test
for the significance of the liquidity variables together. While none of the individual
interactions are significant, the interactions of the four liquidity variables are signifi-
cant for determining yields, suggesting a role for bond characteristics in the responses
of borrowing costs. Finally, while the coefficient on risk is noisy–in contrast to the
GYZ results for sovereign bonds–the sign is consistent with theory and time series
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Table 1.6: Heterogeneous Responses: GYZ Method
Yield Spread
Monetary Shock 1.48 1.11
(1.01) (1.06)




log(1 + AGEit) -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
log T2Mit -0.00 -0.02
(0.01) (0.01)
log(1 + COUPit) -0.00 0.00
(0.03) (0.03)
Monetary Shock * Investment Grade = 1 -0.14 -0.16
(0.21) (0.15)
Monetary Shock * logPARi -0.02 -0.02
(0.04) (0.04)
Monetary Shock * log(1 + AGEit) -0.01 -0.01
(0.03) (0.02)
Monetary Shock * log T2Mit -0.14 -0.11
(0.11) (0.12)
Monetary Shock * log(1 + COUPit) 0.21 0.05
(0.31) (0.29)
P-value, liquidity interactions 0.051 0.228
N 22758 22699
Note: An observation corresponds to an FOMC date-bond pair. Each column refers to a
separate regression. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and are clustered at the
date level.
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evidence, in which less risky bonds exhibit lower responses to monetary shocks.
1.3.4.3 Schwert Spread Components
While GYK deals with sovereign bonds, Schwert (2017) is a paper at the frontier
of the municipal bond pricing literature. The main exercise in the paper exploits
the microstructure of the MSRB data to examine the portions of tax adjusted muni
spreads that are accounted for by risk and illiquidity concerns. The basic procedure
assumes that yields on municipal bond trades are determined according to
yit = (1− τ)(rt + γit + ψit),
where τ is the marginal tax rate, rt is the risk-free rate, γit is the risk premium, and
ψit reflects illiquidity, perhaps in the form of trading costs or asymmetric information.
To estimate the liquidity component ψit, the method first constructs λit, an aver-
age of several (standardized) illiquidity measurements from the literature. I describe
these illiquidity measures in more detail in Appendix A.2.3; I follow Schwert closely,
dropping a measure that requires more observations in order to extend to a larger
sample of municipal bonds from smaller governments. The following equation for
(tax-adjusted) spreads is then estimated at each time t:
yit
1− τit
− rt = β0 + βtλit + βRt Ratingit + εit. (1.35)
Here, yit is the daily yield of a bond, τit is an imputed tax rate,19 rt is the zero coupon
19In my estimation, this is the same for all bonds, since I want to use this procedure on the full
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U.S. treasury rate of similar maturity, and Ratingit is a factor variables describing
the S&P bond rating, if one exists. Armed with a series of betas on each day, the
series of liquidity spread components is computed according to
ψit = βt(λit − λ1t), (1.36)
where λ1t is the first percentile of the liquidity measure. The risk component, γit,
is simply computed as the portion of the tax-adjusted spread unexplained by the
liquidity component.
Because the individual measures of these components are noisy, Schwert aggre-
gates them into time series variables, using the four-month rolling average of daily
cross-sectional mean spread components. This results in the time series γt and ψt,
which are plotted in Figure 1.8. Note that my estimates of the relative magnitudes
of these components differ substantially from Schwert’s, which put the majority of
the weight on risk; this is because I am using a more extensive sample of municipal
bonds, whereas he uses only the largest state and local governments. This suggests
a difference in spread makeup between smaller and larger state governments, and
merits investigation in future research.
I estimate the effects of monetary shocks on these series, as in the time series
results above, and present results in Table 1.7. Not much of significance stands out
here, although there is some weak evidence of a transitory effect of monetary shocks
on the liquidity component of spreads. Overall, it does not seem, to the extent
monetary policy affects borrowing costs in a heterogeneous way, that the effect is
range of the data and cannot match all bonds to a geographic area.
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Figure 1.8: Muni Spread Components
Table 1.7: Effect of Monetary Shocks on Spread Components
Default spread Default spread Liquidity spread Liquidity spread
Monetary shock -0.11 -0.10 0.10 0.02
(0.27) (0.17) (0.05) (0.08)
N 2952 2944 3360 3352
Horizon 2 days 6 days 2 days 6 days
Note: An observation corresponds to one day. Each column refers to a separate regression. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses.
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working through altering the components of risk and liquidity on spreads.
1.3.4.4 Government Finances Data
The last margin of heterogeneity I investigate involves a series of finance variables
for municipalities. To obtain these data, I use the Census/Survey of Governments
data from the U.S. Census. This survey obtains hundreds of balance sheet variables
for state and local governments in the U.S., taking a representative sample annually
and a full population sample every five years. Following Schwert (2017), I select the
local governments in the U.S. with annual revenues of over $50 million. I then obtain
the 6-digit CUSIP codes for these government issuers from the Bloomberg Terminal,
and connect them to my panel dataset.
I estimate a series of regressions using these financial variables, and results are
given in Tables A.4, A.5, and A.6 in Appendix A.3.4. None of the coefficients are
precisely estimated. However, a clear pattern emerges: larger values seem to depress
the response of bond yields to monetary policy. While not a smoking gun, this pattern
is consistent with the state-level index coefficients on monetary shocks, which seem
to imply that bonds from more populous states respond less to monetary shocks.
This is a conjecture, however, and requires a more powerful identification strategy.
Unfortunately, these finance statistics only vary at the annual level, and such data
is not universally available for all muni issuers in all periods.
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1.3.5 Empirical Takeaways
This empirical section has studied, from a number of angles, the effect of monetary
shocks on municipal bond markets. On average, the yields on an index of general
obligation municipal bonds respond by 22 basis points to a 100 basis point shock
to the risk-free rate. This dampened effect is consistent with the lower volatility
of municipal yields in general relative to treasuries. Furthermore, while the “level”
of the issuer does not seem to matter, the location of the issuer does. In other
words, I document heterogeneity across the U.S. in the response of municipal yields
to monetary shocks. This heterogeneity maps to the model from Section 2.2.
I then investigate potential sources of this heterogeneity. There is some limited
evidence that the heterogeneity may arise from differences in bond ratings or liquidity
considerations, which map to a model of over-the-counter debt pricing. There may be
an association as well between the size of a locality and its borrowing costs’ response
to monetary shocks, but the data on government finances is limited, especially for
smaller governments. In the main quantitative results below, I do not take a stance
on the source of heterogeneous responses, but the various options may carry different
policy implications.
1.4 Quantitative Results
This section shows quantitatively the importance of the municipal public finance
channel of monetary transmission; significantly, the estimated heterogeneity in muni
yield responses to monetary shocks implies heterogeneous effects of monetary policy
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on localities, depending on local financial frictions. Increasing the response of local
government borrowing costs from the lowest state-level estimates to the highest im-
plies an increase of up to a half percent of household utility for an expansionary shock
of 25bp. Furthermore, the nature of municipal bonds and frictions in muni markets
significantly dampen this channel: allowing a municipal government to borrow at the
aggregate risk-free rate more than doubles the output response to a monetary shock.
Finally, although expansionary monetary policy is stimulative in early periods, the
increase in municipal debt finance becomes a drag on local economies far into the
future.
In this section, I focus on the response of single small open economies, abstracting
from a full model of the U.S. I take this approach for ease of exposition. In Appendix
A.4.1, I show that the results on heterogeneity of borrowing costs indeed carry over
to a model in which there are multiple localities at one time. The only difference from
the perspective of the locality is the process of the risk-free rate; when I consider the
“partial equilibrium” with only one locality, I take the vector [yTt r∗t ] as an exogeneous
process, as is common in the international literature. I specify its process below.
1.4.1 Calibration and Solution
Before moving on to the quantitative results, it is necessary to discuss specifics on
the calibration of the model for proper interpretation, which in this case is a U.S.
municipality as a small open economy. I first discuss functional form choices, then
parameters which are taken from the literature or estimated. I also calibrate a set of
parameters to match some average statistics on state and local spending, revenues,
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consumption, and debt, followed by an investigation into the effects of local openness
on the local fiscal multiplier. Finally, I briefly discuss the solution method.
1.4.1.1 Functional Forms
In the body of the paper, I use the model outlined above, opting for an ad hoc
version of financial markets, in the vein of models with external debt elastic interest
rates in the open economy literature. I use a simpler formulation for simplicity and
ease of mapping the empirical response coefficients. Furthermore, while the sources
of heterogeneity in borrowing costs have been investigated in multiple ways, this
formulation allows an abstraction from taking a stand on their relative magnitudes
for the time being. To begin, assume the exogenous tradable endowment yT reflects
shocks in the aggregate economy. Then let the aggregate risk-free r∗t be determined
by the system












, and yT ∗, r∗ are parameters reflecting steady state
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′ reflect the exogenous shocks, with mt being our shock of





H(exp(dHt − d̄H)− 1). (1.38)
The benefit of this formulation is the ability to set any arbitrary steady state debt
level; in the baseline calibration, I make the representative local household a saver,
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i.e., d̄H < 0.20 I set the government’s borrowing costs in a similar fashion, but with
a friction on the adjustment to the treasury rate:
rGt = r
∗ + θG(r∗t − r∗) + φG(exp(dGt − d̄G)− 1). (1.39)
First, note the imperfect response of actual borrowing costs to the risk-free rate,
governed by θG, which will be the key parameter of interest capturing the response
of muni yields to aggregate interest rate shocks. These pricing functions will be used
in the main results of this paper, and similar results for the OTC model can be found
in Appendix A.4.2.






V (h) = Φ log(h̄− h) (1.41)
W (g) = γ log(g). (1.42)
Furthermore, the consumption aggregator is CES:










where ξ determines the substitution elasticity across tradable and non-tradable con-
20This imposition captures two features of the real world. First, it is more reasonable to assume
that a household saves at the risk-free rate than that it borrows at this rate, and I wish to abstract
from the market for household debt in this project. Second, it provides a “demand side” for the
external financial market; while not strictly necessary here, it may be helpful for the reader to be
able to think of having borrowers and savers in the model.
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Table 1.8: Fixed Parameters
Parameter Description Strategy Value
σ CRRA utility parameter Literature 2
α Labor share of production Data/Literature 0.6
µ Elasticity of substitution in production Literature (Gali and Monacelli, markup target 20 percent) 6
β Discount rate Literature, imply s.s. interest rate of 0.03 0.9694
θ Calvo parameter Data/Literature (target average 10 mos between price changes) 0.7
h̄, h Labor endowment and steady state Literature, labor supply = 1/3 3, 1
Φ Leisure utility Set to solve mr = mc in steady state
γ Government utility Normalize to log utility 1
ξ Elasticity of substitution Literature, set to 1/σ 1/2
sumption, and A represents the “openness” of the economy, which will be a key factor
in the size of the local fiscal multiplier–more on this below.
1.4.1.2 Parameters
The parameters in the model are set using a combination of data and literature. Table
1.8 gives the basic parameters from the model which are standard in the literature.
Nothing of extreme note is here, other than to note the decreasing returns to scale
in intermediate production, which are consistent with the labor share of production
in the U.S.
The exogeneous process for yTt and r∗t is defined by the coefficient matrix B,
which amounts to a VAR process with a lag of one period. For the baseline results,
I simply estimate the matrix B as a bivariate VAR on the series [log(Yt) log(rt)]′,
where Yt is real GDP and rt is a treasury rate, in this case, the U.S. 10-year. This






Table 1.9: Calibration Targets
Target Value
State and local government consumption and investment / GDP 0.11
State and local government own revenues / GDP 0.09
State and local government debt / GDP 0.15
Household savings / GDP 0.05
Imports / total shipments, from CFS (> 50 miles) 0.66
Municipal bond yield 2.75
Local government spending multiplier (Chodorow-Reich) 1.8
The baseline elasticity of municipal borrowing costs to the exogenous component
of the aggregate interest rate is taken directly from the main time series result for all
general obligation bonds in the empirical section, θG = 0.22. In the section studying
the effects of heterogeneity in this elasticity, I use the distribution of the state-
level estimates as plausible lower bounds on the heterogeneity, since they themselves
represent averages to some extent. The low and high end of these estimates are used
to define “low” and “high” elasticities, respectively.
The remaining six parameters,21 yT ∗, A, τG, d̄H , d̄G, φG and κ are calibrated to
a set of moments that represent averages for state and local governments in the U.S.
economy, in addition to a selected point estimate from the literature on local spending
multipliers. These targets and their values–approximated for simplicity–are given in
Table 1.9. At this point, a discussion is necessary on the exact interpretation of this
small open economy. Is it a state government or a local government, or something
else? The issue, of course, is that households in the U.S. are under the jurisdiction of
21I also set φH = 1. This matches fairly well the persistence of the household debt response
to a monetary shock in the Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996) style procedure mentioned
previously, as well as the magnitude of the economy’s output response.
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multiple tiers of governments, each of which exerts its own sphere of responsibility.
Why are state and local expenditures being used for calibration? A robust literature
exists describing the determination of public policy in federalist systems, but it is not
the goal of this paper to enter in to that exciting discussion. Suffice it to say, for now,
that the “government” imagined in this model is some sufficiently small combination
of government roles that can be thought to be representative of its constituents’
value functions. In the baseline calibration, I set a tradable consumption to total
consumption ratio of 0.66, matching the proportion of shipments in the Commodity
Flow Survey that travel further than 50 miles. This yields a value for A of 0.2683.
The degree of openness, given in this paper by the parameter A, can also be
thought of as defining the “size” of the locality in question. As the locality’s area
increases, a higher proportion of household consumption is produced within the
locality; for example, a good produced in San Francisco but consumed in Oakland
is considered an import if the locality is defined by the Oakland city limits, but
as a domestic good if we define the locality as the state of California or the more
nebulous “Bay Area.” To see how the choice of openness affects the multiplier, Figure
1.9 plots the on-impact government multiplier as a function of A, holding the rest of
the calibration constant.22
In this figure, the vertical line represents the baseline calibration, which is chosen
to match the preferred local government spending multiplier from the literature sur-
vey in Chodorow-Reich (2019), which puts forward 1.8 as a good value. Clearly, the
impact multiplier depends crucially on the definition of a locality, or its openness.
22φ is dependent on the choice of A, for market clearing.
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Figure 1.9: Local Government Multiplier and Openness
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Alternative definitions of a locality, such as a state, in which tradable consumption
is less important, will result in larger multipliers. As the economy becomes increas-
ingly closed, the multiplier increases, as we approach the closed economy case. The
multiplier,in addition to openness, also depends crucially on the proportion of non-
Ricardian agents in the household, κ; these two determinants stand in agreement
with the papers of Chodorow-Reich (2019) and Farhi and Werning (2017a), which
analyze fiscal multipliers in monetary unions. A resulting implication is that if open-
ness A decreases, fewer non-Ricardian agents will be required to match the preferred
multiplier. Finally, this impact multiplier does not take into account the dynamic
effects of local fiscal policy; the next section presents these effects in fuller detail.
1.4.1.3 Solution Method
For the results in this paper, I solve for the impulse response functions of the model
by simulating the model’s response to a one-time, unexpected shock to the exogenous
portion of the interest rate. I assume that the economy is in steady state before the
shock, and returns to steady state after 300 periods. While more computationally
intensive than a perturbation strategy, this method allows me to later extend the
model by including explicit constraints on debt issuance by the local government.
For the calibration of the hand-to-mouth share κ to match the local government
spending multiplier of 1.8, I iterate over solutions of a stripped-down version of the
model with exogenous government spending.23 Because this calibration procedure
23In Appendix A.4.5 I further explore the effects of fiscal shocks in this model. I find that, for a
shock to federal government spending, the effects on the local economy depend crucially on whether
the federal government is purchasing local output or output from elsewhere. Federal spending on
public goods crowds out local spending on public goods, and is only stimulative when that spending
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requires potentially many evaluations of the response of the economy to an exoge-
nous government spending shock, I compute these responses with a second-order
perturbation in the Dynare package for Matlab. The quantitative responses from
perturbation methods are quantitatively similar to those obtained from the more
computationally intensive “MIT shock” method.
1.4.2 Results of an Interest Rate Shock
The response of this calibrated economy to a 25bp expansionary monetary shock
is shown in Figures 1.10 and 1.11. The figure shows the percent deviations from
the steady state in response to the monetary shock. Notice the logic of the channel
shown in the second figure: borrowing costs decrease, increasing government debt and
spending, resulting in output stimulus. In the baseline calibration, a 25bp decrease
in the risk-free rate results in over a 3 tenths percent increase in output on impact.
Note, however, there is a long-run effects of the government debt buildup. Be-
cause the only margins of fiscal adjustment for the government are debt and spending–
revenues are exogeneous–the government will have to reverse its debt accumulation
through costly decreases in government spending later on. One immediate conse-
quence of this result is the importance of thinking about the long-term consequences
of stimulating debt-financed spending. Expansionary monetary policy allows local
governments to shift spending from far in the future to the present, stimulating out-
put in the short run but depressing it in the long run, even after interest rates have
returned to steady state.
occurs locally.
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Figure 1.10: IRFs, 25bp Expansionary Shock
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Figure 1.11: IRFs, 25bp Expansionary Shock
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Figure 1.12: IRFs Compared to Standard Case
In the empirical section, I noted that the responses of municipal yields to mone-
tary shocks were muted relative to what one might expect. As a result, the stimula-
tive or depressive effects of monetary policy through local public finance are lower in
a model which takes these features of muni markets into account, relative to a model
which assumes local governments can borrow at the risk-free rate. To see the mag-
nitude of the difference between the calibrated model and a model with borrowing
costs at the risk-free rate, see Figure 1.12.
In the model that does not take the muted response of local borrowing costs
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to monetary shocks into account, the stimulative effects of monetary policy are
more than double the model with realistic borrowing costs. When local govern-
ment borrowing costs are tied more closely to the risk-free rate, local government
debt increases by almost five percent relative to the steady state, and the reaction
of spending, output, and labor are much higher than before. This stark difference
suggests that models which assume municipal governments have access to borrow-
ing at the aggregate risk-free rate will significantly overstate the stimulative effects
of monetary policy on local economies; such models will also understate the possi-
bility for heterogeneity of stimulus across localities.24 I take up the extent of the
heterogeneity in the next section.
In Figure A.5, I plot an estimated response of output to a monetary shock ac-
cording to the Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996) methodology mentioned
earlier. The peak response of output to a one standard deviation monetary shock
matches very well the magnitude of the peak response in the calibrated model, sug-
gesting that the magnitudes of response in this model are reflective of the real world.
Across the board, this type of “canonical” open economy DSGE model fails to gen-
erate the hump-shaped responses of economic variables to monetary shocks observed
in VARs. One could imagine a number of features to supplement the model which
might better match these hump shapes, but these features are not the focus of this
paper.
24In Appendix A.4.3, I show that the inclusion of an explicit limit on debt issuances dampens
the effect even further, resulting in anther potential source of heterogeneity, depending on the
distribution of such limits in practice.
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1.4.3 Heterogeneity Over Monetary Responses
A model that assumes a one-for-one relationship between municipal borrowing costs
and national interest rates eliminates the possibility that borrowing costs might
respond differently to monetary shocks in different localities. As a result, such a
model will eliminate an important source of heterogeneity in the passthrough of
monetary shocks across regions and localities in the U.S. In Figure 1.13, I plot the
same impulse response functions as in the previous section for the baseline economy
θG = 0.22, and two additional economies: θG = 0.1 and θG = 0.34. These two
additional economies are symmetric deviations from the baseline estimate of muni
yield responses to monetary shocks, roughly corresponding to the low-end and and
high-end of the state-level responses described in Section 1.3.3.2.
Realistic differences in the response of local government borrowing costs to mone-
tary shocks have quantitatively important implications for heterogeneity in monetary
transmission. For example, Francis, Owyang, and Sekhposyan (2012) estimate the
responses of several U.S. cities to monetary shocks, grouping them according to re-
gion, and finding that the difference between the smallest regional peak employment
response and the largest is about tenfold. In the model here, the difference is just
under twofold. Furthermore, the dispersion of peak employment responses to mone-
tary shocks in the full model of Appendix A.4.1 is about 9% of estimated dispersion
in the responses obtained from a series of simple VARs25. These two comparisons
25The experiment here is the following. For each U.S. state, I estimate a VAR of state employ-
ment, national GDP, and the federal funds rate with a lag of four quarters, calculating the peak
employment response to a one standard deviation shock to the federal funds rate for each state. I
define dispersion of the responses as the standard deviation of percent deviations from the mean
peak response. Dispersion in the model is 0.0746, versus 0.8421 in the data
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Figure 1.13: IRFs by Response Elasticity
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combined suggest that differences in borrowing cost responses to monetary shocks
account for 10-20% of the variation in monetary transmission across U.S. states.
The municipal bond market is the only difference26 between the economies in
Figure 1.13, yet monetary transmission is markedly different between the economies.
A government whose borrowing costs fall more after an expansionary shock borrows
more, spends more, and sees greater output and labor increases on impact; the
impact effects on output and labor are almost 50 percent greater in the high-response
economy than the low-response economy. In the long run, of course, these effects
will be flipped: the high-response governments have more debt to pay down, and
thus a bigger future recession. The magnitude of response of municipal bond prices
to monetary shocks is a key parameter, then, in determining both the size and path
of local economic outcomes.
Why is this effect important? First, such differences in passthrough may affect
the desirability of a given central bank policy in a monetary union. The results here
suggest that, for example, the Federal Reserve should take into account heteroge-
neous effects on municipal governments across the U.S. when it is considering a given
policy. Additionally, to the extent that a given policy can strengthen the relationship
between treasuries and munis, that policy can increase the short-term output effects
of monetary policy on the economy as a whole. Finally, since we have a calibrated
model of a local government in a monetary union, in which the muni market plays
an important role, we can examine the implications of this model for the two most
26Appendix A.4.4 gives one example of another difference between localities which might affect
transmission: the steady state level of government spending. Unsurprisingly, the municipal spending
channel of monetary policy is stronger when steady state government spending is higher.
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recent U.S. crises, providing insights into local government behavior during each of
them. It is to these crises that the next section now turns.
1.5 Application: Two Crises
In the previous sections, I have specified and calibrated an open-economy model of
a local government. The open-economy model highlights the key role of financial
markets in municipal government decisions over the business cycle. Such a model,
then, is a good candidate for studying the effects of some recent economic crises on
state and local governments.27 First, I use the model to show that the effect of a
recession combined with a financial crisis, as in 2008, dampens the ability of local
governments to respond; this corresponds with the true observed behavior of state
and local spending following the Great Recession. Finally, I am able to generate
some predictions going forward from the current COVID-19 crisis.
1.5.1 State and Local Government Spending During the Fi-
nancial Crisis
The Great Recession and its subsequent recovery were unique in myriad ways, and
the behavior of state and local governments is no exception. For the three recessions
27It should be noted that the results in this section are meant to be more illustrative that
quantitative. The model of the paper is built for more conventional study of monetary policy
transmission. Specifically, abstracting from the default decision in the model is generally acceptable
for steady state, given the extremely low rates of municipal default. Crises of unprecedented size,
as these are, might render this abstraction unrealistic. Nevertheless, the experiments here help
to illustrate some of the issues at hand; it may be helpful to think of the government as a state
government, since these governments in general do not default on their debt.
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Figure 1.14: State and Local Government Spending After Recessions
leading up to 2008, state and local government expenditures increased during the
immediate recovery. In 2009, however, state and local governments decreased their
spending, representing a break from previous recoveries. Figure 1.14 shows these
recoveries.
One key difference in 2008, aside from the severity of the recession, was the
associated crisis in financial markets. The model outlined in this paper allows us to
examine the interaction between financial markets and state and local fiscal policy
during recessions. Table 1.1 shows that, while U.S. treasury yields decreased quite
dramatically during 2008-2014, municipal bond yields did not move much at all,
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especially at the high end of yields. This suggests either a decrease in liquidity in
muni markets, or an increased perception of risk due to financial conditions.
Figure 1.15 plots the response of government spending in the open-economy model
to two types of models. The first is a simple decrease in the tradable endowment
yT ; in other words, an external crisis. The second combines an external crisis with
a financial crisis; following the muni market during and after the Great Recession,
I define this as a negative shock to θG, i.e., a dampening of the ability of municipal
bond yields to decrease during the recession, and an increase in φG, meaning that
inceasing debt becomes costlier.
Clearly, the financial crisis dampens the fiscal response of state and local govern-
ments to an external crisis. While a decrease is not induced for long, the financial
crisis does cut out much of the government’s fiscal response. A number of factors go
in to the fiscal decisions of these governments in response to crises, including politi-
cal considerations and budget rules, the non-response of borrowing costs during the
Great Recession is likely an important factor in the lack of fiscal response by state
and local governments.
1.5.2 Municipal Budgets and COVID-19
In March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic caused widespread economic shutdowns in
the U.S. Additionally, municipal bond markets went haywire, precipitating unprece-
dented action by the Federal Reserve to stabilize prices, including a mechanism by
which the Fed would purchase munis, in addition to other assets. Despite the sta-
bilization, it is widely thought that state and local governments will now be faced
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Figure 1.15: Government Spending After Two Recessions
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Figure 1.16: IRFs to a Pandemic Shock by Fed Response Time
with many quarters of low revenues and difficult fiscal pressure. How does this crisis
show up in the context of the model of this paper, and what might it tell us about
the future path of state and local government spending?
While this model in many ways is not designed to capture the current pandemic
crisis, I interpret the events thus far in three ways. First, as an external crisis like
in Section 1.5.1, with a decrease in yT , reflecting the contraction in the entire U.S.
Second, I shock h̄, which in this model reflects an exogenous shock to unemployment,
corresponding to the pandemic-induced lockdowns. I include a limit on debt increases
to 2.5%, refelcting real debt issuance constraints faced by governments in times of
crisis. Finally, I insert a transitory positive shock to borrowing costs, reflecting the
chaos in the muni market which resulted in yields increasing by over 100bp at one
point, relative to the baseline levels to which the Fed helped return them.
Figure 1.16 shows four hypothetical pandemic crises, each imposing a different
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persistence of the shock to borrowing costs for the local government. These can be
thought of as hypothetical scenarios reflecting the speed of response by the Fed; in
other words, what might have happened had the Fed delayed in its response to shore
up liquidity in the municipal bond markets. In each case, the temporary financial
market shock dampens government spending to a significant degree. Clearly, time
of response has a moderate effect on the response of state and local governments,
preventing governments from spending as much as they’d like to support households.
These effects are transitory, however, as government spending and output quickly
catch up to their preferred levels when interest rates return to “normal” levels. This
simple experiment supports the rationale for the Fed’s quick actions to prop up state
and local government debt and spending in the early phases of the crisis.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper has provided a framework for understanding the passthrough of monetary
policy to localities in the U.S. through state and local government spending. In an
open economy model of a small U.S. region, the financial market underlying municipal
borrowing costs affect the local government’s ability to borrow and spend on fiscal
policy in response to a change in the national risk-free rate. Municipal bond yields in
the data exhibit dampened but heterogeneous responses to monetary shocks. These
responses may be affected by liquidity in the over-the-counter municipal market,
default risk perceptions, or some combination of the two.
Realistic heterogeneity in the response of municipal borrowing costs to monetary
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shocks implies differences of over 20 percent in output and employment responses to
monetary shocks in the calibrated small open economy model. The financial market
is important: failing to take into account the dampened response of municipal yields
to monetary shocks would overstate the local stimulative effects of monetary policy
by more than double. The importance of borrowing costs in determining local fiscal
policy provides a playground which may give some insight into local fiscal policies in
response to recent economic crises.
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CHAPTER II
Optimal Minimum Wage Setting
in a Federal System1
2.1 Introduction
After Kansas City, and St. Louis, Missouri set their own minimum wages above the
state level in 2017, the Missouri state legislature prohibited any city from setting
its own policy. While there is likely a political motive for a red state to overturn a
progressive policy in its blue cities, there are also potential economic benefits from
centralized redistribution. The central government can more efficiently implement
such policies when workers are mobile by internalizing spillovers, and a state may
not want one of its cities to set a higher minimum wage because of the externality
imposed on the rest of the state. This may justify minimum wage preemption laws
in Missouri and 24 other states. However, since the state is constrained to setting a
1Joint work with Andrew Simon.
75
uniform policy, as in Oates’ (1972) decentralization theorem, then local policy setting
may be preferred.
We examine optimal minimum wage setting in a federation with mobile workers to
understand the relative benefits of centralized, decentralized, and joint policy setting
with interregional spillovers. Which level of government should set minimum wage
policies? Although our substantive focus is on the minimum wage, our framework
has implications for a broad set of policies where local governments supplement
federal decisions, like the EITC, income taxes, and Medicaid. Understanding the
appropriate level of government decision making is increasingly important as the
U.S. federal government has continued to shift more responsibility for these policies
to states (Baicker, Clemens, and Singhal, 2012).
Our work most directly builds on Lee and Saez (2012), who examine the role of
the minimum wage in the competitive labor market of a single jurisdiction, where
workers are implicitly immobile. They find that a binding policy is desirable, even
when non-linear taxes are available, if the newly unemployed have zero surplus from
working and the government values redistribution to low-wage workers. In their
model, workers can migrate between low and high wage jobs, though they face dif-
ferent costs from working in each. When a worker’s sector is fixed so that labor
supply can only respond on the extensive margin, the minimum wage is second-best
Pareto inefficient.2 With only one jurisdiction, their framework is unable to consider
the relative merits of having different levels of government set policy as well as the ex-
2Gerritsen and Jacobs (2020) allow for educational investment in the Lee and Saez framework
and find that a minimum wage is only optimal in the presence of non-linear taxes if the gains from
more education outweigh higher unemployment.
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ternalities that result from horizontal and vertical government competition. Vertical
competition in a federation is particularly important for the minimum wage because
it is a price floor policy; only the higher one matters. If the central government that
is restricted to a uniform policy sets a binding minimum wage in the lower wage
region, then it lowers the costs associated with horizontal competition.
We adapt the Lee and Saez (2012) model to a two-jurisdiction framework with
mobile agents, regional governments, and a federal government to study the trade-off
presented in the decentralization theorem. Workers are not mobile across sectors,
but the high-skilled are mobile across jurisdictions.3 Our goal is to understand
the conditions under which setting a binding minimum wage is optimal for each
type of government and analyze the welfare implications of different policy setting
authorities. Local governments compete for high-skilled workers, which hinders their
ability to redistribute through the minimum wage, but the central government is
restricted to a uniform policy. Our stylized framework only includes two inputs for
tractability, but the high-skilled can be thought of more broadly as mobile factors
of production that may respond to increases in the minimum wage, like capital and
firm location. In addition to the “tiered” U.S. model of a federal uniform price
floor in which states may “top off,” or raise the floor, we consider federal uniform,
decentralized, and federal non-uniform policy setting.
We first provide theoretical results to understand the extensive margin decision of
implementing a binding minimum wage when governments maximize social welfare.
3Blundell and MaCurdy (1999), and Lee and Saez (2012) both note that the extensive margin
working decision where workers are not mobile across sectors is the most important and relevant in
practice.
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The local governments will set a binding policy if the welfare loss from unemployment
is zero on the margin, and the government values redistribution to low-skilled workers
more than emigration. Our conditions are the same as in Lee and Saez, except
governments are concerned with policy induced migration. The federal government
only cares about migration insofar as it affects total output and moving costs, leading
it to have stronger preferences for a minimum wage than local jurisdictions.4 Since
the theoretical model only gives predictions on the extensive margin, we proceed
to calibrate a two region model to the aggregate U.S. economy to illustrate how
mobility and regional heterogeneity in productivity impact the relative benefits of
centralization, decentralization, a hybrid system as in the U.S., and centralized non-
uniform policy in general equilibrium.
The key insight from the model is that different levels of government are strate-
gic complements in policymaking and the extent of this complementarity depends
on input mobility and regional heterogeneity in productivity. Higher levels of mobil-
ity increase the costs associated with horizontal competition, while higher levels of
regional heterogeneity decrease the effectiveness of uniform central policy. When ju-
risdictions are identical and inputs are mobile, centralized authority leads to greater
social welfare while additionally allowing local governments to enact policy has no
effect. However, when jurisdictions differ but inputs are immobile and therefore there
are no interregional spillovers, decentralized authority is preferred. Simultaneously
allowing the central government to also set a minimum wage in this case does not
4We also discuss joint policy setting by the local and federal government as well as federal non-
uniform policies and several alternative models, such as rent-seeking governments, economy-wide
aggregate production functions, and additional mobile factors of production, to understand how
the model assumptions impact the sufficient conditions for a minimum wage.
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change the equilibrium. For the more realistic cases with heterogeneous regions and
imperfectly mobile inputs, a hybrid system improves welfare since central uniform
policy reduces horizontal competition and decentralized policy allows for a different
minimum wage in each jurisdiction.
Regional heterogeneity in redistributive preferences may also drive differences in
the minimum wage, as reflected in the Missouri example. Urban areas with high
minimum wages tend to be both more productive and more progressive. We find
that progressivity has a nonlinear effect on optimal policy since the minimum wage
redistributes to the low-skilled from the high-skilled and the newly unemployed. A
government with a very progressive social welfare function would not implement a
binding minimum wage because of the negative effects of additional unemployment,
while a government at the other extreme would not implement a binding policy
because it does not value redistribution. Local heterogeneity in preferences can also
lead to higher minimum wages. If one local government enacts a minimum wage
because of its redistributive preferences, this can lead the other local government
to set a binding policy, since a higher minimum wage in one region decreases the
migration externality in the other.
To understand the welfare implications of tiered and centralized policy setting,
we calibrate an economic geography model of the continental United States to match
regional heterogeneity in productivity, high-skilled location decisions, employment,
and the federal government’s optimal policy. Consistent with our earlier findings, this
model predicts that tiered policy setting yields a small welfare gain over centralization
alone, as it allows the federal government to more effectively redistribute from high-
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skilled to low-skilled workers. Even though states are heterogeneous in productivity,
and high-skilled workers are fairly mobile, we also find that tiered minimum wage
setting closely approximates the social planner’s optimal policies. Similar models
have been used to study place based policies in general (Kline and Moretti, 2014),
corporate tax cuts (Suárez Serrato and Zidar, 2016), and income taxes (Colas and
Hutchinson, 2020).
While we focus on the trade-offs of different minimum wage setting authorities,
the previous normative literature focused on different tax systems. Stiglitz (1982),
Allen (1987), and Guesnerie and Roberts (1987) find that the minimum wage is not
optimal when non-linear taxes are available, however, Guesnerie and Roberts find
they may be desirable under linear taxes. The literature has also considered more so-
phisticated minimum wage policies in a single jurisdiction where government compe-
tition is implicitly absent, like a graduated minimum wage tied to firm size (Danziger
and Danziger, 2018), in-kind redistribution (Economides and Moutos, 2017), moni-
toring job search (Boadway and Cuff, 2001), and bargaining power (Hungerb uhler
and Lehmann, 2009).5 Previous work on optimal tax that incorporates government
competition in a federation (e.g. Wilson, 1982; Gordon, 1983; Hamilton and Pestieau,
2005; Gordon and Cullen, 2012; Dvorkin, 2017) has not simultaneously allowed gov-
ernments implement minimum wages. We connect these two previous literatures
by understanding optimal minimum wage policies as a tool for redistribution in a
federation.6
5We examine the implications in a competitive labor market, but other work has focused on
the optimality when there are search frictions, as in search-and-matching model. See Flinn (2006),
Dube, Lester, and Reich (2016), and Lavecchia (2019), for example.
6There is also a large empirical literature on the effects of the minimum wage. See Neumark
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By putting the optimal minimum wage analysis into a federation, our work relates
to the literature on tax competition. In our model, when a jurisdiction increases its
minimum wage, high-skilled workers migrate to the other region, creating a horizon-
tal externality that is increasing in mobility. Similar to models like Wilson (1986),
and Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) on tax competition, agent mobility will lead to
low local minimum wages. By adding a federal government to the Wilson-Zodrow-
Mieszkowski set-up, Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002, Mar. 2004) find vertical externali-
ties leave state taxes too high, which is in contrast with our result that federal policy
decreases the cost of local minimum wage setting. Our results are therefore more
similar to Janeba and Wilson (2011) who examine local public good provision with
both horizontal and vertical externalities. In their model, local provision is too low
due to competition, but central provision is inefficient because it is determined by
a winning coalition in the legislature. In other political economy models, like Lock-
wood (2002) and Besley and Coate (2003), central provision is inefficient for similar
reasons, whereas it is inefficient in our framework because the federal government
is restricted to a uniform policy. Our assumption is based on the U.S. system, but
this restriction does not need to hold. In May 2019, European Commission Vice-
President Frans Timmermans called for each member of the European Union to set
a minimum wage of 60% of its median salary.
Although not centered on the minimum wage, there is a complementary litera-
ture on the interaction of mobility and redistribution, beginning with Stigler (1957)
and Oates (1972). Our focus in this work is on the implications of different levels
(2018) for a recent review.
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of government undertaking redistribution as in Oates (1977), Ladd and Doolittle
(1982), Brown and Oates (1987), and Dixit and Londregan (1998). Our approach to
understanding this mechanism is similar to Epple and Romer (1991), who also use a
computational model to capture general equilibrium effects. The importance of mo-
bility for policy making in a federation has also been studied in the context of public
goods (Epple and Platt, 1998; Caplan, Cornes, and Silva, 2000; Calabrese, Epple, and
Romano, 2012; Simon, 2020),7 income redistribution (Wildasin, 1997; Armenter and
Ortega, 2011; Gordon and Cullen, 2012), and higher education (Wildasin, 2000).8
2.2 Model
We consider a simple two-region, two-factor model to emphasize the role of regional
heterogeneity and factor mobility in determining the relative effectiveness of cen-
tralized and decentralized minimum wage setting. The economy, I, consists of two
regions, i ∈ {1, 2}, low-skilled and high-skilled workers, local firms, and local and
federal governments. We consider each in turn.
Each region i has a unit mass of immobile low-skilled labor. Low skilled labor
may either be employed, l, or unemployed, u, so that ui + li = 1. If employed,
they pay a cost θ of working, which is distributed according to a known distribution
µ(θ). There are h̄ high-skilled workers who are (im)perfectly mobile across regions,
so that h1 + h2 = h̄. High-skilled workers face moving costs of ξ ∼ ζ(ξ), but do not
7There is also a relatively large literature on the value of centralized environmental policies with
spillovers. See Banzhaf and Chupp (2012) for a recent example.
8There is also a growing empirical literature on income taxation and mobility. See Kleven et al.
(2019) for a review.
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face a working cost.9 We interpret this as a normalization on working costs so that
the low-skilled costs are relative to those of the high-skilled. It also ensures that all
high-skilled workers are in the labor force for any reasonable minimum wage policy.
Workers can only be employed in their region of residence. Consumption, cj, for each
worker j is given by her wage minus her cost of working and moving costs paid, if
applicable.
Our mobility assumptions are based on the high correlation between education
level and mobility, and the fact that low-skilled workers sluggishly respond to em-
ployment shocks.10 To better understand the implications of these restrictions on
workers, we consider how low-skilled mobility affects our theoretical results in the
next section. Then, in section 2.4, our calibration exercise varies ζ(ξ) to describe the
relationship between the high-skilled migration elasticity and optimal minimum wage
setting authority. Although the model and calibration are based solely on low and
high-skilled workers for tractability, the high-skilled represent input factor mobility
more broadly. For example, firms may respond to a minimum wage in their capital
investment or location decisions and local governments compete for these resources.
Our choice of using the high-skilled as the mobile factor allows us to naturally incor-
porate the mobile input into a social welfare calculation. We discuss how additional
mobile inputs affect our results later in this section.
Each region has a single perfectly competitive firm with production function
9In our simplified framework, we abstract away from congestion costs, which are likely important
for high-skilled migration (Moretti, 2013).
10(Amior, 2019) documents this relationship using the CPS. Our assumptions are similar to those
in (Wildasin, 2000) who examines the public provision of human capital in a federation, but we
allow for variable high-skilled mobility to understand the comparative statics. We discuss this
assumption more explicitly later in this section.
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γif(l, h). Without loss of generality, we assume γ1 = 1 and γ2 = γ ≤ 1. Workers
are paid their marginal product, and if the high-skilled are perfectly mobile, they
migrate so that wh1 = wh2 . Relative low-skilled competitive wages across regions
depends on γ and the relative stock of high-skilled workers. We assume that the
optimal minimum wage is never binding for high-skilled workers, so that they are
also always employed. Let Θie be the set of θ’s of the low-skilled employed workers
in i and Θiu the unemployed. For a given wage, workers with relatively large values
of θ are unemployed because they choose to exit the labor force. If there is a binding
minimum wage, others become unemployed due to the change in low-skilled labor
demand by the firm. Similarly, define Θih as the set of high-skilled workers in i.
There is one central government, and each region has its own local government.
Both the local and central governments have perfect information about workers’
working and moving costs and regional productivity, and we explore the consequences
of this assumption in Section 2.4.3. Governments care about the consumption of
their constituents, according to the concave function G(c), where G′ > 0, G′′ < 0,
and G′(0) < ∞. Total utility in r is given by
∫
j∈rG(cj)dj, r = {1, 2, I}, i.e. each
region maximizes the total utility of its own residents, while the central government
maximizes the utility of both regions. We assume that G(ch) > 0 for any feasible
policy so that high-skilled workers are valued and local governments compete for
them. Federal and local governments are either endowed or not with the ability
to set a minimum wage. There are four potential authority structures: (1) only
regional governments; (2) only central government uniform; (3) both central uniform
and regional governments; and (4) central non-uniform. Governments do not need
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to raise revenue.
Equilibrium is determined in two stages. In the first stage, no government has
minimum wage setting authority; this is the competitive equilibrium. This gives
each worker a residence. In the second stage, some governments are endowed with
minimum wage setting power and optimally set their policy, given the policies of
other governments, if applicable, and the responses by firms and workers.
Definition 1. The economy is in equilibrium after the second stage for a given au-
thority structure if:
1. Each government with minimum wage setting authority optimally sets its min-
imum wage to maximize the welfare of its residents, given the policies of the
other governments with authority.
2. Firms maximize profits, taking the residencies of workers and government poli-
cies as given.
3. Each worker optimally chooses whether to enter the labor force to maximize
utility.
4. No high skilled workers want to move.
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2.2.1 Decentralized Minimum Wage
We consider the conditions under which it is optimal for local governments to set a
binding minimum wage. Each jurisdiction i’s social welfare function is defined as







where cj = wj − θj for low-skilled employed individual of type θj, ch = wh for high-
skilled individuals, and cu is the consumption of the unemployed. Without taxes and
transfers, cu = 0. Since moving costs are only paid if residents leave, they do not
directly enter the regional government’s social welfare function. As in Lee and Saez
(2012), let gu = G′(c0)/λ; gl =
∫
Θe
µ(θ)G′(cl)dθ/λ and gh = G′(ch)/λ, where λ is the
Lagrange multiplier on the Social Planner’s budget constraint.11
For a given level of the minimum wage in the other jurisdiction, w̄−i, i implements







11The Social Planner’s budget constraint is (1 − li)cu + licl + hich ≤ liwl + hiwh. Since the
governments in our model do not redistribute and only set a minimum wage, they do not have a
budget constraint. Also note that the construction of the g terms are analogous for the regional

























The first line represents the change in welfare induced by newly unemployed low-
skilled workers. ∆w̄iΘiu denotes the set of workers who become unemployed due
to the minimum wage w̄i, which depends on how workers are separated from the
firm after the policy change. Following Lee and Saez (2012), we assume efficient
rationing, i.e. workers with the lowest surplus from working involuntarily lose their
jobs first. Under the assumption, ∆w̄iΘiu = [γifl(l, h), θ(w̄)], where θ(w̄) is the largest
θ worker who becomes unemployed. θ(w̄) depends on the new policy level, the relative
production functions in each jurisdiction, −i’s minimum wage, and the amount of
migration. For a very small binding policy, θ(w̄) = γifl(l, h). Therefore, the marginal
low-skilled worker who loses her job has cj = 0 before and after the policy change.
The second line represents the change in welfare from the still-employed in region i
and the third line is the change in welfare due to emigration.




> 0 by construction and ∂li
∂w̄i
< 0 since it is less profitable
to employ low-skilled workers at a higher wage. Increasing the minimum wage also




< 0 from the zero-profit condition.12
As the marginal product of labor for high-skilled workers falls, some high-skilled
12With perfectly competitive markets and constant returns to scale, the zero-profit condition
implies that ldwl + hdwh = 0, giving the relationship between the minimum wage and high skilled
wages. See Lee and Saez (2012) Appendix A.1. for more information.
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workers leave, giving ∂hi
∂w̄i
< 0 as well. For this reason, the third line of the first order
condition only involves emigration and not immigration. Since the local government
only cares about its residents, i.e. natives less those who move out, it does not
internalize individual migration costs.
Proposition II.1. If (1) there is efficient rationing; (2) the demand elasticity is
finite; (3) the supply elasticity of low-skilled workers is positive; (4) the government
values additional wages to low-skilled workers more than the loss of wages to high-
skilled (redistribution) and outmigration, then it is total welfare improving for a
jurisdiction to impose a (small) binding minimum wage.
Proof. Our assumptions imply that the first two terms sum to 0 and the magnitude of
the third term is larger than the sum of the magnitude of the fourth and fifth terms.
More explicitly, using the above expressions and the zero profit condition, we can
rewrite the last three terms as liλ[gl−gh]+ ∂hi∂w̄iG(ch). This is identical to proposition
1 in Lee and Saez (2012) except jurisdictions are now also affected by potential
outmigration, weakening the incentive to enact a binding minimum wage.
Under these assumptions, this extensive margin decision to adopt a minimum
wage depends on γ, w̄−i, the elasticity of substitution between low and high-skilled
workers, and the mobility of the high-skilled. In section 2.3.2, we conduct a cali-
bration exercise to better understand how these parameters impact equilibrium, on
both the extensive and intensive margins.
We now consider how changes to the assumptions of Proposition II.1 affect the
desirability of a binding minimum wage. Without efficient rationing, the first two
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terms do not sum to zero for a small increase in the minimum wage because workers
with a large surplus from working lose their jobs. If workers were fired randomly
after the increase in the minimum wage, then social welfare would be lower in ex-
pectation as workers with positive value of employment are separated rather than
the indifferent marginal employee. However, even if the lowest cost workers were
separated first, a government may still implement a binding minimum wage if the
value of redistribution is sufficiently large.13 This reasoning leads to a corollary to
Proposition II.1.
Corollary II.2. Efficient rationing leads local governments to weakly prefer the
highest minimum wages, all else equal, relative to any other separation assumption.
Proof. Efficient rationing maximizes the sum of the first two terms, while not affect-
ing any other terms. Otherwise, there is a first order welfare loss from unemployment.
The condition is weak because a government may not desire a binding minimum wage
for any separation policy if the other conditions of Proposition II.1 do not hold.
If conditions (2) or (3) do not hold, then the employment of low-skilled workers
will change too dramatically for the first two terms to sum to zero. Condition (4)
may fail if governments care too much about outmigration relative to redistribution,
if they do not care about redistribution, or if they only care about redistribution
to the unemployed. As a special case, consider when high and low-skilled labor are
13Lee and Saez (2012) note that while this is the most favorable assumption for optimal policy,
it may not be realistic or may be costly to reach through queuing or search costs. However, there is
some empirical literature supporting this assumption. Neumark and Wascher (2007) find that the
minimum wage has larger impacts on teenagers and secondary earners who are more likely to have
more elastic labor supply and Luttmer (2007) found that reservations wages do not increase with
the minimum wage.
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= 0 and there is no outmigration. In this case, the
minimum wage is optimal if there is efficient rationing as the government trades off
the unemployment of marginal workers with the additional earnings of all others. As
the two types of labor become less substitutable, increasing the minimum wage will
lead to lower high-skilled wages and more outmigration. Decreasing the elasticity of
substitution will weaken the incentive to have a minimum wage, all else equal.
To further understand the migration externality, consider the impact of raising
the minimum wage on the other jurisdiction. If high-skilled workers migrate from
jurisdiction i because moving costs are sufficiently small on the margin, the marginal
product of labor of high-skilled workers in jurisdiction −i will fall. Government
−i is made relatively better off, all else equal, as there is a small change in high-
skilled consumption, but a larger change in welfare due to the additional high-skilled
workers. This effect lowers the cost for −i to implement a binding minimum wage
as fewer high-skilled workers will want to migrate compared to the case where i does
not have a binding minimum wage. In our model, the marginal product of low-skilled
workers increases when high-skilled workers immigrate, and wages and employment
both increase, leading unambiguously to higher utility for those workers.
2.2.1.1 Mobility and the Minimum Wage
Throughout the model we assume that low-skilled workers are perfectly immobile for
tractability. While these workers tend to have relatively low mobility rates overall,
Monras (2019) finds that after a minimum wage increase, the relative share of low-
skilled workers decreases because of changes in low-skilled in-migration. This effect
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is potentially driven by immigration from other countries. Cadena (2014) provides
evidence that low-skilled immigrants prefer states with unchanged minimum wages
relative to those experiencing increases because of the disemployment effects. Since
our static framework considers a fixed point in time without population change, in-
cluding from immigration, or shocks to workers that induce migration besides directly
from the minimum wage, this concern is not particularly relevant in our highly styl-
ized setting. Monras additionally finds no effect on out-migration. Taken together,
these effects on migration are consistent with moving low-skilled not choosing to live
in minimum wage areas, rather than migration due to changes in the minimum wage
itself. In a dynamic setting where households may move at any given time for any
reason, the immobility assumption becomes less plausible and more important.
We now consider the implications of relaxing the perfect immobility assumption.14
Low-skilled workers initially sort in stage 1 so that wl is equal across jurisdictions.
After a minimum wage increase in i, the firm does not hire any additional low-
skilled and some are separated. Therefore, no low-skilled in −i have an incentive to
immigrate to i after the policy change. The unemployed in i emigrate if the new wage
is higher than the sum of working and moving costs. After a minimum wage increase,
low-skilled employment weakly increases in −i from high-skilled migration, but the
model does not specify who is hired. If the firm in −i only hires initially local low-
skilled workers, then there is no incentive to move and the immobility assumption
does not impact our results.15 If the firm hires workers with the lowest working
14Fukumura and Yamagishi (2020) study government competition with low-skilled migration
responses from minimum wage changes. However, they focus on an economy with only minimum-
wage workers and identical regions.
15Phillips (2018) finds that low wage employers discriminate against applicants with a long com-
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cost, then the incentive to move depends on γ. Absent any binding minimum wage
policies, the marginal worker in jurisdiction A will have a weakly higher working cost
than the marginal worker in B since γ ≤ 1. Therefore, a minimum wage in A will not
lead to low-skilled migration, but one in B will if moving costs are sufficiently small.
In general, adding in low-skilled mobility has an ambiguous effect on the optimal
minimum wage policy that depends on the value of G(0) and whether the newly
unemployed would be hired if they moved.16
The main migration mechanism in the model is the link between regions created
from high-skilled. The extent to which high-skilled workers respond to local minimum
wage policies, ∂hi
∂w̄i
, determines the effectiveness of local government policy relative to
centralization. If the derivative is zero, because moving costs are high or the marginal
product of low and high-skilled workers are unrelated, then our framework reduces
to the single region case as studied by Lee and Saez (2012). Monras (2019) estimates
the relationship between wages and high-skilled out-migration, finding negative or
zero effects; however, they are not statistically different from zero. Cadena (2014)
also provides some suggestive, although mixed, evidence that this derivative is in fact
negative. Taking the point estimates across all specifications at face value, he finds
a negative relationship between the count of immigrants with at least some college
and the minimum wage in a given state.17 More generally, the high-skilled migration
mute, which provides suggestive evidence for this assumption.
16If G(0) < 0, then local governments can set high minimum wages to induce the unemployed to
migrate and raise total social welfare in the jurisdiction.
17When controlling for state-specific trends in the main results, the point estimate becomes
small in magnitude and imprecise. The unweighted results are slightly larger in magnitude, but
still imprecise. Although he interprets this as the minimum wage having no effect on high-skilled
migration, the result is likely underpowered.
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externality represents the impact on endogenous business locations of low-skilled
employers which have been shown to be somewhat responsive to the minimum wage
(Rohlin, 2011 and Aaronson et al., 2018). Since our model treats the low and high-
skilled as linked through production, we think of the high-skilled as the managers of
those firms, with the very high-skilled not captured in our framework.
2.2.2 Extensions of the Decentralized Model
In our baseline model, the results and conditions for a binding optimal minimum wage
are driven by the high-skilled migration externality: when a local government raises
its minimum wage some high-skilled workers move out. The size of the externality
depends on the choice of social welfare function and the production technology. We
extend the model to see how changes in these assumptions alter the conclusions.
We consider a social welfare function where governments only care about natives or
maximize housing values, when there is a single firm that operates in both regions,
and the introduction of additional inputs to production.
2.2.2.1 Social Welfare Function
In our framework, we assume that the government only cares about the total utility
of its final residents in the second stage equilibrium. In the first part of this sec-
tion, we consider a government that only cares about natives, regardless of whether
they move.18 When governments maximize utility of their natives, the derivative of
18See Wilson (2015) for an overview of different assumptions on government maximization with
resident mobility and Cremer and Pestieau (2004) for a review of the literature on government
maximization with factor mobility.
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the social welfare function shown in equation 2.2 no longer includes the final term:
∂hi
∂w̄i
G(ch). However, they internalize migration costs. The government still trades off
lower consumption of high-skilled workers with higher consumption of the low-skilled
through the minimum wage, but no longer faces a first order cost from emigration.
The implied minimum wages are higher compared to our baseline model.
Proposition II.3. If conditions 1-3 from Proposition II.1 hold, the government cares
only about their initial residents, and it values additional wages to low-skilled workers
more than the loss of wages to high-skilled (redistribution) and moving costs, then it
is total welfare improving for a jurisdiction to impose a (small) binding minimum
wage.
Proof. This is immediate from the first order condition, where the last term now
concerns moving costs and not outmigration. Under this new assumption on the



























Corollary II.4. Local governments that care about their initial residents set weakly
higher minimum wage policies than those that care about their final residents.









dξ. By construction, ∂ξ
∂w̄i
= ξ if the
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G′(ch)E∆ξ(Θih)[ξ]. First consider when −i does not have a binding minimum
wage. Then ∂hi
∂w̄i
< 0, and the inequality holds since G(ch), G′(·), ξ > 0 by assumption.
If −i has a binding minimum wage and its initial residents return after i puts on a
binding minimum wage, then both sides of the inequality are 0, and it holds as well.
If i residents migrate instead, then the argument from the first case applies.
The preceding analysis assumed that governments are utility maximizers, but we
now consider a model where rent-seeking governments maximize property values.19
In the most general application of this approach to our framework, all households and
firms demand land. Define Hd(w̄) to be the housing or land demand under minimum
wage policy w̄ and ∆j
′
j H
d(w̄) be the change for workers who transition from type j
to j′ due to the policy change, or for firm f . We assume that housing demand is
nondecreasing in income, and that the elasticity of housing supply is finite. Then,













It is immediate that ∆llHd(w̄) ≥ 0. Workers who remain employed after the wage
increase will have more income and demand more housing. Similarly, workers that
lose their jobs will demand weakly less housing, giving∆ulHd(w̄) ≤ 0. The magnitude
of this term importantly depends on how we treat the working cost. If θ is a real
19See Epple and Nechyba (2004) for a survey of these two different assumptions on the govern-
ment’s objective function.
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cost, then for a small binding minimum wage, the workers who lose their jobs under
efficient rationing will have zero net income both before and after the policy change.
If it is a utility cost, they will have less income and demand strictly less housing. In
the welfare maximization framework, this distinction did not affect optimal policy.
In the case where θ is a utility cost, the minimum wage is less attractive because we
no longer have an assumption akin to efficient rationing. The always unemployed
also have no change in income, implying ∆uuHd(w̄) = 0.
Similar to our analysis in the utility maximization case, there is weakly less
demand from high-skilled workers when the minimum wage increases. ∆hshsH
d(w̄) ≤ 0
since their wages weakly decrease and ∆hs′hs H
d(w̄) ≤ 0 due to outmigration from
falling wages. The changes are zero in the extreme case where low and high-skilled
labor are perfect substitutes.







, where L(l, h) is the total amount of land used by low and
high-skilled workers for production. We showed that ∂L(l,h)
∂w̄
< 0 as low-skilled workers
become unemployed and the high-skilled migrate. If we assume that more workers




> 0, and firm demand for land decreases. However,
if the firm engages in more land-intensive activity when it has fewer workers, then
∂Hdf
∂L(l,h)
< 0, and firm demand for land increases.20 Summarizing the above analysis
gives us the following proposition.
Proposition II.5. A rent-seeking local government will implement a small binding
minimum wage if conditions 1-3 from Proposition II.1 hold and if the housing supply
20In Section 2.2.2.3 we derive the general effect of additional inputs on the optimal minimum
wage.
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elasticity is finite, housing demand is nondecreasing in after working-cost net income,
and the net change in housing demand from the low-skilled employed and firms is
positive and larger than the decrease in demand from the high-skilled.
Proof. Under the assumptions, the condition in equation 2.3 is satisfied as described
above since the first two terms are 0, and the sum of the remaining are positive.
Note that the final term can be either positive or negative.
The optimal minimum wage trades off more housing demand from the still em-
ployed low-skilled with lower demand from the high-skilled due to wage decreases
and outmigration. We discussed a comparable set of assumptions to the welfare
maximizing case, (i.e. efficient rationing with no change in housing demand for the
newly unemployed, and no land demand by firms), that leads to similar policies.
We specify utility maximization in our main theoretical and quantitative analysis
because the results are theoretically similar and it does not require us to also spec-
ify a specific housing market system. This allows us to focus our analysis on the
high-skilled migration externality.
2.2.2.2 Regional Economic Linkages
When each jurisdiction has its own production function, asymmetric minimum wage
policies lead high-skilled workers to migrate as the policies affect their relative marginal
products across locations. If there is a binding minimum wage, employed low-skilled
workers are paid that wage, but the amount of unemployment depends on the fea-
tures of the production function. We now consider alternative assumptions on the
production technology to understand how changes in the linkages across states affect
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the desirability of a minimum wage. We first consider a model where there is only
one aggregate production function in the economy. This is motivated by the impor-
tance of large firms that operate in multiple states and choose where to hire their
labor. For a company that operates in many states, the marginal product of labor
of any worker may not only depend on the number of workers in her place of work,
but in the entire company.
Proposition II.6. If conditions 1-3 from Proposition II.1 hold, there is a single
aggregate production function, and the government values additional wages to low-
skilled workers more than the loss of wages to high-skilled (redistribution), then it
is total welfare improving for a jurisdiction to impose a (small) binding minimum
wage.
Proof. With one aggregate production function, the marginal product of high-skilled
workers will be the same in both jurisdictions, regardless of the minimum wage
policies. High-skilled workers have no desire to migrate and the final term in equation
2.2 equals zero21. We are then in the Lee and Saez (2012) model where workers’
locations and skill sectors are fixed.
Proposition II.6 replaces the outmigration condition with the single production
function assumption. All else equal, this leads to higher minimum wages than in the
baseline model. High-skilled workers are perfectly inelastic to all governments and
now bear more of the burden of minimum wage policies, allowing the government
to engage in more redistribution to the low-skilled. Since low-skilled workers are
21Note that this also implies that there is no difference between a government that cares about
natives or residents.
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also always paid their marginal product, and marginal products do not differ across
locations, when a jurisdiction raises its minimum wage, some low-skilled workers
will become unemployed in each jurisdiction due to efficient rationing. Under our
assumptions, each jurisdiction has low-skilled employed workers earning zero surplus
from working in the competitive equilibrium. This negative externality imposed
on the other jurisdiction will lead minimum wage policies to be too high from an
efficiency perspective as governments engage in behavior akin to tax exporting.
We now briefly consider two other production technologies that affect optimal
policy setting– trade linkages and agglomeration. In the baseline model above, we
assume that production is consumed exclusively by local residents. In reality, of
course, regions in a federation engage in trade with each other, such that households
consume both “home” and “foreign” goods, with relative prices being affected by the
schedule of minimum wage policies. If, instead, agents consume goods from both
regions the externalities of local minimum wage setting will be smaller.
When the home region sets a binding minimum wage, it restricts the supply of
its output, putting upward pressure on its relative price. Without trade, the foreign
good becomes relatively more attractive at the margin and agents move in response
are able to take better advantage of the lower price of their now home good. However,
trade mitigates this effect as workers at home can purchase the relatively less costly
foreign good without moving.
Agglomeration would instead amplify the externalities. Since a binding minimum
wage in a region leads to high-skilled out-migration, agglomeration effects would
imply that relative productivity would decrease. More high-skilled leave because of
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the implied change in wages.
2.2.2.3 Capital and Other Inputs
With two inputs to production and zero-profits, high-skilled wages decrease with the
minimum wage. We introduce elastically supplied capital, k, with required return,
r̄, so that this is not necessarily the case. With three production inputs, the zero-










is relatively large in magnitude and
negative, the marginal product of high-skilled workers increases with the minimum
wage. The increased marginal product will induce migration into the jurisdiction
as high-skilled workers move for higher wages. In this case, it is Pareto efficient22
to implement a very small binding minimum wage since the marginal low-skilled
worker is indifferent between working and not due to efficient rationing, and the
wages of all other still employed low-skilled and all high-skilled workers increase.
Raising the minimum wage further will not be Pareto efficient, and the government
will trade off additional consumption from the employed low-skilled and high-skilled,
and migration into the region from high-skilled workers with reduced consumption
from the newly unemployed.
From the zero-profit condition, we can generalize dwh
dw̄
when there are additional














22We are implicitly assuming that capital is paid its marginal product and always earns zero
profit so we do not need to worry about rents to capital owners.
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Proposition II.7. When there are additional inputs to production besides high and
low-skilled labor, a small binding minimum wage is Pareto Efficient if conditions 1-3





≥ 0, there is no outmigration, and by efficient rationing all workers
are weakly better off.
2.2.3 Alternative Configurations for Minimum Wage Setting
Authority
Using our baseline model, we consider the implications of alternative minimum wage
setting authorities. As in the decentralized case, we develop conditions under which
each type of government finds it optimal to implement a binding minimum wage.
2.2.3.1 Only Federal Government
In this section, we consider optimal minimum wage setting when only the federal












Note that in the federal government’s optimization problem, it cares about the
utility of all high skilled workers regardless of residence. Unlike in the regional
government’s problem, when high skilled workers move, their utility still matters for
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the federal government. The government also cares about the migration costs paid
by individual workers.23
2.2.3.2 Federal Non-Uniform Policy
When the federal government can set a different policy in each region, the policies
are given by:
(w̄1, w̄2) = argmaxSWf (w̄1, w̄2) (2.6)



















































.24 We also use the fact that moving costs are randomly assigned after households
choose a residence in the competitive equilibrium and that under our assumptions,
23The final term of the government’s social welfare function therefore involves integrating over
the types of households in each jurisdiction.
24The last equality only holds if the lower bound on the moving costs are zero, which we maintain
throughout, and for a small minimum wage.
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there will be net migration to jurisdiction 2. The FOC for w̄2 is defined analogously.
The first row of the FOC gives the welfare loss from newly unemployed low-skilled
workers in jurisdiction 1. The second row gives the welfare gain from new low-skilled
employment in jurisdiction 2. As high-skilled move to jurisdiction 2, the marginal
product of low-skilled labor increases, leading workers to enter the labor market.
The third row gives the welfare gain to the still-employed in both jurisdictions. The
wage, conditional on employment, increases in jurisdiction 1 due to the new binding
minimum wage, while the wage in jurisdiction 2 increases because of induced high-
skilled immigration. The final row gives the welfare loss to high-skilled workers, due
to both the change in wages and moving costs paid by those who move to jurisdiction
2.
Proposition II.8. If (1) there is efficient rationing; (2) the demand elasticity is
finite; (3) the supply elasticity of low-skilled workers is positive; (4) the government
values additional wages to low-skilled workers more than the loss of wages to high-
skilled; and (5) the first worker to move to the other jurisdiction has zero moving
costs, ξ = 0, then it is total welfare improving for the federal government to impose
a (small) binding minimum wage.
Proposition II.8 is the same as Proposition II.1, except the central government
only cares about migration insofar as it affects efficiency and moving costs paid.
Condition (5) is similar to efficient rationing, but for moving, so that moving costs
are zeros for a small binding minimum wage. It implies that the lower bound on the
moving cost distribution is zero.25 Even without condition (5), the federal govern-
25This assumption on the moving cost distribution is not realistic and is chosen to provide suf-
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ment may implement a binding minimum wage if it values redistribution enough. An
increase in the federal minimum wage leads to lower high-skilled wages, regardless of
moving costs, and is therefore not Pareto improving. Comparing Propositions II.1
and II.8, we expect the federal government to prefer higher minimum wages than
regional governments, all else equal.
The case in which the federal government can set a different minimum wage in
each region is synonymous with the social optimum. The social optimum is defined
in our context by the sum of total welfare for all agents in all regions. This is exactly
the function maximized by the federal government. When its policy is allowed to
be asymmetric, it has the flexibility to reach the socially optimal minimum wage in
each region.
2.2.3.3 Federal Uniform Policy
In this case, we restrict the central government to set a single uniform policy. The
minimum wage is given by:
w̄ = argmaxSWf (w̄) (2.7)
The FOC is quite similar to the non-uniform case, where the responses are given
with respect to w̄ instead of (w̄1, w̄2). When γ = 1, the solution will be the same
in the non-uniform and uniform cases. If γ < 1, then the competitive equilibrium
ficient, but not necessary, conditions for a federal minimum wage. However, in a long-run version
of our model where workers do not have a fixed residence, the moving costs can be interpreted as
preferences for one region compared to the other. In that case, it is plausible that some workers
are indifferent, all else equal.
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low-skilled wages in jurisdiction 1 will be greater than those in 2. Therefore, when
considering a small binding minimum wage, it will only be binding in 2. Under
the assumptions of Proposition II.8, the Social Planner will always want a binding
minimum wage in each jurisdiction, however it may be the case that even when the
assumptions hold, the federal government does not set a binding minimum wage if
constrained to only set a uniform policy. When the Social Planner sets a binding
policy in each jurisdiction, it can mitigate the welfare loss due to migration, both
moving costs and the suboptimal allocation of individuals across jurisdictions. When
the federal government can only set one policy and it is only binding in a jurisdiction,
then there is an externality imposed on the other. This is seen by noting that all of
the components of the government’s first order conditions depend on the enforced
minimum wage in both jurisdictions. For γ < 1, a small binding uniform policy is
equivalent to the Social Planner only setting a minimum wage in the low productivity
region, which the previous section showed is suboptimal.
2.2.3.4 Tiered System
The U.S. has a tiered system in which the federal and local government both set
minimum wages, and the larger of the two is enforced. The federal government
is restricted to set a uniform policy. Based on our previous analysis, under the
assumptions of Proposition II.1, each local government sets a binding minimum wage,
and under the assumptions of Proposition II.8, the federal government also sets a
binding policy for at least the less productive region. As a result, there will be binding
policy enacted in each. In the symmetric case, the federal minimum wage will be
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weakly higher than both jurisdictions’ preferred policies because of the differential
effects of outmigration and moving costs. The effect of moving costs must be less
than outmigration by construction.
2.3 A Two Region Example
2.3.1 Parameterization
In the interest of exploring the relative welfare consequences of different configu-
rations and the relative advantages of decentralized and centralized policy setting,
we consider a parameterized version of the model. The calibrated model illustrates
the mechanisms highlighted in the theory section, particularly regional heterogeneity
and competition. In the previous sections, we are unable to give theoretical predic-
tions for each policymaker beyond the extensive margin conditional on the other
policies. The calibrated simulations in the next section on optimal policy provide
results for the intensive margin decisions when governments compete while factoring
in the general equilibrium effects of their actions.
We specify the following functional forms. We assume f is a constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) production function with elasticity of substitution between high
and low-skilled labor σ = 1
1−ρ and weight α on the low-skilled.
f(l, h) = (αlρ + (1− α)hρ)
1
ρ (2.8)
With this production function, ρ ≤ 1. If ρ = 1 the two types of labor are perfect
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substitutes and if ρ = −∞ then the two types are perfect complements. Worker
heterogeneity is determined by the distributions on θ and ξ, which we assume to be
θ ∼ U(0, θ̄) and ξ ∼ U(0, ξ̄). The sufficient conditions from propositions II.1 and II.8
require that the lower bounds are zero. Alternative distributional assumption on the
moving costs do not qualitatively affect our results.26




log(cj + ν)dj (2.9)
where ν is a utility function shifter. Since some low-skilled workers are always unem-
ployed with cu = 0, ν must be positive. log(ν) is therefore the value of unemployment
to the government. Smaller values of ν do not affect labor supply, but increase the
social cost of unemployment. We choose individual utility to be net, after migration
and disutility from working, consumption so that there are no income effects.
2.3.2 Calibration
We calibrate our model to match aggregate moments of the U.S. economy. We have
seven parameters: α, γ, and ρ for the production function; h̄, θ̄, and ξ̄ to describe
the worker population; and ν for the social welfare function. We vary γ to see how
26For example, modeling the moving costs as a type I extreme value idiosyncratic preference
for region 1, similar to our quantitative model in Section 2.5, does not affect the mechanisms
highlighted here. In both cases, low ξ high-skilled workers in i will move after an increase in the
minimum wage in i. However, the number of movers, and therefore optimal policy, depends on the
distributional assumptions. We specify that the moving costs are normally distributed so that all
draws of ξ are non-negative for all values of γ. Under the type I extreme value assumption with
asymmetric regions, some individuals have negative moving costs in the baseline. For the purposes
of this exercise, we do not allow for that source of misallocation.
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different levels of regional heterogeneity impacts our results; for the calibration, we
set γ = 1, corresponding to the symmetric case. Additionally, we let h̄ = 1 to reflect
the fact that about one-third of the population has a Bachelor’s degree (CPS), and
ρ = 0.286, based on the estimate of the elasticity of substitution between high and
low-skilled workers in Katz and Murphy (1992).27
Based on the timing assumptions of our model, we calibrate the remaining pa-
rameters in two stages. In the first stage of the calibration, based on the competitive
equilibrium, we set α and θ̄. We calibrate α to match the relative wages across skill
types. Using the Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group microdata,
the Economic Policy Initiative reports hourly wages in 2017 by highest degree re-
ceived. Based on their report, we set wh
wl
= 1.82. We calibrate θ̄ to match the 2017
labor force participation rate of high school graduates. Based on estimates from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics in 2017, the value for high school graduates is 57.7%,
while the value for those with only a Bachelor’s degree is 73.3%. Since our model
assumes that high skilled workers are always in the labor force, we scale up the high
school rate to 57.7
73.3
= 78.7. ν is normalized to 1 so that the utility of the unemployed
is 0. It also ensures that G(ch) > 0
In the second stage, after all workers have established residencies from the com-
petitive equilibrium, we calibrate the upper bound on the moving cost distribution,
ξ̄ to match the elasticity of migration with respect to wages of 0.5 from Kennan and
Walker (2011). For a 10 percent decrease in γ, ξ̄ is found so that there is an increase
27For the purposes of the calibration, we set h̄ using college graduates to match the definition of
high-skilled in Katz and Murphy.
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in the stock of high-skilled workers in jurisdiction 1 of 5 percent.28
The parameter estimates are presented in Table 2.1. The estimate column gives
the values used in the welfare calculations and the residuals note the distance between
the model implied value and the target, when relevant.








From the baseline calibrated model, Figure 2.1 plots total social welfare in the
economy as a function of the minimum wage. In the left panel, the minimum wage
is effective in both regions and so this figure represents the problem of the central
government restricted to a uniform policy. A small binding minimum wage increases
welfare since the government values redistribution, the marginal separated low-skilled
worker has 0 surplus from working, and no high-skilled workers move since the regions
are identical and a uniform policy is enforced. As the minimum wage increase further
to 102.5 percent of the competitive wage, welfare also increases. After this point,
the higher price floor causes relatively too much additional unemployment and lost
high-skilled wages. When the minimum wage is 5.6 percent above the competitive
28We interpret the Kennan and Walker (2011) partial equilibrium results as a productivity shock
in our general equilibrium model. The shock in one region affects high-skilled wages directly and
through its effect on low-skilled labor supply, while the general equilibrium migration effect moves
in the opposite direction. If instead we shock just high-skilled wages in one state holding everything
else fixed, then ξ̄ would barely change to 1.3140 instead of 1.3134.
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level, the policy is worse than no policy at all.
(a) Single Minimum Wage in Both Regions (b) Minimum Wage in Region 1 Only
Figure 2.1: Welfare and the Minimum Wage
Note: Both panels of the figure plot the total social welfare in the economy for various levels of
the minimum wage. The left panel plots welfare as a function of a single minimum wage applied
in both regions while the minimum wage only applies in region 1 in the right panel. Since the
regions are identical, the implications from a minimum wage in only 1 or 2 are the same. The
vertical line denotes the competitive low-skilled wage in the absence of any policy.
The right panel of the figure plots total welfare as a function of the minimum
wage in region 1 with no minimum wage in the other. If region 2’s government does
not set a binding policy, this figure depicts the decentralized problem for region 1.
For a small binding policy, total social welfare decreases in region 1 because the
loss of high-skilled workers is more than the value from additional wages to the low-
skilled. Welfare in region 2 increases from the inflow of new high-skilled workers,
which increases the total population and low-skilled wages but at the expense of
high-skilled wages. The increase in region 2 is not enough to offset the loss in region
1 and so a small binding minimum wage in only one region decreases total welfare in
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the economy. The migration externality is too large relatively to the benefits from
redistribution.
2.4 Optimal Minimum Wage Setting
To supplement the theoretical work on the extensive margin, we use the calibrated
model to trace out the relative benefits of centralization verse decentralization as
a function of mobility and regional heterogeneity for optimal minimum wage set-
ting. Our results illustrate the trade-off captured by the decentralization theorem,
where the federal government can only set a single uniform policy and local govern-
ments can better adjust to their own needs. We find that centralization of minimum
wage setting authority is always weakly preferred to decentralization in our base-
line calibrated model, even when regions are heterogeneous, because of interregional
spillovers and the corresponding competition for high-skilled workers. Local gov-
ernments never want to set binding minimum wages, while the central government
loses its incentive to set a uniform minimum wage as heterogeneity across regions
increases.
Panel A of Table 2.2 presents results for the symmetric case, i.e., when relative
productivity γ = 1. The five rows correspond to the five different types of gov-
ernment structure that we allow in our context. The top row is the competitive
equilibrium with no government, and the bottom row is the case of a benevolent
central government setting non-uniform policy, which is synonymous with a social
planner solution. The middle three rows correspond to cases with local governments
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only, a central government restricted to uniform policy only, and a U.S.-style hybrid
system with both of these types, respectively. Columns list the values for unemploy-
ment, wages for high-skilled and low-skilled workers, and the fraction of (mass 1)
high skill workers that sort to region 1. If the wages of a particular case match the
wages in the competitive case, then there is no binding minimum wage. The far right
column lists the welfare loss relative to the federal non-uniform or social planner.
In the symmetric case, local governments do not want to set a binding minimum
wage because the resulting outmigration is too large to be offset by the increase
in wages for the low-skilled. Condition 4 of Proposition II.1 does not hold. In
contrast, the central government is not affected by this race-to-the-bottom behavior
to keep high-skilled workers because migration does not change the set of agents
in the central government’s welfare function. In the symmetric case, the central
government exactly matches the social planner’s policy, since the social planner sets
identical minimum wages in each region.
In our calibrated equilibrium, we find that the social planner and central gov-
ernment set the optimal minimum wage to 102.5% of the competitive wage. The
binding minimum wage leads to a small total welfare increase over the competitive
and decentralized cases of 0.23%. With higher low-skilled wages, the always em-
ployed low-skilled have a welfare gain at least 2.14% that depends on their working
costs. The gain comes at the expense of the newly unemployed, whose welfare de-
creases by 100% as consumption drops to 0, and the high-skilled, whose welfare falls
by 1.65%. As more low-skilled workers become unemployed, the marginal product of
the high-skilled workers falls, leading to lower consumption. The always unemployed
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are unaffected by changed in the policy.
With heterogeneous regions, the central government’s ability to match the social
planner’s solution disappears. Panel B of Table 2.2 presents the outcomes when γ is
reduced to .995. With this very small productivity difference, the central government
desires a binding minimum wage that is between the social planner’s two policies:
slightly too high for the less productive region, but too low for the more productive
area. The centralized and tiered environments both result in a positive welfare loss
relative to the social planner, though they are still preferred to the decentralized case
where local governments do not implement a binding policy.
Finally, we present results for γ = 0.99 in Panel C of Table 2.2. In this case,
the local and central uniform governments do set a binding minimum wage, while
the social planner’s solution sets a different binding policy in each region. As in the
previous cases, the migration incentive is too strong for the local governments to set a
binding policy, and now that is also the case for the central uniform as well. A small
binding central uniform policy only affects the less productive jurisdiction, which
causes high-skilled workers to migrate. The migration externality decreases welfare
as total output in the economy shrinks, even more low-skilled workers in region 2
become unemployed, and some high-skilled pay migration costs. In the γ = 0.995
case, the jurisdictions were similar enough that the same policy implemented in both
did not cause too large of an externality. With large amounts of heterogeneity, like in
the U.S., central uniform policies are inefficient. The optimality of a central uniform
minimum wage is decreasing in regional heterogeneity. With two policies to set, the
social planner is able to set the binding minimum wage in each jurisdiction so that
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the populations remain the same as in the competitive equilibrium.
Table 2.2: Baseline Results
Authority u wl1 wl2 avg wh h1 SW Loss
Panel A: γ = 1
Competitive .426 .361 .361 .657 .5 .23%
Decentralized .426 .361 .361 .657 .5 .23%
Federal Uniform .523 .370 .370 .643 .5 0
U.S. .523 .370 .370 .643 .5 0
Federal Non-Uniform .523 .370 .370 .643 .5 -
Panel B: γ = .995
Competitive .429 .362 .358 .655 .506 .23%
Decentralized .429 .362 .358 .655 .506 .23%
Federal Uniform .533 .370 .370 .640 .509 .16%
U.S. .533 .370 .370 .640 .509 .16%
Federal Non-Uniform .533 .372 .368 .640 .507 -
Panel C: γ = .99
Competitive .432 .364 .356 .653 .513 .23%
Decentralized .432 .364 .356 .653 .513 .23%
Federal Uniform .432 .364 .356 .653 .513 .23%
U.S. .432 .364 .356 .653 .513 .23%
Federal Non-Uniform .522 .372 .364 .640 .513 -
Note: This table presents the simulated equilibria for our baseline calibrated
model different minimum wage setting authorities and levels of regional het-
erogeneity. The competitive equilibrium is provided for comparison. Social
Welfare (SW) Loss is defined relative to the Federal Non-Uniform, or Social
Planner.
2.4.1 Variable Mobility
The relative differences in government competition of mobile high-skilled agents
drives our main results in the previous section. Local governments are averse to
minimum wage induced outmigration, as it creates a first order welfare loss. The
114
central government faces a much smaller cost from migration, especially since the
first workers who move have no migration costs. However, both types of governments
bear the burden of decreased total output as households sort across jurisdictions. We
now explicitly vary the mobility of the high-skilled to better understand this mecha-
nism. With high migration costs, the model captures the short-run effects as workers
are unable to move in response to the policy. As migration costs decrease, the model
better captures the long-run equilibrium effects.
When migration costs increase, minimum wages become more desirable for re-
gional governments; when high-skilled workers are immobile, regional governments
enact exactly the social planner policy. Without migration, there are no interregional
spillovers and the local governments’ problems exactly match that of the social plan-
ner because the two economies are additively separable in the social welfare function.
From the baseline symmetric model, if the minimum of the moving cost distribution
is increased slightly to 0.0025 from 0, or 0.3% of the competitive high-skilled wage,
then the decentralized outcome would match the social planner as well. The lowest
moving cost is large enough that the high-skilled are effectively immobile in equilib-
rium. As long as the minimum moving cost is more than 0.03% of the high-skilled
competitive wage, regional governments will enact binding policy in the baseline
model. Small changes in the moving cost have large implications for government
competition.
To understand the interaction between productivity heterogeneity and mobility,
we set γ to .95 and the minimum of the migration cost distribution to 0.0025. Table
2.3 presents the results. As before, the social planner implements a different binding
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minimum wage in each jurisdiction. In the decentralized case, migration costs lessen
horizontal competition enough so that both local governments set binding policies,
but not enough to replicate the social planner’s solution. The central uniform policy
alone leads to greater welfare loss than the decentralized policy setting because there
is considerable heterogeneity, but the government only has one instrument. However,
the hybrid system captures the social optimum. When the central government sets its
policy equal to that of the social planner in jurisdiction 2, it now becomes optimal
for jurisdiction 1 to raise its policy. The local government faces a smaller threat
from outmigration than the decentralized case where the regional government in
jurisdiction 2 sets its policy too low. In this more realistic case, where jurisdictions
are heterogeneous and all migration is at least a little costly, the hybrid minimum
wage setting authority is welfare improving over either by itself. Centralized and
decentralized policy setting are strategic complements. This justifies the policies we
see in Seattle, for example, while not supporting the policies by the Missouri state
government of prohibiting its cities from setting higher minimum wages or in Europe
where many countries set a single national policy.
At the other extreme, we consider perfectly mobile high-skilled workers. In this
case, the outmigration response to a minimum wage will be even stronger than in
the baseline case, such that local governments will have even less of an incentive
to implement binding minimum wages. For the central government, the effect is
ambiguous. The lack of moving costs means that migration is less costly, since what
matters to the central government is the costs paid by individuals rather than the loss
of population. However, the central government also cares about the total output
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Table 2.3: γ = .95 and ξ ∼ U [0.0025, ξ̄]
Authority u wl1 wl2 wh avg h1 SW Loss
Competitive .456 .374 .334 .638 .566 .21%
Decentralized .497 .378 .338 .632 .566 .08%
Federal Uniform .466 .374 .336 .367 .566 .19%
U.S. .542 .383 .343 .626 .566 0%
Federal Non-Uniform .542 .383 .343 .626 .566 -
Note: This table presents the simulated equilibria for the case where γ = .95
and ξ ∼ U [0.0025, ξ̄] for different minimum wage setting authorities. The
competitive equilibrium is provided for comparison. Social Welfare (SW) Loss
is defined relative to the Federal Non-Uniform, or Social Planner.
in the economy, which is decreasing with migration. When γ = 1, no households
move as a result of federal policy, and the calibrated migration and perfect mobility
equilibria are identical. When γ = 0.95, the federal non-uniform optimal policies are
0.379 in jurisdiction 1 and 0.340 in jurisdiction 2, compared to 0.383 and 0.343 in the
baseline calibrated case. Higher levels of mobility push down optimal federal policy.
2.4.2 Alternative Social Welfare Functions
The previous quantitative results rely on a single specification of the social welfare
function, namely, U(c) = log(c + ν), where we set ν = 1. ν is a shifter on the
progressivity of the welfare function, with lower values corresponding to a more
progressive desire for redistribution. The right panel of Figure 2.2 presents the
equilibrium minimum wages desired by local governments and by the social planner
as a function of the ν for the symmetric case holding all other structural parameters
fixed. Since our theory requires that G(ch) > 0, ν cannot be too small in our baseline
model. To fully investigate the importance of progressivity, the left panel of the figure
117
uses the social welfare function log(2(c+ ν)) so that G(ch) > 0 for all ν > 0 since in
the symmetric baseline equilibrium, ch > .6 for any feasible minimum wage policy.
The optimal minimum wages are an inverted-U shape in progressivity. As ν ap-
proaches zero, the welfare of the unemployed quickly heads toward negative infinity,
such that adding to unemployment becomes increasingly costly from a social welfare
perspective. Minimum wages distribute from the high-skilled and the newly unem-
ployed to the low-skilled employed. If ν were 0, then the social welfare would be
negative infinity for all policies, including no binding minimum wage, since there
will always be some unemployed workers in our model. In that case, the optimal
minimum wage would not be defined for any government. The pattern is identical
when γ < 1.
We now consider a utilitarian social welfare function. Since our agents maximize
consumption, this social welfare function is equivalent to maximizing the sum of
wages minus any working costs or moving costs paid. In the symmetric γ = 1 case,
no binding minimum wages are optimal for any government. With a relatively large
amount of regional heterogeneity, for example when γ = 0.95, the social planner de-
sires a small binding minimum wage of about 0.3% over the competitive wage in each
jurisdiction. Under our baseline social welfare function, when γ = 0.95, the social
planner would set optimal minimum wages of about 2.5% above the competitive.
In addition to the productivity heterogeneity explored previously, regions may
also differ in their progressivity. St. Louis and Kansas City, Missouri as blue cities
in a red state may have set higher minimum wages because they value redistribution
more. To test this implication, Figure 2.3 varies ν for only jurisdiction 1, holding
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(a) Baseline model (b) Utility given by: log(2(c+ ν))
Figure 2.2: Optimal Minimum Wage as a Function of ν
Note: In the right panel, we vary ν from 0.4 to 1.3 using the baseline calibrated model. In the left
panel, we vary ν from 0.05 to 1.3 changing the social welfare function to log(2(c+ ν)) The
low-skilled wage in a jurisdiction is the maximum of the competitive wage and that government’s
minimum wage policy. The Social Planner’s optimal policy (solid line) equals the Central Uniform
and Tiered optimal policies since jurisdictions are symmetric.
the value for jurisdiction 2 fixed at 1, and plots the equilibrium decentralized policies
and the competitive outcome when jurisdictions are otherwise identical. When ν is
slightly less than 1, jurisdiction 1 values redistribution sufficiently to set a binding
minimum wage. Unlike in the baseline, condition 4 of Proposition II.1 is now sat-
isfied. Although the welfare cost of setting a minimum wage for the government in
jurisdiction 2 is now lower because the binding minimum wage in the other region
reduces the value of migration for the high-skilled, it remains at the corner of no
binding policy. It is not until ν in jurisdiction 1 falls below 0.7 that jurisdiction 2
sets a binding minimum wage. As ν in jurisdiction 1 falls further, jurisdiction 2 is
induced to set a binding minimum wage. In this region of ν, governments engage
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in race to the top. When ν decreases even further, the benefit of setting a high
minimum wage also decreases and the policies begin to level off. Even when regions
are equally productive, differences in the value of redistribution can lead competing
governments to set binding decentralized policies.
Figure 2.3: Optimal Minimum Wage as a Function of ν in Jurisdiction 1
Note: We vary ν in jurisdiction 1 from 0.4 to 1.3 keeping ν in jurisdiction 2 fixed at 1. The
low-skilled wage in a jurisdiction is the maximum of the competitive wage and that government’s
minimum wage policy.
2.4.3 Information
In addition to mobility and regional competition, the relative information quality of
different levels of government affects the optimal minimum wage setting authority.
Decentralized policy setting may be preferred because local governments have better
knowledge of the labor supply, labor demand, and migration elasticities or local
productivity. These parameters jointly determine how employment changes after a
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minimum wage increase. In a 2019 report, the CBO documented a large amount of
variation in estimates of the employment elasticities from the recent minimum wage
literature from 0.4 in Cengiz et al. (2019) to -1.7 in Clemens and Wither (2019).
Which estimate should a government use when determining its policy? In the context
of our model, if a government thought the employment elasticity were positive, then
it would believe that a binding minimum wage is Pareto improving and only faces
a welfare trade-off when the estimate is negative. Therefore different estimates lead
to very different “optimal” policies. Local governments may additionally have better
information about the market structure, which we do not explore in this paper, or
political beliefs leading them to favor one estimate over another; for example, if it
believes there is significant monopsony power in the region, it may place more weight
on positive estimates. If any government has noisy or incorrect information about
the regions or these parameters, then it will not be able to set policy optimally.
While the previous analysis assumed that both levels had perfect information
about workers and regions, we now explore the consequences of misspecified policy.29
Panel (a) of Figure 2.4 presents the welfare for different minimum wage policies
in each region for the baseline model normalized by the welfare in the competitive
case with no binding policy. In each row, the minimum wage varies from 0 to
10 percent above the competitive wage in region 1. The columns vary the price
floor in region 2. The grid therefore constructs a discretized version of the social
planner’s problem and it confirms that the optimal minimum wage is about 2.5
29We do not make explicit assumptions about why the minimum wage differs from the optimal
policies found in the previous subsection but instead simulate how deviations affect welfare. These
errors may be due to a lack of information.
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percent above the competitive. Similarly, looking down the main diagonal gives the
optimal central uniform policy. Based on these simulations, we see that very large
uniform minimum wages can lead to lower total welfare than having no policy, which
is also the decentralized case. Importantly for policy-making, these results suggest
that when regions are symmetric, a minimum wage that is too high is better than
one that is too low. Specifically, we find that a minimum wage 0.5 percentage points
too high yields higher welfare than one that is 0.5 percentage points too low. The
same is true when we compare policies that are 1.5 and 2.5 percentage points off in
either direction.30
Asymmetric policies for which the difference is more than 2 percentage points
also lead to lower welfare than having no policies at all. When the enforced mini-
mum wage is too different in otherwise identical regions, the migration externality
overpowers the benefits from redistribution. Since symmetric policies do not induce
migration, relatively more of the burden falls on high-skilled workers that the pro-
gressive government values less. However, large differences in the enforced low-skilled
wage across equally productive regions leads to a large amount of migration. This
exacerbates the disemployment effects of the minimum wage in the region with a
higher policy. In our simulations, we find that minimum wages of 101.5 and 103.5
percent of the competitive performs worse than a uniform policy of 106 percent.
To understand how errors in optimal policy setting from a lack of information
vary with productivity and mobility, Panel (b) displays the relative welfare based
on the simulations shown in Table 2.3 where γ = .95 and min(ξ) = 0.0025. With
30We cannot compare more than 2.5 percentage points off of the optimal because then the low
minimum wage would not be binding.
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(a) γ = 1, min(ξ) = 0 (b) γ = .95, min(ξ) = 0.0025
Figure 2.4: Welfare and the Minimum Wage
Note: Panel (a) presents the total social welfare in the economy for different minimum wage
policies in both regions ranging from the competitive wage to 110 percent of the competitive.
Welfare is normalized so that it is 1 in the competitive case where neither region has a binding
minimum wage. Panel (b) conducts the same simulations but for the case where γ = .95 and
min(ξ) = 0.0025 as in Table 2.3. Minimum wage combinations with higher total welfare are
shaded darker.
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perfect information, the optimal uniform central policy is less than 101 percent of
the competitive wage in region 2 and not binding in region 1 while the optimal non-
uniform policy is about 102.5 percent above each region’s respective competitive
wage.31 Since moving costs are positive on the margin, both regions set binding
policies of about 1 percent above the competitive in the decentralized case as well.
The patterns are very similar to the baseline example except the welfare matrix is no
longer symmetric. Based on the asymmetry, we want to determine if the government
should be relatively more cautious in the high or low productivity region. Our
results indicate that setting too high a minimum wage in the low-productivity region
while setting too low a minimum wage by the same percentage points in the high-
productivity region is better than the reverse.
2.4.4 Taxes and Transfers
In the previous sections, we study the optimal minimum wage without taxes, which
is an “optimal suboptimal policy.’’ When the federal government has access to linear
income taxes (a single income tax rate and a demogrant), it will always prefer linear
taxes to a combination of a minimum wage and linear taxes in our calibrated model.
The proof of this numerical result in our framework is presented in Appendix B.1. Lee
and Saez (2012) prove in a model without migration, when workers are not mobile
across skill levels and non-linear taxes and transfers are available, then it is not
optimal to also have a binding minimum wage. This is analogous to the no mobility
31The diagonal of this figure does not give the optimal central uniform policy because regions
have different competitive wages. Since productivity in region 2 is much lower than 1, the optimal
uniform minimum wage is found by looking across the top row.
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case of our model discussed above. In a search-and-matching framework, Lavecchia
(2019) finds that both a minimum wage and optimal taxes are preferred only if the
government has very strong redistributive preferences.32 As shown in the previous
sections, the migration externality from any policy that restricts low-skilled labor
supply and induces migration is worse for the local governments than the federal,
and income taxes are no exception. This is intuitive in light of the literature which
tends to find that redistribution is better handled by the federal government (e.g.
see Gordon and Cullen, 2012).
If the government taxes income, then low-skilled workers will restrict their labor
supply, impacting the marginal product of all workers and lowering total output in the
economy. High-skilled labor supply is not perfectly inelastic to each jurisdiction, but
it is perfectly inelastic to the economy and the federal government. The government
trades off redistribution with efficiency. A binding minimum wage will increase low-
skill labor supply, but decrease labor demand, while an income tax will decrease
labor supply and have no effect on demand, potentially allowing the policies to
be complements. While the optimality of jointly specifying a minimum wage and
linear income tax is uncertain, we show that under the assumptions of our calibrated
model, the federal government would never implement a binding minimum wage if
linear taxes are available.
Although it is not optimal to have both a binding minimum wage and a federal
32Redistributive policies may also have an insurance component that high-skilled workers care
about (Hoynes and Luttmer, 2012). If a high-skilled worker was separated from her job due to a
shock, and then was able to find employment at the minimum wage rather than the low-skilled
competitive one, the insurance value would be positive. However, in our static model with fixed
worker skill levels, the high-skilled are made weakly worse off from a minimum wage increase.
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income tax, we incorporate this into our model and recompute the equilibrium to
compare the policies. Our simulations confirm that the government does not want to
set a binding minimum wage when it sets the income tax optimally. In our baseline
symmetric calibrated model, we find that federal government would choose to set a
tax rate of 24% and no binding minimum wage in both jurisdictions, as expected.
The policy dramatically increases unemployment to 35.5% of the low-skilled workers
from 26.2% under the optimal minimum wage. The restricted labor supply leads low-
skilled wages to rise to 0.390, and high-skilled wages to fall to 0.616. The government
trades off its redistribution incentive with decreased low-skilled labor supply that
leads to increased unemployment and falling high-skilled wages. As the income tax
increases, the marginal (zero consumption) low skilled worker exits the labor force.
This raises the marginal product of all the still employed low-skilled workers, thus
acting very much like a minimum wage, except now the government is also able to
redistribute some of the additional income to the unemployed.
The optimal linear income tax increases total welfare over the optimal minimum
wage by 2%. Compared with the optimal minimum wage model, where the utility
of the unemployed is 0 by construction, the utility of unemployed is 0.126. The
low-skilled worker with the lowest working cost sees her utility increase by 16.2%
under the optimal linear income tax compared with a minimum wage, which is a
lower bound on the welfare increase for low-skilled workers. High-skilled workers
see their welfare fall by 5.1%, as the government redistributes total wealth. If the
federal government were able to set a different tax rate on each skill type, it would
tax low-skilled at 73% and the high-skilled at 100%, leading to a welfare gain of
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8.5% over the optimal minimum wage. This result is driven by the fact that the
high-skilled workers supply labor inelastically to the economy. Since the government
can use that revenue to lessen the harm of unemployment, it then sets a much higher
tax rate on the low-skilled as well.
Throughout this section, we assumed that the governments tax income. However,
if the tax is on consumption, equal to income minus cost of working and migration,
then there is no labor supply response, and a federal government with a concave
social welfare function would optimally set a leveling tax so that all workers have
the same utility. With a leveling tax, a minimum wage is suboptimal as the induced
unemployment lowers total output in the economy that can be redistributed. A
utilitarian government would have no desire to redistribute through a consumption
tax since the total output consumed would not change.
2.5 A Quantitative Model of Minimum Wage Set-
ting
Our two region model demonstrated that decentralized and centralized minimum
wage setting are strategic complements and that the extent to which they are de-
pends on regional heterogeneity and mobility. While this approach highlights im-
portant mechanisms, we now extend the model to the case of U.S. states to quantify




We consider a spatial equilibrium model of local labor markets as in Rosen (1979)
and Roback (1982) with two imperfectly substitutable types of labor, and state and
federal governments. High-skilled workers in state j have indirect utility given by
V hj = w
h
j + φj + κεj (2.10)
where whj is the high-skilled wage rate in j, φj is a state j parameter that captures
amenities and costs of living, and εj is an i.i.d. type I extreme value idiosyncratic
preference for j, with standard deviation κ. High-skilled workers pick the location













Immobile low-skilled workers can be employed or unemployed. If a worker i is
employed in state j, she pays working cost θij ∼ U(0, θ̄j) and receives wages wlj.




wlj − θij + φj if employed
(2.12)
Low and high-skilled workers in the same state face the same cost of living and
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receive the same amenities.
Each state has one firm that hires low and high-skilled workers with production
function
fj(l, h) = γj(αjl
ρ + (1− αj)hρ)1/ρ (2.13)
This specification differs slightly from Equation 2.8 in that it allows both γ and α to
vary across markets. The government’s social welfare function is given in Equation
2.9.
2.5.2 Data and Calibration
We calibrate the model to the continental U.S. states in 2015. In 2013 and 2014,
Congress considered the Minimum Wage Fairness Act, which would have raised the
federal price floor in 2015 for the first time since 2009. After this failed, President
Obama continued to push for an increase through 2015, although Congress did not
act. Since the federal government considered changing the minimum wage, but chose
not to, we take the 2015 policy to accurately reflect the government’s preferences for
redistribution. This allows us to back out ν for the federal government from the
observed equilibrium.33 While there has been a continued discussion of increasing
the minimum wage, the federal government has not considered changing it since. We
33More specifically, ν is calibrated so that $7.25 is the welfare maximizing central minimum wage
policy, holding the state policies fixed at their 2015 levels. This implies a Nash equilibrium where
the federal government does not find it beneficial to deviate given the strategies of the states.
However, the governments may be more sophisticated and know that changes in federal policy will
also impact the state’s optimal policies. We address calibrating ν for all states in Section 2.5.5.
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therefore use the 2015 American Community Survey (ACS) to estimate the model
parameters.
From the ACS, we observe individual level wages by education and labor force
attachment in each state. This gives the number of the low (high school equivalent)
and high-skilled (college graduates) employed workers, as well as their average wages,
the number of unemployed, and the number not in the labor force. Since many high
school equivalent workers earn more than the minimum wage, the model implied
high-skilled wage equals the state’s minimum wage times the high-skilled/low-skilled
wage ratio in the data. θ̄j in each state is picked to match the state’s high school
equivalent labor force participation rate in the data.
Taking log of Equation 2.11, we first estimate κ given the observed population
shares and high-skilled wages in the data from the following regression equation:
log(pj) = β0 + β1w
h
j + υj (2.14)
where β1 = 1/κ. However, endogeneity from the correlation of amenities and wages
as well as measurement error will lead to a biased estimate of κ. We therefore
instrument for the high-skilled wage with the number of low-skilled residents. The
model provides intuition for it as a valid instrument. First, the marginal product of
the high-skilled depends on the number of low-skilled employed in a state, and so
it should be correlated with the total stock of low-skilled. We confirm this in the
middle column of Table 2.4. Additionally, low-skilled workers are immobile, and so
the total number is exogenous in the model. We find that κ is 1.048. As expected,
the estimate is slightly larger than the value of 0.717 from Suárez Serrato and Zidar
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Table 2.4: High-Skilled Migration Elasticity
OLS First-Stage IV
log(pj) High-skilled Wage log(pj)




Observations 48 48 48
Note: The leftmost column (OLS) reports the estimated effect of average high-skilled
wages in a state on the log of the percent of high-skilled workers in that state, using data
from the 2015 American Community Survey. The middle column reports the first-stage
for the IV regression in the rightmost column. Robust standard errors are reported in all
columns. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
(2016), who conduct a similar analysis on county groups, a smaller unit of geography,
using a Bartik instrument approach. They similarly find an OLS/IV ratio for κ of
just above 3.
After estimating κ, we can recover φj up to a normalization that minφj = 0.
Since workers’ indirect utility is a function of φj, the normalization together with
our estimate of ν determine the concavity of the social welfare function. Under the
functional form assumptions, this does not affect high-skilled location choices and is
chosen so that all workers have non-negative utility. Since only φj+ν is identified, an
alternative normalization would only affect the magnitude of ν and not the results.
The calibration of the state specific production function follows Section 2.3.2.
First, we set ρ = 0.286 following Katz and Murphy (1992). We calculate αj to
match the wage gap between high and low-skilled workers and γj so the marginal
product of the low-skilled employed matches the state’s minimum wage. Given the
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model’s parametrization, the values perfectly match the targeted moments. 34
After recovering the other parameters, we finally back out the federal govern-
ment’s redistribution preferences ν so that the observed policy of $7.25 maximizes
total social welfare in the economy. We aim to minimize |7.25−w∗(ν)|, where w∗(ν)
is the optimal minimum wage as a function of the concavity of the social welfare
function. Table 2.5 summarizes the parameter estimates. The model is unable to
perfectly match the current federal minimum wage for any progressivity shifter, al-
though the residual is only about 1 cent. In the context of the model where states
are heterogeneous, the federal government and 21 states should not coordinate on
the same policy. However, $7.25 may be salient at a national level as a reference
point, or the federal government may understate regional heterogeneity because of a
lack of information.
Table 2.5: U.S. Model Calibration Results
National Parameters Estimate Residual
ρ 0.29 -
ν 4.05 0.012




34For this calculation, we calculate the state’s wage gap as the ratio of college graduates and
high school equivalent or less in the ACS for employed workers between ages 16 and 70. Since the
minimum wage is a floor, the ratio of high-skilled wages to the minimum wage would overstate their
relative marginal product in the model.
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2.5.3 Welfare and U.S. Minimum Wage Setting Authority
Does joint state and the federal tiered minimum wage setting in the U.S. increase
aggregate social welfare over centralized policy alone? While our previous theoretical
results suggest there should be positive gains, in the application, the sign is ambigu-
ous since state are heterogeneous in their preferences for redistribution as well as
their productivities. This implies that the most productive states do not always set
the highest minimum wages. The correlation between the 2015 state policies and γj
is only 0.53.35 If a relatively low productivity state sets too high a minimum wage
relative to what is binding in others, too many high-skill workers move. Since the
state is of relatively low productivity, this disproportionately harms its low-skilled
workers by increasing unemployment. Given this tension created from differences in
preferences for redistribution, it is possible for optimal centralized policy to lead to
higher total welfare from the perspective of the federal government than the tiered
system.
To measure the potential gain or loss, Panel (a) of Figure 2.5 plots total welfare
in the economy under both minimum wage setting authorities. The solid line shows
how welfare in the tiered system changes as a function of the federal minimum wage.
Based on the calibration, when the states’ minimum wages are held at their 2015
levels, the federal government optimally sets a minimum wage of nearly $7.25, which
confirms our calibration of ν is successful. The dashed line in the figure shows
35This calculation may overstate heterogeneity in preferences because states whose optimal poli-
cies are below $7.25 have no incentive to set their own. Using the 2015 effective minimum wages,
the correlation is 0.85, but for similar reasons this likely overstates heterogeneity. Heterogeneity in
other production parameters matters as well. The correlation between αj and the state policies is
-0.36.
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welfare as a function of centralized policy. Without the state policies, the federal
government optimally chooses a lower minimum wage of $6.90. Panel (a) of Figure
2.6 shows the relationship between tiered minimum wages and low-skilled wages
under centralization.36 This result is in line with the previous findings that state
and federal polices are strategic complements. Higher state minimum wages reduce
the high-skilled migration externality and allow the federal government to engage in
more redistribution by setting a higher wage floor itself.
(a) Aggregate Welfare (b) Welfare by Worker Type
Figure 2.5: U.S. Welfare and the Federal Minimum Wage
Note: Panel (a) plots total social welfare as a function of the federal minimum wage under tiered
and federal uniform minimum wage setting authorities. Welfare is normalized to be 0 under
optimal tiered policy setting with a federal minimum wage. Panel (b) splits welfare into the
contributions from low and high-skilled workers separately. Welfare is normalized to be 0 for each
worker type under optimal tiered policy setting.
Optimal centralized policy has a welfare loss of about 0.006 percent compared to
36Based on our calibration, the tiered minimum wages are binding in all states, while our simu-
lations predict that the optimal federal uniform minimum wage is only binding in 17 states.
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the tiered system.37 Although the aggregate welfare change is small, state and federal
minimum wages together are better able to redistribute to the low-skilled employed,
as shown in Panel (b) of Figure 2.5. The figures also show that suboptimal policy
in the form of low wages, for example due to information frictions discussed earlier,
has a higher social welfare cost under tiered policy setting. This is because many
states set their own policies at or above the federal level. High state policies become
more costly when the federal price floor falls. The opposite is true when the federal
governments sets too high of a minimum wage.38 However, as the federal policy
increases, the tiered and central uniform systems become more similar since only the
higher of the state and national policy is implemented. If the federal policy were
above $9.47, the two would be equivalent.
While the current U.S. minimum wage setting authority yields higher welfare
than centralized policy alone, it may be far from the social planner’s solution. The
48 states are heterogeneous in their productivity and low-skilled working costs, but
21 have effective minimum wage policies of $7.25. This is in part because states face
a different trade-off than the federal government as emphasized in equations 2.2 and
2.5, and because some states may be more or less progressive. Panel (b) of Figure 2.6
shows the relationship between the observed tiered policies, and those under federal
non-uniform. States below the 45 degree line have too high minimum wages under
tiered policy setting. When not limited to a single policy, the government can better
differentiate among states. Those subject to the $7.25 minimum wage in the tiered
37The competitive equilibrium has a welfare loss of 0.021 percent.
38When interpreting the value of the tiered system across different minimum wage levels, it is
important to note that the analysis in this section holds state policies fixed. If the federal minimum
wage were to fall (rise), states should lower (raise) theirs as well.
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(a) Centralization (b) Federal Non-Uniform
Figure 2.6: Comparing U.S. Minimum Wage Setting Authorities
Note: Panel (a) plots the low-skilled wages in each state under tiered and federal uniform policy
setting as well as a dotted 45 degree line for reference. Panel (b) similarly shows the relationship
between tiered policy and the optimal federal non-uniform.
system have federal non-uniform policies that range from $7.14 to $7.53. The federal
government also sets slightly higher minimum wages for states with initially high
policies in this case since it is able to better internalize the spillovers from high-
skilled migration. Overall, current U.S. policy closely matches the social optimum
predicted in this model with only a 0.05 percent welfare loss.
2.5.4 State Heterogeneity and Regional Redistribution
The minimum wage setting authority potentially impacts redistribution across states
in addition to skill groups. Under centralization, the federal government has one
policy lever that only directly affects the lowest productivity states. Higher federal
uniform policies will therefore redistribute to more productive states. To some extent,
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this can improve total welfare because the more productive states are larger and have
more low wage workers and unemployed, but a progressive government does not value
transferring wealth from low to high income areas. Moving from centralization to
the tiered system, there is an ambiguous effect on activity across states that depends
on the relative progressivity of different governments.
To measure how states would be differentially affected under centralization com-
pared to the current tiered system, the left three panels of Figure 2.7 show low-skilled
employment, and high-skilled location decisions and wages change under these two
regimes. Under centralization, Panel (a) shows that low-skilled employment is higher
in most places. It mostly, but not exclusively, increases in states with low tiered min-
imum wages. The states experiencing the biggest decreases from centralization, rep-
resented by points far below the 45 degree line, are all relatively small, which reflects
the government’s trade off of redistributing to large workforces and low wage places.
Without state minimum wages to reduce the high-skilled outmigration externality,
the low-skilled workers in the lowest productivity areas are hit the hardest.
There is very little state heterogeneity in the impact on high-skilled wages because
these workers are imperfectly mobile. If states became too different, some workers
will move. Panel (c) shows that wages are close to the 45 degree line, but nearly
uniformly above. With only a single low federal minimum wage of $6.90, aggregate
low-skilled employment increases in most states and drives up high-skilled wages.
Centralization alone has only a small effect on the high-skilled migration externality
and therefore allows for less redistribution from high to low-skilled workers, leading
to higher average wages. However, since low-skilled employment decreases in some
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states, high-skilled workers’ marginal products fall and they leave those affected low
productivity areas. For this reason, Panels (a) and (e) look similar.
The regional distributional consequences of federal non-uniform over tiered policy
setting are also ambiguous because states’ preferences may be very different from the
federal government. However, the optimal tiered minimum wages closely match the
federal non-uniform, and so the right three panels of Figure 2.7 also show very little
difference in low-skilled employment, and high-skilled location choices and wages.
2.5.5 A Brief Note on Decentralized Minimum Wage Setting
Competition between states for mobile high-skilled workers leads to low minimum
wages under decentralized policy setting. Local governments are therefore less able
to redistribute income from high to low-skilled workers. The amount of redistribution
under decentralization compared with other systems importantly depends on regional
heterogeneity in ν. Following the previous calibration for the federal government,
we aim to estimate νj, j = {1, ..., 48}, such that the observed 2015 minimum wage
in state j maximizes j’s welfare holding the other minimum wages fixed, so that
the 2015 tiered policies are a Nash equilibrium. Since only 27 states set a binding
minimum wage above $7.25, νj is not point identified for every state.
In the calibrated model, there does not exist νj that replicates the state’s 2015
policies. Under our assumptions and calibration, each state would prefer a smaller
minimum wage, holding all other states’ and the federal government’s policies con-
stant. That is, there does not exist a progressivity level such that the current state
minimum wages are best responses. There are several possible reasons why the model
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(a) Centralized Low-Skilled Employment (b) Federal Non-Uniform Low-Skilled Employ-
ment
(c) Centralized High-Skilled Wages (d) Federal Non-Uniform High-Skilled Wages
(e) Centralized High-Skilled Residencies (f) Federal Non-Uniform High-Skilled Residencies
Figure 2.7: The Impacts of Minimum Wage Setting Authorities Across States
Note: The left three panels (a, c and e) compare tiered and centralized policy setting, while the
right three (b, d, and f) compare the tiered and federal non-uniform systems. All figures contain a
a dotted 45 degree line for reference.
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is unable to match the data. First, governments may be more sophisticated. If a
states believes that others will set lower minimum wages too when it lowers its own
policy, then there are smaller gains from doing so. The main advantage of a lower
minimum wage is to attract more high-skilled workers, but the amount is a function
of low-skilled wages everywhere. Second, states could face political frictions. They
may not be able to set their policies on a continuum but are instead restricted to
a small grid. The observed policies may be optimal on the grid but not globally.
Finally, the model is potentially misspecified or, at least, states may have different
beliefs about the implied elasticities. In particular, the model implications for the
effect of the minimum wage on low-skilled unemployment and high-skilled wages may
not be true, for example if workers have monoposony power or the high-skilled have
larger moving costs. More work is needed in the future to better understand state
competition and minimum wage setting.
While we are unable to compare the decentralized and tiered equilibria explicitly,
we aim to measure the relative trade-off of local and federal policy setting, holding
preferences for redistribution fixed. Only 23 of the 48 states set binding minimum
wages under decentralization when all governments have the same value of ν equal
to 4.05. Without a binding policy in many states from the federal government, the
high-skilled migration externality is large and states optimally set lower minimum
wages. Figure 2.8 shows that the low-skilled wages in every state are lower under
decentralized policy setting compared to the current U.S. policies. However, total
welfare under this version of decentralization is only 0.009 percent lower than the
tiered system, or slightly worse than the centralized policy.
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Figure 2.8: Decentralized Minimum Wage Setting
2.6 Conclusion
This paper provides a framework to think about the interaction of minimum wage
setting and federalism. Previous optimal minimum wage research focuses on one
jurisdiction, which misses the implications of government competition. We first build
on the theoretical model of Lee and Saez (2012), extending it to a context in which
high-skilled labor is mobile across regions. We present sufficient conditions for the
desirability of a binding minimum wage, from the perspective of both a local and
central government. Though minimum wages are not optimal in the presence of
even a linear tax system in our model, their prevalence in the real world warrants
consideration from an optimal policy perspective.
We calibrate a two-region model of a federation and compare minimum wage
policies across four types of government structures: decentralization, centralization
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with uniform policy, a U.S.-style combination of both, and a social planner. In our
baseline model, the desirability of centralized policy setting is increasing in mobility;
when mobility is shut down completely, decentralization obtains the social planner’s
solution. However, when all movers face positive moving costs, and regions are
heterogeneous, then the decentralized outcome leads to higher total welfare than
federal uniform policy. Furthermore, suboptimal policy takes the form of minimum
wages that are too low, such that the tiered system we observe in the U.S. is weakly
preferred to either decentralization or centralization exclusively. In the tiered system,
the central uniform policy lessens the externalities from horizontal competition by
local governments leading both types of governments to set policies more closely
aligned with the social planner. Decentralized and centralized policy setting are
strategic complements. When we extend our framework to U.S. states, we find that
the tiered system closely matches the social planner’s solution. Our results indicate
that higher levels of government should not forbid lower levels from setting their
own minimum wages. These results are consistent across social welfare functions,
although the effect of heterogeneity may depend on the progressivity of the social
welfare function.
Though the U.S. system performs well relative to other potential systems, its
ability to efficiently redistribute income still falls short of a simple system of linear
taxes. From the perspective of our calibrated model, the existence of minimum wages
and redistributive taxes in the U.S. remains a puzzle. Further research remains to be
done on the types of models, economic or political in nature, which might give rise
to the joint optimality of both types of policies. It is likely that the income tax is not
142
set optimally due to political frictions, which lead to demand for other redistributive
policies. For now, our results suggest the policy makers should pay attention to the
mobility implications of minimum wage policies, as well as their interactions with
the existing tax system.
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CHAPTER III
Federalism, Fiscal Savings, and
Information Asymmetries
3.1 Introduction
The United States is an important example of fiscal federalism and fiscal unioniza-
tion. One of the main purposes of fiscal unionization is thought to be the ability of
a fiscal union to smooth idiosyncratic risks among its member jurisdictions (Farhi
and Werning, 2017b). The U.S. is a strong version of a fiscal union: the central
government enjoys full tax and spending power. One might expect that such a fis-
cal authority would fully insure subnational governments against risk; however, this
may not be the case if the central government itself faces significant frictions. The
behavior of state governments and the federal government in the U.S. provides a
useful case study to examine how fiscal policy is conducted by members of a strong
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federation.
Fiscal policy at the state level is an important component of the economic envi-
ronment in the U.S. Spending by subnational governments totaled 2.85 trillion dollars
in 2016, representing almost 15 percent of GDP; state government spending alone
made up 28 percent of total government spending.2 In addition, the makeup of state
government spending is fundamentally different than that of the federal government.
While federal government spending primarily constitutes defense, social security, and
interest payments, state governments tend to spend primarily on education and pub-
lic welfare (this includes Medicaid). Constraints faced by state governments differ
substantially from the federal government, as well; state governments interact with
different tax bases, and most face deficit limits of varying strengths.
In light of these observations, policy analysts should not expect state-level fiscal
policy to behave like federal policy. One major way in which state governments differ
from the U.S. government is in the use of Budget Stabilization Funds, or “Rainy Day
Funds”, to improve funding for public programs in times of fiscal distress. All fifty
state make use of rainy day funds; in 2017, Montana became the fiftieth state to
establish such a fund.3 The median balance of these funds in 2016 was 477 million
dollars, having built up significantly since their depletion after the Great Recession.
The presence and size of these funds indicates that fiscal savings may be an important
way in which U.S. states can enact fiscal policy over the business cycle, even in the





the question of this paper: How do U.S. states’ savings respond to business cycles
and federal fiscal policy, and what kinds of models might help us understand this
behavior?
3.1.1 Overview of Results
The broad results are as follows. I present three stylized facts about state public
finances over the business cycle: states engage in precautionary savings, transfers
from the federal government respond less to local shocks than national shocks, and
states whose cycles are less correlated with the national cycle tend to save more. I
obtain these facts using data on state government finances from two different sources,
under four possible definitions of state government savings; the results are robust to
the choice of definition for state government savings.
I interpret these facts as evidence that state government savings behavior is
driven both by balanced budget rules and by the transfer policies of the federal
government. To illustrate, I propose a model of a small open endowment economy
in a fiscal union; i.e., an economy under both a regional government and a central
government, much like a U.S. state. The regional government faces a debt limit,
but the central government observes the state of the world with a noisy signal.
The central government, therefore, is not able to fully insure the regional household
against adverse shocks, and the regional government must build up a stock of savings.
I calibrate the model to U.S. data, and find that it fits qualitative features of the
data quite well. The implied noise shock in the central government’s signal is almost
three times as large as the real economic shocks, indicating significant frictions to
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optimal policy making at the centralized level. The baseline calibration of the model
implies a 2.1 percent welfare loss relative to the social planner solution, indicating a
sizeable influence of the frictions in the model on household utility. Two variations
to the information structure of the central government yield very similar results
to the baseline model. I conclude that information (or other political) frictions at
the centralized level of policy making may create large deviations from the socially
optimal policy; this implies states should consider actively pursuing countercyclical
fiscal policies. Additionally, the results suggest that significant barriers to cross-
region risk sharing may still exist, even in the presence of a strong fiscal union.
3.1.2 Literature and Outline
This paper connects to a number of distinct strands of literature in economics re-
search. On the empirical side, Hines (2010) characterizes the behavior of state-level
spending over the business cycle, arguing that small and large states behave differ-
ently in response to macroeconomic conditions. Nakamura and Steinsson (2014b)
estimate government spending multipliers for U.S. states, using military spending
shocks from the central government. Owyang and Zubairy (2008) find heterogeneous
effects of fiscal stimulus in different states and regions of the union, depending on
regional makeup. In addition to these, Chodorow-Reich (2017) summarizes findings
from empirical literature on the effects of fiscal policy at subnational levels.
In the public finance literature, economies with fiscal federalism have been much
studied (Oates, 2008). This literature tends to compare public goods provision at the
local level to that at the central level. These models are static, however, and do not
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say much about cyclical policy. Furthermore, they tend to compare two methods of
public spending rather than having both local and central governments spending at
the same time. For the purposes of this model, I abstract from the choice of public
goods and study the optimal taxation behavior of states subject to an exogenous
stream of public goods. This is the approach taken by optimal fiscal policy papers
such as Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004), Chari and Kehoe (1999), and Bhandari
et al. (2017).
This paper also draws on the precautionary savings under credit constraints liter-
ature. Aiyagari (1994) is a key early example of this literature. Additionally, papers
such as Bianchi and Mendoza (2018) and Durdu, Mendoza, and Terrones (2009) ana-
lyze savings decisions and credit contraints explicitly in small open economy models;
I take this approach, though the optimizing agents of interest in my model are gov-
ernments, while households are passive. Bhandari et al. (2017) consider explicitly
fiscal policy for a credit constrained government with access to imperfect markets.
I contribute to this literature by considering the problem of a government conduct-
ing fiscal policy under debt limits, but in a small open economy when there is a
“higher” level of government which is also conducting policy, i.e., in a fiscal union or
federation.
Other papers have studied fiscal policy in the context of a union of economies.
Beetsma and Jensen (2005), Debrun (2000), and Ferrero (2009) consider optimal
fiscal policy for economies in a monetary union. Luque, Morelli, and Tavares (2014)
and Farhi andWerning (2017b) consider the desirability of explicit fiscal unionization.
This paper considers the strongest version of a fiscal union, in which the central
148
government has full power to tax and spend in addition to the regional governments;
this is the system in place in the U.S.
Models in which a central government might not have the same access to informa-
tion as local governments have been explored in other contexts. Bordignon, Manasse,
and Tabellini (2001), for example, consider optimal redistribution policy when in-
formation is asymmetric. Silva and Cornes (2000) examine information asymmetries
in the context of interregional transfers and public goods provision. In his survey
of the future of the fiscal federalism literature, (Oates, 2005) also mentions informa-
tion asymmetries between the different levels of government as a feature of federal
systems. This paper contributes to the information asymmetries literature in fiscal
federalism by applying the idea to a dynamic model of fiscal policy.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 presents the main stylized
facts of the paper. Section 3.3 introduces the information model with which the
stylized facts are interpreted. Section 3.4 calibrates, analyzes, and interprets the
model. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 State Government Savings: Three Stylized Facts
This section lays out three stylized facts apparent in the data on U.S. state gov-
ernment savings. First, state governments overwhelmingly engage in precautionary
savings: savings are positive and procyclical. Second, transfer receipts from the fed-
eral government are countercyclical, but depend more on the aggregate U.S. economy
than on a state’s idiosyncratic business cycle. Finally, states whose business cycles
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are less correlated with the national business cycle tend to save more than states
experiencing fluctuations more in step with the aggregate cycle. This section first
describes the data sources and definitions; the second subsection presents the three
facts.
3.2.1 Data and Descriptions
3.2.1.1 Data Sources
Several sources are used to assemble the data for this part of the paper. Data on
rainy day funds and end-period balances for state governments are obtained from the
National Association of State Budget Officers’ - hereafter, NASBO - “Fiscal Survey
of the States.” I use the spring edition of this semiannual report from 1979 to 2017
to obtain data from previous years which is self-reported by states and collected by
NASBO. Due to heterogeneity in the structure of BSFs, some state governments do
not report BSF balances separately from end-year balances, rendering analysis of
rainy day funds alone a bit hairy; I discuss this below when considering all possible
definitions of “savings.”4
Data on state government revenues, spending, and debt holdings comes from
the U.S. Census Bureau’s Census of Governments. While the full sample of local
governments is only administered every five years, all state governments are included
in the limited survey taken every year, such that yearly observations from 1970 to
2012 are available for every state. Other state variables of interest are provided at
4An appendix containing a full explanation of the data collection from NASBO reports is avail-
able upon request.
150
the yearly level on the website of the University of Kentucky’s Center for Poverty
Research. I estimate state-level recession dates using the Philadelphia Fed’s state
coincident index. National annual price level indices are obtained from the OECD.
3.2.1.2 Definition of Savings
In order to study the cyclical behavior of state government savings, some definition
of “savings” is naturally required. Four potential definitions are available in the
data; I choose to focus on a couple of them for ease of exposition. The first obvious
definition of state government savings is the balance of the state’s rainy day fund as
reported to NASBO. While some amount of heterogeneity exists across funds, and
not all states report their RDF balance separately from their general fund, budget
stabilization funds are a useful metric due to their explicit purpose of preparation for
adverse shocks. A second, and slightly more expansive, definition includes all end-
year balances in a state’s general fund; while such a measure will include unplanned
revenue and spending shocks, it captures all rainy day fund activity and provides a
consistent measure across states.
While the first two potential measures are taken from the NASBO reports, the
other two are found in the U.S. Census Bureau’s annual Census of Governments
dataset. The third potential measure of state government savings is a state’s net
assets–cash and securities less debt outstanding–not including assets set aside for
insurance purposes (pensions, etc.). The fourth measure is all of a state’s net assets,
including those in insurance-type funds.
My preferred measures of state government savings are measures two and three.
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These measures, total balances in general funds (including rainy day funds) and net
non-insurance assets, provide a nice balance between the ideal features of a savings
measurement. They are consistent across states, relatively general, and include a
good deal of long-term savings components. Importantly, however, the qualitative
results are not altered by the choice of savings measure.
3.2.2 Three Stylized Facts
3.2.2.1 Fact 1: State Savings Are Positive and Procyclical
The first stylized fact I identify is the presence of positive and procyclical savings
behavior on the part of state governments. Regardless of which measure of savings
measure is observed, U.S. states mostly run positive balances. This is not in itself
a surprising result; in fact, it is exactly what one might expect given the balanced
budget requirement imposed on 49 of the 50 U.S. states.5 Table 3.1 presents sum-
mary statistics for the savings measures of interest, both as a fraction of gross state
product and as a fraction of general current state government expenditures. Clearly,
states run positive levels of savings–0.5 percent or 4.3 percent, depending on the
definition–on average, although some observations do record negative savings levels.
In addition to being overwhelmingly positive, state government savings also move
with the business cycle. Figures 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 show how various percentiles
of the distribution of savings across states move over the business cycle for the
four measures of state savings, where the shaded regions indicate NBER recession
dates. Clearly, savings balances build up in economic expansions and spend down
5NCSL, 2010.
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Table 3.1: Measures of State Government Savings: Summary Statistics
Savings measure Mean Variance Percentiles
50th 10th 90th
BSF over GSP 0.0038 0.0003 0.0012 0 0.0040
Gen. fund balance over GSP 0.0051 0.0003 0.0026 0.0002 0.0083
Net noninsurance assets over GSP 0.0427 0.0139 0.0175 -0.0258 0.1060
Net total assets over GSP 0.1763 0.0208 0.1600 0.0594 0.2823
BSF over expenditures 0.0228 0.0066 0.0102 0 0.0371
Gen. fund balance over expenditures 0.0379 0.0063 0.0242 0.0013 0.0776
Net noninsurance assets over expenditures 0.3367 0.5174 0.1604 -0.2329 0.9355
Net total assets over expenditures 1.5531 0.7419 1.4838 0.6304 2.4441
Note: Moments reported here are over all state-year observations. Data on budget stabilization funds and general fund balance come
from the NASBO fiscal survey of the states, data on net assets come from the Census of Governments, and gross state products are
obtained from UKCPR. Sample periods are as follows: BSFs from 1985-2016, balances from 1979-2016, both net assets series from
1981-2012.
in recessions; this is consistent with the stated purpose of RDFs, which are included
in these measures. I interpret this behavior as being indicative of a precautionary
savings motive on the part of state governments, induced by the presence of balanced
budget rules and the desire of policy makers to smooth expenditures over the cycle.
As a supplemental example, I also plot the series of Kentucky’s balances over
GSP alongside its HP-filtered log GSP series in Figure 3.5. The cyclical behavior of
Kentucky’s balances seems acyclical in the 1980s; however, in the early 1990s they
come more into line with what would be expected under a precautionary savings
motive, building up in state level expansions and spending down during contractions.
Notably, the fund doesn’t simply respond to U.S. level decreases in output relative
to trend; it experiences a decrease in the mid-1990s and recently in the mid-2010s,
both corresponding to downturns in gross state product. Furthermore, note that the
mid-2000s recession seems to begin earlier in the state, and the state’s balances begin
to respond accordingly before the U.S. as a whole fell into recession. Furthermore,
over the entire sample the correlation coefficient of the two series is 0.40, further
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Figure 3.1: Real State Government Rainy Day Funds
Figure 3.2: Real State Government Total Balances
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Figure 3.3: Real State Government Net Financial Assets (Not Incl. Insurance Funds)
Figure 3.4: Real State Government Net Financial Assets
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Figure 3.5: Kentucky State Government Balances and Business Cycle
indication of significant precautionary savings behavior in Kentucky; similar behavior
is observed in other states.
3.2.2.2 Fact 2: Transfer Receipts Are Countercyclical and Respond Heav-
ily to National Cycle
The second stylized fact describes the behavior of state governments’ transfer re-
ceipts from the federal government. These transfer payments are countercyclical,
as one might expect, but respond quite differently to aggregate and idiosyncratic
fluctuations. Specifically, a state government’s transfer receipts from the federal
government respond more strongly to the condition of the U.S. economy as a whole
than to economic conditions within a state, running counter to the idea that fiscal
unions serve to smooth idiosyncratic risk across members. In other words, Michigan
might expect an increase in transfers when the rest of the country goes into recession,
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even if Michigan is expanding; conversely, Michigan may not expect as much revenue
from the federal government when it is contracting, if the rest of the country is doing
well.
In order to observe the relationship between business cycles and transfers from
the federal government to state governments, I estimate the following equation:
log(Tit) = 1 + β1yit + β2y−i,t + ΓXit + εit. (3.1)
In this equation, Tit represents the amount of transfers state i receives from the
federal government in year t. yit and y−i,t represent the cyclical components of state
i’s output and the sum of the other states’ outputs, respectively. Xit is a vector of
controls, including population and state fixed effects. There is, of course, a potential
source of endogeneity in this regression: transfers from the federal government to
state government i may have an effect on the local business cycle in state i, biasing
the estimate of β1 toward zero. In Appendix C.2, I instrument for yit and y−i,t using
a measure of monetary shocks, which I argue are plausibly exogeneous to state-level
transfers, and show that the main result of this section is not affected; if anything,
the difference is more stark.
Table 3.2 presents the output from a regression of state receipts from the federal
government on population, cyclical GSP, and the cyclical component of the sum of
the GSP of the other states; this corresponds to an estimation of Equation 3.1 with
a population control and standard errors clustered at the state level. The response
of federal transfers to a state respond more strongly to the cyclical component of the
aggregate economy (less GSP of the state itself) than to the idiosyncratic cycle of the
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Table 3.2: Determinants of State Government Receipts from Federal Government
Variable log(pop) log(GSPi), cyclical log(GSP−i), cyclical
Coefficient 0.0061 -0.2083** -0.5068***
(s.e.) (0.0021) (0.1016) (0.1111)
Note: Results from a fixed-effects regression estimating Equation 3.1 of receipts on the explanatory variables with standard errors
clustered at the state level. Observations include 46 states for which holes do not exist in the Census of Governments data from 1981
to 2012. * p ≤ 0.10, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01.
individual state. A one percent decrease in a state’s own GSP relative to trend results
in a 0.2 percent increase in transfer receipts; at the same time, a similar decrease in
other states’ GSP would yield a 0.5 percent increase in the state’s receipts.
For a bit more insight into the composition of these transfer receipts, consider
Figure 3.6. Clearly, the most significant component of federal government transfers to
states is the “public welfare” category; this category includes funding for a wide range
of public assistance programs that are administered at the state level, Medicaid being
the largest among them. the second biggest category is for education funding, and
the third for highways. The previous result about the response of federal transfers
to the business cycle of the aggregate economy seems to be driven by the two biggest
categories, public welfare and education, as both of these transfer categories exhibit
the same pattern of greater response to the aggregate business cycle.
That public welfare drives a large part of the main result in this section might raise
concern upon a first glance. The public welfare portion mainly consists of Medicaid
payments, unemployment insurance, etc.; these transfers are typically formulaic,
simply responding to claims made by low income individuals. Thus, it might seem
strange to claim, as the model below does, that the result displayed in Table 3.2 could
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Figure 3.6: Composition of Federal Transfers to States
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reflect some information or political friction in the fiscal policy system. However,
while the business-as-usual operations of these transfers involve responses to demand,
the federal government has shown that it is willing to step in and increase these
transfers in a discretionary way in response to large business cycle shocks. The most
recent example of such an action is in the American Reinvestment and Recovery
Act (ARRA) of early 2009, which was the largest fiscal stimulus response to the
Great Recession in the U.S. The ARRA included an increase in Medicaid payments
amounting to about $87 billion dollars to be paid to states6, over and above what
would normally have been paid, for the years 2009 and 2010.
Such a discretionary increase in these payments is exactly in line with the results
found in this section; the federal government only responded with large increases in
Medicaid transfers when the whole country was in recession, rather than in response
to idiosyncratic state-level downturns. This only matters, of course, if state-level
business cycles are substantially different from the aggregate business cycle. I argue
here that state-level recessions are indeed quite distinct from the aggregate business
cycle, and occur with greater frequency.
To identify state-level recessions, I follow Brown (2017) by using the Philadelphia
Fed’s monthly coincident indices, which are available both for states and for the U.S.
as a whole. I identify the turning points of the cyclical component of this index using
the modified BBQ (MBBQ) algorithm from Engel7, and identify recessions for the
U.S. and all fifty states therein. While only 4 recessions are identified for the U.S. over
6https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20100715.109669/full/
7Engel modifies the BBQ algorithm of Harding and Pagan (2002), and provides code at http:
//www.ncer.edu.au/data.
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the sample period (1979-2017), most states experienced more than four recessions;
furthermore, states were in recession for an average of 73 months, compared to just
46 months for the U.S. nationally. These recession differences suggest that U.S. states
experience heterogeneous idiosyncratic shocks apart from the U.S. business cycle as
a whole.
That states’ business cycles differ substantially from the U.S. business cycle sug-
gests the transfer responses identified here will have significant implications for risk
in state government budgets. Notably, a state whose business cycle moves more in-
dependently from the rest of the country might be exposed to more risk because of
the federal transfer system than an otherwise equal state whose cycle moved more
instep with the U.S. cycle. Having already identified possible precautionary savings
behavior by state governments, one might expect these independent states’ govern-
ments to save more relative to other states; indeed, that is what these policy makers
do, as I show in the following section.
3.2.2.3 Fact 3: Less Correlated States Save More
If the transfer policy of the U.S. federal government to U.S. state governments doesn’t
respond as much to idiosyncratic fluctuations, then states whose cycles are less cor-
related with the rest of the country might be expected to run higher balances of
government savings. To evaluate this prediction, I develop a measure of a state’s
correlation with the business cycle of the rest of the country. For each state, I apply
an HP-100 filter to two annual time series: the state’s annual real GSP series and
real U.S. GDP less the state’s GSP. The long-run correlation of the cyclical compo-
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nent of each of these time series yields the correlation of a state’s business cycle with
that of the other 49 states. In this section, I show that this “correlation” measure is
negatively associated with precautionary savings behavior on the part of U.S. state
governments.
Figures 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10 show the time path of state government savings
for the five most correlated and least correlated U.S. states with GDP.8 Clearly,
states whose business cycles are least correlated with the U.S. business cycle run
higher levels of government savings as a percentage of GSP than those which are
most correlated. The most stark example is Figure 3.9, in which the most correlated
states on average run slightly negative net assets (not including insurance funds).
For a flavor of how correlations vary across the U.S., see Figure 3.11, in which states
whose cyclical GSP is more correlated with U.S. GDP are highlighted.
Of course, there are a multitude of factors determining how correlated a state is
with the rest of the country, some of which may also affect a state government’s level
of savings. To further demonstrate the relationship between the correlation measure
and a state’s government savings, I estimate the equation
sit = 1 + β1yit + β2y
cycle
it + β3ρi + β4ρiy
cycle
it + ΓXit + εit. (3.2)
Here sit is some measure of state government savings, yit is gross state product, ycycleit
is its cyclical component, and ρi is the main explanatory variable of interest, namely,
a state’s correlation with the business cycle of the rest of the country. Because ρi
8For the remainder of the paper, I disregard Alaska. Alaska’s reserve funds are massive in
comparison to the other states, and it is the least correlated with the rest of the U.S. The case of
Alaska certainly supports my conclusions, but I want to prevent it from driving the results entirely.
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Figure 3.7: Average BSF Over GSP
Figure 3.8: Average State Government Total Balances Over GSP
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Figure 3.9: Average State Government Assets Over GSP (Not Incl. Insurance Funds)
Figure 3.10: Average State Government Assets Over GSP
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Figure 3.11: State Correlations with the National Business Cycle
Note: Darker shade indicates a state’s business cycle is more correlated with the business cycles of
the other 49 states. Highest value is Illinois, with a correlation of 0.83.
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Table 3.3: Determinants of State Government Balances
Dependent variable log(∼ Real balances) Real balances / GSP Real balances / Expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Business cycle correlation -0.0920** -0.0825* -0.0847* -0.0054*** -0.0038** -0.0038** -0.0412*** -0.0262** -0.0262**
(0.0412) (0.0466) (0.0468) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0144) (0.0128) (0.0127)
Log(GSP), cyclical 0.5505*** 0.4131** 0.1138 0.0225*** 0.0177*** 0.0167*** 0.3036*** 0.2536*** 0.2487***
(0.1886) (0.1885) (0.0789) (0.0042) (0.0050) (0.0063) (0.0377) (0.0454) (0.0547)
Log(GSP), cyclical * High correlation - - 0.9854* - - 0.0031 - - 0.0155
(0.5528) (0.0068) (0.0652)
Log(GSP) 0.0537*** 0.0570*** 0.0577*** - - - - - -
(0.0124) (0.0131) (0.0132)
Controls N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y
Note: This table reports results estimating Equation 3.2 for state balances. The sample for these regressions is 49 U.S. states (Alaska
not included) for the years 1981-2012. The regressions are according to a random effects model. Standard errors are clustered at the
state level. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Table 3.4: Determinants of State Government Net Assets (Not Incl. insurance funds)
Dependent variable log(∼ Real net assets) Real net assets / GSP Real net assets / Expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Business cycle correlation -1.2630*** -1.2365*** -1.2320*** -0.1168*** -0.0605** -0.0607** -1.0787*** -0.5528*** -0.5541***
(0.3325) (0.3857) (0.3845) (0.0393) (0.0267) (0.0267) (0.3393) (0.2115) (0.2118)
Log(GSP), cyclical 0.9278** 0.5754 0.0538 0.0513* 0.0581* 0.0202 0.9424*** 1.0980*** 0.9055***
(0.3416) (0.6129) (0.6406) (0.0274) (0.0328) (0.0381) (0.1349) (0.1655) (0.2011)
Log(GSP), cyclical * High correlation - - 1.8011** - - 0.1196*** - - 0.6059**
(0.7729) (0.0413) (0.2714)
Log(GSP) 0.1993** 0.3001*** 0.2979*** - - - - - -
(0.0834) (0.0857) (0.0852)
Controls N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y
Note: This table reports results estimating Equation 3.2 for non-insurance assets. The sample for these regressions is 49 U.S. states
(Alaska not included) for the years 1981-2012. The regressions are according to a random effects model. Standard errors are clustered
at the state level. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
is a time-invariant object at the state level, I estimate a random-effects model9 and
cluster standard errors at the state level. Tables C.2 and C.3 give the output from
a selection of these regressions for the two preferred definitions of state government
savings.
Clearly, the relationship between “correlation” and state government savings is
negative and significant in all specifications of the estimation model. The interpre-
tation is exactly the stylized fact highlighted in this section: states whose business
cycles are less correlated with the rest of the U.S. run higher levels of government
9Wooldridge, 2010.
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savings. Evidence of the procyclicality of these savings balances is also seen in most
specifications. Qualitatively, these results are robust to any of the aforementioned
measures of state government savings.10
Among the controls, the variance of a state’s cyclical GSP is sometimes positively
related with savings levels, lending more evidence to the idea that these savings
measures capture precautionary savings behavior.11 There may also be weak evidence
that the less correlated governments are more hesitant to spend out of their savings
in bad times, perhaps out of desire to have funds in case worse conditions hit later.
Regarding other control variables of interest, states with Democrat governors tend to
run lower levels of savings, and the strength of a state’s balanced budget rule seems
not to be associated with higher savings levels. I include a fuller version of some of
these regressions in Appendix C.3.
When combined with stylized facts 1 and 2, this third fact hints at an impor-
tant feature of the effect of the federalist structure of the U.S. on state-level fiscal
policy. It seems that, by exposing less correlated state governments to more risk
by not insuring them against downturns as much as the more correlated states, the
federal government creates stronger incentives for these state governments to engage
in precautionary savings behavior. The rest of the paper attempts to expand on this
story by putting forth a quantitative model of federalism and government policy over
the business cycle that are able to reproduce these facts and others related to public
finance over the business cycle. The model will allow counterfactual analysis of poli-
10The stylized fact also remains when the regressions are weighted by GSP.
11Seegert (2017) documents the rise in volatility of state tax revenues over time; this may also
explain some of the rise in the savings measure over time for many states.
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cies like balanced budget rules at the state level, shed light on the broader debate
about the role for states in pursuing countercyclical fiscal policy, and contribute to
the discussions aboutfiscal unionization. For example, counter to Oates (1972), if
real frictions to centralized fiscal policy are sizeable enough, it may be optimal for
lower levels of government to engage in stimulus policy.
3.3 An Information Model
To begin thinking about the cyclical behavior of state government savings in a quan-
titative sense, I put forward a model of multi-tiered governments and imformation
asymmetries. The basic structure of the model is as follows: a state is modeled as a
small endowment economy in a fiscal federation, or a “region,” to avoid confusing us-
age of the word “state.” There are two levels of benevolent governments, regional and
central, each with its own advantages and disadvantages. The regional government
must provide a certain level of some public good, but is subject to strict borrowing
limits. The central government is not subject to borrowing restrictions and makes
tax and transfer policy to help regional governments smooth consumption, but only
observes the state of the world with a noisy signal.
The balanced budget restriction at the regional level versus the information fric-
tion at the central level is the key trade-off in the allocation of fiscal policy. In a
model without frictions, there would be no difference between the provision of financ-
ing for the public good at the local or central level, as either government would be
able to perfectly smooth the representative household’s consumption over the cycle.
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Furthermore, in the presence of any sort of balanced budget requirement or a similar
disadvantage in smoothing consumption at the local level, it would be optimal for
the central government to take over all countercyclical fiscal policy, leaving the local
government to simply levy a tax exactly equal to public goods spending.12 This is
one conventional wisdom on federalism and fiscal policy articulated in Oates (1972).
Such specialization in fiscal policy is not observed in the data, however. As noted
above, U.S. states engage in precautionary savings behavior. Therefore, it is likely
not the case that centralized fiscal policy is strictly preferred to decentralized policy;
there must be some trade-off between policies at regional and central levels. I propose
to model this trade-off by way of an information friction on the part of the central
government. While the central government has an advantage in its ability to smooth
consumption through borrowing and/or compulsory transfers, it does not observe the
state of the economy exactly, receiving a noisy signal about the endowment shock.
Because of this, the central government will not respond perfectly to region-specific
shocks, requiring the regional government to save up funds in order to smooth.
This way of motivating the trade-off is consistent with discussions about the ad-
vantages of state and local governments vis-a-vis central governments. For example,
the CBO references differences in information about citizens’ situations and prefer-
ences as a reason why local government action might be preferred in some cases,13
12Goodspeed (2016) studies the trade-off between federal transfers and rainy-day funds, where
the relative effectiveness of each government’s fiscal policies may differ structurally. In this case,
the central government may not want to fully take over.
13CBO (2013) captures the basic tradeoff: “[Federal grants] can increase economic efficiency in
instances when state and local governments have localized knowledge that would allow them to
implement a program more efficiently and effectively than the federal government could, but they
lack an incentive or funding to provide as much of a good or service as would be desirable from a
national perspective...”
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and Bordignon, Manasse, and Tabellini (2001) examines the behavior of optimal
transfers when local governments have better information about their tax bases than
the federal government. The “signal” method of modeling an information friction
provided here can be interpreted in a number of ways. The most obvious interpreta-
tion is that of a central fiscal authority having imperfect measurement of indicators
the regional economy14; however, it could also be that a far-away central authority,
although receiving accurate measurements, is not as “tuned in” as local authorities
with the effects on local citizens of the observed shocks.
Furthermore, an even more reduced form interpretation of the information friction
is that it captures other factors which might dampen the ability of a central fiscal
authority to respond to local shocks, including political economy frictions like slow
or biased legislatures; below I elaborate on the relationship between the information
and political economy models. The idea that local governments have better ability to
know and match the preferences of their constituents goes all the way back to Tiebout
(1956), and the political economy friction imposed by a legislature in centralized
provision is found most notably in (Besley and Coate, 2003). That the federal
government insures national shocks more consistently than local shocks suggests
using some sort of friction in a model involving federal transfers; while I choose in this
paper to explore an information interpretation, the political economy interpretation
is also a helpful framework. The information angle serves as an example of how
information economics can be applied to policy problems.
14Such imperfect information is likely not a lack of data but a lack of more informal information




Income for the household in region i is allocated exogenously according to an endow-
ment process. The household is passive; it does not engage in any behavior to affect
its consumption.15 The endowment in period t for region i is given by the following:
yit = ȳ + γzit + εit, (3.3)
where ȳ is the long-run mean of income, zit is an aggregate component, εit is an id-
iosyncratic component, and γ multiplies the aggregate component. Both components
follow an AR(1) process, for example, the process for εit is given by
εit = ρεεi,t−1 + ξ
ε
it, (3.4)
where ξε ∼ N(0, σ2ε ).
Note that regions here are modeled as a continuum of ex-ante identical islands.
The lack of ability to trade with other regions is an extreme assumption, but it high-
lights the lack of complete insurance available to the regional agents. It also elimi-
nates the complications that might be introduced by regional governments competing
strategically with one another. While inter-region games are no doubt interesting,
15The household may be thought to engage in one action, namely, the election of a regional
government. In the framework here of a representative household, a government whose preferences
exactly align with the household’s is elected; this is exactly the type of regional government I
consider. Equating the household and government’s preferences and decisions for consumption and
savings is a strategy used in Aguiar and Amador (2011).
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the strategic interactions of interest in this paper are those between the central gov-
ernment and the subnational governments.
3.3.1.2 Regional Government
The problem of the government in region i is to choose a stream of taxes and sav-
ings, τit and sit, to finance an exogenous stream of government purchases git, which
generate no utility. The preferences of the government are exactly aligned with those











The government is subject to the following constraints:
cit = yit − τit
git + sit = τit + Tit + (1 + r)si,t−1
sit ≥ φ,
where τit is the lump sump tax chosen in period t, sit is the savings (negative debt)
of the regional government, yit is the endowment, git is required government spend-
ing, φ is the per-period borrowing constraint, and Tit is the fiscal transfer from the
federal government, which will be taken as given from the perspective of the regional
government.
The transfers will result from the policy function of the central government,
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T (st, zt, θt, ft), where θ is a noisy signal of εt which is unobserved by the regional
government, and ft is its prior belief about εt; both of these will be explained shortly.
Given the observed state variables, the regional government cannot predict transfers
T exactly, and must choose its policy to maximize expected utility over the possible
realizations of the transfer function, such that its dynamic programming problem
can be described by the following equation:




V R(st+1, zt+1, εt+1)
]
s.t. ct + st+1 = yt + T (st, zt, θt, ft) + (1 + r)st − gt.
(3.6)
Note the presence in this problem of an expectation operator on current period
consumption; in this model, the local government chooses next period savings before
observing the realization of transfers T from the central government, and must use
taxes and subsidies to balance the budget at the end of the period.
3.3.1.3 Central Government
In addition to the regional government, the central government features as a second
optimizing agent in the model. Its inclusion reflects the fact that, in the context of the
U.S., the federal government is not a passive agent with regard to fiscal policy. While
much federal spending, such as the Social Security program, is indeed formulaic, the
federal government also engages in a large amount of discretionary spending, up to a
third of which is a direct transfer to the states. The central government is benevolent,
so its optimization problem at first glance is almost equivalent to that of the regional
government:
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V C(st+1, zt+1, θt+1, ft+1)
]
s.t. ct + s(st, zt, εt) = yt + Tt + (1 + r)st − gt.
(3.7)
Note, however, that the differences between the two decision problems are not in-
consequential; the model generates a wedge between the decision rules even in the
presence of identical welfare functions.16 First, the central government’s choice vari-
able is Tt rather than st. While the fiscal balance carried over into the next period
is chosen by the regional governments, the central government chooses how much
to give to (or take from) the regional governments in the form of transfers in each
period. Furthermore, there is no period budget balance necessarily required on the
part of the central government. I assume that the central government can perfectly
observe the aggregate shock zt; as a result, it is able to perfectly insure the regions
against aggregate shocks. Therefore, for the remainder of the paper I abstract from
the aggregate shocks, and consider a model with only idiosyncratic shocks and the
recasted policy functions s(st, εt, ft) and T (st, θt, ft). Given this recasting, two mech-
anisms can be employed to discipline the financial behavior of the central government
and prevent it from accumulating debt indefinitely.
The first mechanism that can be employed is budget balance over the infinite
horizon, i.e., a no-Ponzi-game condition on the central government’s assets. In this
16This paper abstracts from the possibility that the regional government could simply tell the
central government what its state is. The information friction might be thought of as the noise
introduced as information is passed from lower levels of government to higher levels. Of course,
differences in objective functions would exacerbate the differences in behavior, but the information
mechanism alone is of sufficient interest for the purposes of this paper.
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framework, there is a finite number of regions, and the central government has a stock
of assets out of which positive transfers are paid and into which negative transfers









where At is the stock of assets held by the central government for the purposes of
transfers to the regional government.
The second method is to have period budget balance and an infinite number of
regional governments. In this setup, the central government in every period takes
from some regions and gives to others, such that total transfers (for idiosyncratic
shocks) net out to zero: ∫
Titdi = 0. (3.9)
For the simple case in which all regions are identical, solving for the transfer func-
tion in this case is analytically equivalent to the solution for the first mechanism.
Appendix C.4 shows that both mechanisms result in the simple budget condition
E0
[
T (st, θt, ft)
]
= 0.
In addition to the differences in choice variables, note that the state variables are
also different for the central government. The central government observes st, but
receives a noisy signal θt about the state variable εt:
θt = εt + ξ
θ
t
ξθt ∼ N (0, σ2ξθ).
(3.10)
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Here, ξθt is the noise component of the signal, and σξθ reflects the relative noisiness
of the signal. Finally, the central government brings into the period a prior belief on
the distribution of the idiosyncratic component ε: ft = N (µt, σ2µ,t). After observing
the signal, the central government updates this prior to form a posterior with which
it forms its expectation for the choice of transfer, then projects this posterior forward
into the next period using the law of motion for ε. This process is described in further
detail in the next section.
3.3.2 Bayesian Updating
The central government begins time period t with a prior belief ft on the distribution
of εt: ft = N (µt, σ2µ,t). Upon observing the noisy signal θt, the central government
updates its belief to f̂t = N (µ̂t, σ̂2µ,t) according to the following rules, which mimic
the classic signal extraction problem put forth in Lucas (1973):














It is this distribution f̂t that the central government uses to form its expectations
when solving for its optimal policy. The extent to which the belief about the mean
is updated after observing the signal is determined by the relative variance of the
noisy portion of the signal. The noisier the signal, the less weight is attached to it
in the process of forming beliefs about the region’s endowment.
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At the end of the period, the central government must form its belief about εt+1,
which is the prior distribution it will bring into the next period as a state variable.
These priors for period t+ 1 are formed from applying the known AR(1) process to
the posteriors formed in period t:








Given these laws of motion, the posterior variance σ̂2µ,t is bounded in the long run,
and under certain conditions converges to a single value. In Appendix C.5, I show
that the fixed point is
σ̂2µ,∞ =














In solving the model, I assume that the central government has already reached this
value for the posterior variance. This eliminates another state variable and allows
the belief about the distribution of ε to be characterized by movements in µt.
3.3.3 Timing and Equilibrium
The timing of events in the model is as follows. In every period t,
1. All shocks ξ are realized.
2. Regional governments observe the true shock to their endowment ξε, but not
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the private signal θt. The central governments observes the noisy signal θt.
3. The central government forms its update belief f̂t from the prior belief f and
the signal θt.
4. Transfers and next period savings are chosen and committed to simultaneously
by the central government and regional governments, respectively.
5. Regional taxes adjust to satisfy the choice of st+1, given the realization of Tt.
6. The central government uses f̂t to form ft+1, the prior belief going into the
next period.
Definition: A Markov Perfect Equilibrium is a set of policy functions
{
s(st, εt, ft), T (st, θt, ft)
}
such that, given exogenous processes for εt, θt, and gt,
1. s(st, εt, ft) solves the regional government’s problem given T (st, θt, ft), and
2. T (st, θt, ft) solves the central government’s problem given s(st, εt, ft).
Here I define the equilibrium with one region, but in principle there could be
many of these regions, each with its own equilibrium with respect to the central
government. Since these regional governments are islands in the model, the solutions
are separable, and it is helpful to cast the problem in terms of one region only.
Note that the simultaneity is an important assumption in the model. If, upon
realization of shocks, one government moved first, then its move would reveal what its
information was. A sequential game, therefore, would include signaling elements into
the strategic decision-making process. While signaling may be an important factor
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in reality, whether the local or federal government is the more realistic first mover
within a period is unclear. Additionally, given that, in the real world, policy-making
is a continuously ongoing process, the simultaneity assumption is not particularly
incredible.
3.3.4 Relation to a Political Economy Model
Thus far, I have specified the main friction to central government policy making as a
matter of imperfect information and learning on the part of the central government.
The other compelling source of inefficiency in centralized policy is political in nature.
Discretionary transfers to regions/states and their agencies originate from budgetary
decisions made in a legislative body; while noisy signals are likely at play here,
political processes and voting are a major determinant of transfers. The federal
government may not respond to idiosyncratic shocks simply because others vote
down extra transfers to places in recession.
While the political story is somewhat different, I propose that the information
frictions modeled above can be thought of as including political frictions, as well.
To see this, consider a simplified version of the information model, in which there is
no persistence for the idiosyncratic component (ρε = 0) for simplicity. Suppose the
noise shock ξθ can take on one of two values: ξθ ∈ [−ξ̄θ, ξ̄θ], each with probability
1/2, where ξ̄θ > 0. From the perspective of the regional government, which knows
the true ε as well as the transfer function T (s, θ), it could receive one of two values for
the transfer. If ξθ = −ξ̄θ, transfer T will be higher than it would be in a frictionless
model, and vice versa if ξθ = ξ̄θ. So the regional government forms its expectations
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and policy knowing that, given s and ε, its transfer will be either Thigh or Tlow, each
with probability 1/2.
Now consider a slightly different model, in which the friction to centralized policy
making is political, i.e., transfers are voted on by a legislature for the central gov-
ernment. Following the political economy setup of Besley and Coate (2003), suppose
there are two regions in the fiscal federation, and utility spillovers of the following
type:
Ui(ci, c−i) = (1− κ)u(ci) + κu(c−i), κ ∈ (0, 1/2).
Transfers are chosen by the legislature, which is modeled using the minimum winning
coalition strategy. In every period, each region has probability 1/2 of being “in
power,” i.e., casting the median vote on transfer policy. If a region ends up in power,
it receives a higher-than-efficient transfer, Thigh, and if it is the minority, it receives
a lower-than-efficient transfer Tlow.17 So, just as in the simple model of information,
this framework requires the regional government to set policy knowing that it will
receive Thigh or Tlow with probability 1/2, and we can expect its behavior to be similar
to that in the simple information model. Given that a well known and widely used
model of political frictions can be mapped into a similar version of the information
model presented here, I think it reasonable to think of the “information” friction as
potentially including political factors, as well.
17Here, as in Besley and Coate’s model, the spillover term κ ensures that the deciding voter does
not completely disregard the utility of the other region.
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3.4 Quantitative Analysis
3.4.1 Estimation and Calibration
In order to examine the properties of the model, it is sufficient to consider the
case of a single region. There are no interactions in this model across sectors, and
the interactions of interest are between the regional governments and the central
government. Given this strategy, I attempt to get some results roughly corresponding
to the ‘median’ U.S. state. I estimate an AR(1) model for HP-100 filtered log(GSP )
in all 50 states, and set ρε and σε to be the respective medians of the AR(1) parameter
estimates. I then calibrate σξθ to match the median of corr(Tt, yt), the correlation
of transfer receipts from the federal government with output, at the state level.
Parameters for the baseline case are given in Table 3.5. I normalize ȳ = 1 and
set gt = g = 0.05 to roughly approximate data on U.S. state government spending.
Utility is CRRA: u(c) = c1−ν−1
1−ν , and I let ν = 2. I choose an annual interest rate of
0.04, and set the discount rate such that β < 1
1+r
to keep the region from wanting to
increase savings indefinitely.18 I set φ = 0 to reflect the balanced budget constraints
that are present in most U.S. states, and choose a realistic upper bound for regional
government savings of 0.2, which is not binding in the baseline case. Later, I study
the potential welfare effects of lowering φ, but 0 is an intuitive choice for the baseline
case. I also restrict the transfer policy to respond linearly to the central government’s
signal, given its prior beliefs. This does not alter its optimal policy much, but it
greatly eases the computation burden involved in solving the problem.
18Aiyagari, 1994.
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Table 3.5: Baseline Parameters, Information Model
ρε ξ
ε ξθ ȳ g ν φ β r
0.5095 0.0280 0.0671 1 0.05 2 0 0.961 0.04
I solve for the equilibrium policy functions by the use of an “inner loop, outer
loop” strategy. The “inner loop” refers to the process of solving for each policy
function given the policy function of the other government. The regional government
policy is solved by value function iteration, and the central government policy is a
static optimization problem, since its choices do not affect its future value function.
The ‘outer loop,’ then, repeats this process, updating each policy function until both
have converged.
3.4.2 Results
To assess the performance of the model compared to U.S. data, I simulate the cali-
brated baseline region for 10000 periods and observe its behavior. Table 3.6 presents
some basic moments for some of the key variables of interest. Of the moments which
are not explicitly targeted, corr(yt, st), the co-movement of local government savings
and output matches remarkably well. The autocorrelation of transfer receipts is a bit
low, but in an acceptable qualitative range. The variability of savings and transfers
are low relative to the data, but their relative magnitudes to each other seem to
make sense.
The one outlier, of course, is the behavior of savings. In the model, savings is
more persistent and less variable than it is in the data. One reason for this may be
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Table 3.6: Business Cycle Moments
Model Data (median of log hp-100 filter at state level)
corr(yt, Tt) -0.1457 -0.1536
corr(yt, st) 0.2674 0.2862
corr(yt, yt−1) 0.5205 0.5430
corr(Tt, Tt−1) 0.1670 0.3531




Note: Moments reported here are for the cyclical components of HP filters of these variables.
the following: the moments I report in the data are in the extreme long-run case of a
static economy. Savings here doesn’t grow over time: once it reaches a desired level,
it stays there and simply fluctuates around that level. It may be that, in the real
world, U.S. states have not yet ‘settled’ into their desired long-run levels of savings,
thus exhibiting more unpredictability.
I also compute the impulse response functions of savings and transfers to id-
iosyncratic shocks. Figures 3.12 and 3.13 give the predictions from the model, while
Figures 3.14 and 3.15 display results from the data. The IRFs from the data are
computed from running a VAR with savings (or transfer), state GSP, and U.S. GDP
for all 50 states; I plot the median of the estimated IRFs and the median of the
confidence bands. The model predicts a hump-shaped response of savings to an
idiosyncratic regional shock, and the data seems to present some weak evidence in
favor of this prediction. The complete lack of response of transfers to the regional
shock is also consistent with the model, which predicts a response that is stunningly
low in magnitude.
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Figure 3.12: IRF of Savings to GSP Shock, Model
Figure 3.13: IRF of Transfers to GSP Shock, Model
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Figure 3.14: IRF of Savings to GSP Shock, Data
Figure 3.15: IRF of Transfers to GSP Shock, Data
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The lack of much meaningful transfer response in the model is consistent with
the data, and is driven by the massive information cost implied by the baseline
calibration. To generate a realistically low correlation between local fluctuations and
transfer receipts from the federal government, the variability of the noise component
of the central government’s signal has to be almost three times as large as that of
the real idiosyncratic shock. Even though such a sizeable noise shock is necessary to
match the data relatively well, information costs that large seem almost incredible.
Certainly, in the real world, the frictions at the level of centralized policy making
are more diverse; for example, political dynamics are likely an important part of a
central government’s inability (or unwillingness) to insure regions against adverse
shocks. In the context of this model, all such frictions are being captured by the
single noise parameter; nevertheless, its size implies a central government that is
quite weak in responding to economic shocks at the regional level.
3.4.3 Model Extensions
The baseline model makes an assumption on the nature of the central government’s
knowledge set; specifically, that the central government observes a noisy signal on the
idiosyncratic state and beginning-of-period savings, but is not able to back out the
previous period’s idiosyncratic shock. This information structure is in the middle,
so to speak, of two other possible setups, for which I present results in this section.
I show that both model extensions behave in a qualitatively similar way to the
baseline model, with only a couple key differences. These similarities suggest that
the presence of this noisy signal is indeed the key driver of the quantitative results.
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Table 3.7: Business Cycle Moments
Baseline Model Data Extension 1 (observes lag perfectly) Extension 2 (does not observe savings)
corr(yt, Tt) -0.1457 -0.1536 -0.1999 -0.1485
corr(yt, st) 0.2674 0.2862 0.2643 0.2588
corr(yt, yt−1) 0.5205 0.5430 0.5319 0.512
corr(Tt, Tt−1) 0.1670 0.3531 0.0420 0.1779
corr(st, st−1) 0.9466 0.1072 0.9590 0.9405
sd(yt) 0.0366 0.0281 0.0377 0.0387
sd(Tt) 0.0170 0.0694 0.0173 0.0134
sd(st) 0.0549 1.16 0.0619 0.0568
Note: Moments reported here are for the cyclical components of HP filters of these variables.
Model extension 1 allows the central government to perfectly back out the pre-
vious period’s idiosyncratic state εt−1. This could either come from its observation
of st or a lagged ability to obtain data on local economic conditions, and either
interpretation is fine for the solution of the model. While extension 1 represents
an improvement on the central government’s ability to obtain information relative
to the baseline model, extension 2 is a tighter restriction. In extension 2, the cen-
tral government is not able to observe the region’s savings account whatsoever; it
must form an expectation about local savings based on its posterior beliefs and its
knowledge of the regional government’s policy function.
Moments from the simulations of the two model extensions, along with the base-
line model and the data, are given in Table 3.7. For each of these extensions, I use
the parameterization from the baseline model for direct comparison with the baseline
model. The model extensions behave in many respects very similarly to the base-
line model, especially extension 2, suggesting that the exact nature of the central
government’s relationship with information on local savings is not the key driver of
the model. The main difference occurs in model extension 1, in which transfers are
more correlated with regional business cycles, with a much lower autocorrelation.
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This is to be expected, given that the central government’s prior is more accurate
in this extension. The impulse response functions in these extensions unsurprisingly
behave similarly in the extensions, with extension 1 displaying a stronger response
of transfers to shocks, unsurprisingly with a one-period delay for the peak response,
given that perfect information is revealed one period later.
3.4.4 Welfare Analysis
The precautionary savings behavior in the model depends critically on the presence
of a strict limit on deficits on the part of the regional governments. This is a realistic
feature of the model, given the widespread use of such balanced budget rules in the
real world. In this model, such rules are not a result of optimizing behavior, but
external parameters imposed on the agents. There are no other frictions on policy
at the local level; therefore, were balanced budget rules to be sufficiently relaxed,
regional governments would be able to achieve the social planner solution of full
consumption smoothing for the household. By studying the effects of removing this
constraint, I can say something about the welfare loss imposed by the baseline model
relative to the social planner, as well as examine the potential effects of removing a
balanced budget constraint.
To compute social welfare in the region, I solve the model and then simulate
it starting at s0 = 0, ε0 = 0, with time-0 social welfare being given by the sum
of discounted utilities. As φ is lowered, the model approaches the social planner
outcome quite quickly; when φ ≤ −0.10, the model essentially matches the social
optimum. The implied welfare loss of the balanced budget rule (combined with the
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frictions on the central government, of course), then, is about 2.1 percent of welfare
in the social planner case. This is, of course, a sizeable number. All of this loss
occurs in the early periods, when the regional government increases taxes in order
to build up its stock of savings to its desired long-run level. From this point on, the
household is better off than it would be in the no-balanced-budget case, due to the
extra interest income for its government, but these gains are far outweighed by the
losses in early periods.
3.4.5 Implications for Fiscal Policy
The model presented in this paper implies that significant structural frictions to
optimal countercyclical fiscal policy making may exist at centralized levels of gov-
ernment. The magnitude of these frictions suggests that a role exists for U.S. states
to participate in active fiscal policy over the business cycle. Clearly, as the data
show, U.S. state governments do in fact save in order to manage public finances
during downturns. The most visible vehicles for such savings are rainy day funds,
but states have other avenues, as well.
I have avoided using the word “stimulus” thus far, as Keynesian-type stimulus
does not appear in my model. However, it is likely that the presence of these frictions
in the making of fiscal policy at the federal level imply that it may be optimal for U.S.
states to engage in stimulus policy during recessions; this conclusion runs counter to
a conventional wisdom going back at least as far as Oates (1972), though Gramlich
(1997) does find a stimulus role for states. More work should be done to explicitly
model the implications of information and other political frictions for state-level fiscal
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policy over the business cycle.
Of note as well is the analysis of the effects of balanced budget rules in this model.
In the information model presented here, removing the balanced budget rules com-
pletely eliminates welfare losses from baseline model, allowing regional governments
to smooth completely over the business cycle. Of course, the assumption is that
there are no real costs to borrowing, no default risk, etc. It may be that, in the
real world, the balanced budget rules for U.S. are optimal responses to real costs of
debt finance. In that case, the policy implications of loosening balanced budget rules
would be completely the opposite: a welfare loss instead of a welfare gain.
Finally, these results may have something to say about the debate over fiscal
policy in Europe. The results in this paper serve as a caution to potential efforts
to establish a European fiscal union. While the ability of a such a union to finance
spending with a deficit would be an advantage, there may be significant frictions to
effective and timely fiscal stimulus along the lines of the frictions identified in this
paper. Such frictions may prevent the effective smoothing of risks across countries,
working against the stated purpose of unionization. In the presence of significant
information or political frictions to optimal policy, a fiscal union in Europe may have




This paper identified three key facts about the public finances of U.S. state gov-
ernments over the business cycle, in the context of the role of the U.S. as a strong
fiscal union. First, state governments engage in precautionary savings, in large part
due to balanced budget requirements. Second, transfer payments from the federal
government tend to respond more strongly to the aggregate business cycle than to
state-level economic cycles. Third, states whose business cycles are less correlated
with the national cycle tend to save more relative to other states. In light of the first
two facts, I interpret the third fact as an indication that federal transfers (or lack
thereof) influence state government savings behavior.
To give structure to this interpretation, I turn to a modeling framework in which I
interpret a U.S. state as a small open endowment economy in a fiscal federation. Both
levels of government, regional and central, may conduct fiscal policy, but each is faced
with a different friction. Regional governments face borrowing limits, but central
governments are faced with an information friction (which may also be interpreted
as a political friction). The information friction prevents the central government
from perfectly smoothing over the cycle, and thus regional governments must engage
in precautionary savings.
I find that the model fits many qualitative features of the data well, and conclude
that it is a useful framework in which to begin thinking about state government
finances. The implied information friction is almost three times as large as real
volatility; this is a formidable friction implying a central government with little ability
to smooth over idiosyncratic cycles for states. Two variations on the structure of the
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information available to the central government yield quantitatively similar results.
The baseline calibration also implies a long-run welfare loss of two percent relative
to the social optimum. These results imply that frictions to policy making at the
central level may be a significant factor in fiscal policy at the state level.
I conclude, contrary to some conventional wisdom, that space exists for states
to actively pursue robust fiscal policies over the business cycle; furthermore, states
that save are behaving optimally given their constraints. To the extent that central
governments are constrained by a lack of information or stymied by politics, they
may not be able to perfectly implement a first-best countercyclical fiscal policy. Of
course, more research is needed into the size and nature of these frictions to policy,
especially as they relate to recessions and expansions. Federalism, its complexities
and mysteries notwithstanding, remains an important vehicle through which policy






A.1 New Keynesian Model Details
This appendix section provides further details on some of the equations in the New






















where PNit is the firm’s price. When a firm is given the opportunity to set its price,
it maximizes the present value of these per-period profits, taking into account the





























Here P̃Nit is the chosen price of the firm, Wt is the raw wage in time t, and Qt,t+s is
the nominal discount factor that converts income in t+s to payments t; this discount




























The first term of the bracketed piece is the marginal revenue in each period, while
the second term is the marginal cost. Separating the two terms results in a present
value marginal revenue and a present value marginal cost, and recognizing that all








































results in Equations 1.18 and 1.19 from the text.









Again using the fact that all prices set in period t will be the same, we see that
(PNt )
1−µ = θ(PNt−1)
1−µ + (1− θ)(P̃Nt )1−µ.
Dividing both sides by (PNt )1−µ gives rise to Equation 1.20 in the text.
Similarly, to obtain Equation 1.21, consider the aggregation of total hours worked,





















































which simplifying gives Equation 1.21.
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A.2 Empirical Methodology Appendix
A.2.1 Sample Selection and Data Cleaning
This appendix describes the process for selecting and cleaning the trade-level munic-
ipal bond data for use in the paper. First, I use the Bloomberg terminal to obtain
CUSIP codes for all General Obligation (GO) bonds issued by general governments
at any time up to present day. Depending on download limits, it may be necessary
to break up the downloads into blocks of 5000 bonds or fewer.
Bloomberg provides CUSIP codes for each bond at the 8-digit level, consisting of
a 6-digit issuer code followed by a 2-digit issue-specific code. MSRB, however, reports
CUSIPs at the 9-digit level. The 9th digit in any CUSIP code is an automatically
generated character according to the following algorithm:
1. Assign each character of the 8-digit code a numeric value xi, with numeric
characters being assigned their own value 0 − 9, and alphabetic characters
assigned numeric values beginning with 10: A = 10, B = 11, ... Z = 35
2. Construct a sum S =
∑8
i=1(1+I(i))xi, where I(i) = 1 if i is even, and I(i) = 0
if i is odd. In short, every other xi is multiplied by 2.
3. Let s be the last (ones) digit of the sum S
4. Assign the 9th digit of the CUSIP code to be the complement of s, i.e., 10− s,
or simply s if s = 0.
With the full 9-digit CUSIP codes in hand, I then request the full trade-level
MSRB dataset from WRDS, which includes info on every brokered trade of a muni
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bond included in the list of CUSIPs I provide. This data begins in 2005, when bro-
kers in the municipal bond market were required to provide real-time transaction
information to the MSRB, and continues to the present day. The MSRB data in-
cludes bond characteristics such as coupon, dated date, and maturity date, and trade
characteristics like par value, price, yield, time and date, and whether the trade was
a purchase from or sale to a customer or if it was an inter-dealer trade.
I broadly follow Schwert’s conditions for cleaning this trade-level dataset to re-
move potential errors in the data. This includes all bonds with coupons greater than
20% and times to maturity over 100 years in the future. It also drops individual
trades with a yield to maturity of 0, a price outside the range [50, 150], or a recorded
trade date after the maturity date. This results in a dataset of 1,587,426 trades from
2005 to 2019.
The dataset used in the main estimation procedure takes the monetary shocks
series described below and merges with a dataset of daily yields and spreads. Daily
yields and spreads are assumed to be the median value for a bond-day pair. An
observation in the resulting data is an FOMC decision day-muni bond pair, with two
sets of yields and spreads. The first is the most recent daily price as of the FOMC
day, and the second is the most recent daily price as of the day two weeks after the
FOMC day; for a bond that has not been traded in two weeks, these two values may
be the same.1
1Though as I note in the body of the paper, such observations are ultimately dropped
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A.2.2 Identification of Monetary Shocks
As mentioned in the body of the paper, I employ the method of Bu, Rogers, and Wu,
2019 to identify monetary shocks at the FOMC date frequency. The BRW method
uses a Fama-MacBeth two-step procedure to extract monetary shocks from a series
of U.S. treasury yields. The procedure normalizes monetary shocks mt such that
they enter one-to-one into daily changes in the 5-year treasury yield2:
∆R5t = α +mt + ηt.
The method then takes the zero-coupon treasury series, representing years to
maturity i from i = 1 to i = 30. Each of these yields are assumed to respond to
monetary shocks on FOMC dates according to
∆R5t = α̃i + βimt + ηit.
The first step of the procedure seeks to estimate the series of 30 parameters βi. Since
mt is unobserved, the method uses the normalization to R5t , allowing us to instead
plug in and estimate the equation
∆Rit = αi + βi∆R
5
t + εit,
where αi = α̃i + βiα and εit = ηit + βiηt.
An immediate problem arises in this estimation: εit is correlated with R5t through
2The choice of maturity is not crucial to the procedure, a 1- or 2- year bond would work, as well.
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ηt, resulting in a biased OLS estimate. To deal with this issue, the BRW method
estimates each βi using a Rigobon and Sack (2004) instrumental variables method.
In short, an estimate for βi can be obtained from the equation
[∆Rit] = αi + βi[∆R
5
t ] + µit,
where [∆R5t ] = (∆R5t ,∆R5t ∗)′ and [∆Rit] = (∆Rit,∆R∗it)′. Variables with a ∗ repre-
sent a one-day movement in the corresponding rate one week before the FOMC date.
The instrumental variable for this estimation is [∆RIVt ] = (∆R5t ,−∆R5t ∗)′. The pro-
cedure relies on the assumption that the variance of non-monetary news does not
change from week to week.
The second step, armed with the IV estimates β̂i, then estimates the equation
∆Rit = αt + m̂tβ̂i + εit
on each day t, recovering the estimated monetary shocks mt as the resulting coeffi-
cients.
A.2.3 Schwert Illiquidity Measures
In Section 1.3.4.3 I describe the method for decomposing municipal spreads into risk
and illiquidity components, as in Schwert (2017). To construct the illiquidity measure
ψit, I standardize three measures of illiquidity used by Schwert, and construct ψit as
the monthly average of these three measures. The monthly average is used due to
the paucity of munis with multiple trades on a given day, which is required for the
200
daily measures.
The first measure originated in Feldhutter (2012), and is intended to explicitly
capture the transaction costs introduced by the over-the-counter nature of bond
markets, in which bonds might trade at multiple prices at the same time. This is





where P is the price, i is a CUSIP code, t is a given day, and s is a trade size. The
idea of this measure is to capture the common occurence in which a dealer matches a
buyer with a seller, with the difference in the prices representing the costs of finding
and making the transaction. In the data, trades of the same bond on the same day
of the same size are coded as round-trip trades, and the daily illiquidity measure is
the average of round-trip trades on that day.
Another measure of the transaction costs element of liquidity is the “Price Dis-
persion” measure from Jankowitsch, Nashikkar, and Subrahmanyam (2011). This
measure is similar to the first measure, but uses all prices on a given day. This mea-
sure of illiquidity represents the average dispersion around the “market consensus”








where j represents a trade of bond i on day t, Pij is the price of trade j, Qj is the




. If a bond’s prices are highly dispersed
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on a given day, it could reflect high transaction costs or inventory risks for dealers,
among other sources of illiquidity in bond markets.
The third measure, from Amihud (2002), is meant to capture the price impact
of trades for a municipal bond. This is related to the market depth component of
liquidity, i.e., the ability of a bond to sustain large trades without large movements
in price. If, on a day for which there are multiple price changes for a muni, the
average price change relative to trade size is large, then trades are having an impact









where notation is the same as above, and Nit is the number of trades of bond i on
day t. Note that this measure begins with the second trade on a given day, since
intraday price changes are the object of interest here.
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A.3 Additional Empirical Results
A.3.1 VAR Evidence of Government Behavior
This section provides aggregate time series evidence on the repsonse of state and
local government fiscal policy to monetary shocks. I follow closely the strategy of
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996), by estimating the VAR equation
Yt = A+B1Yt−1 + ...+B4Yt−4 + εt, (A.4)
where t corresponds to one quarter. The vector Y includes variables in the following
order:
Y = [logGDP logC logP log I logX logWL R log Π ∆M ],
where GDP is GDP, C is Personal Consumption Expenditures, P is the GDP defla-
tor, I is private investment, WL is earnings, R is the federal funds rate, Π is profits,
and ∆M is the change in M2 from the previous period. t represents a quarter in the
U.S.; for monthly variables I use the first month of the quarter.
X here is the response variable of interest, corresponding to state and local gov-
ernment total debt, consumption expenditures, investment, or consumption + in-
vestment. The expenditures are reported at the quarterly level as a part of NIPA.
Debt is included in the Federal Reserve’s flow of funds data; due to a definitional
change in 2004, I adjust pre-2004 values to match the post-2004 series, imputing
the 2004Q1 growth rate to 2003Q4. Figures A.1, A.2, A.3, and A.4 here show the
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effect of an expansionary shock to the federal funds rate on the variables of interest.
Furthermore, Figure A.5 gives the estimated response of output in the VAR with
debt.
Figure A.1: CEE Impulse Response to Fed Funds Shock
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Figure A.2: CEE Impulse Response to Fed Funds Shock
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Figure A.3: CEE Impulse Response to Fed Funds Shock
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Figure A.4: CEE Impulse Response to Fed Funds Shock
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Figure A.5: CEE Impulse Response to Fed Funds Shock
While there is an initial decrease in expenditures in the short run, due to conven-
tional leaning-against-the-wind factors, expenditures do seem to rise in the medium
run. This increase corresponds with the peak of the debt buildup response. As such,
it is consistent with the borrowing costs channel put forward in this paper.
A.3.2 Additional Specifications
In this section, I investigate two additional specifications of the baseline results in
Table 1.3. In Table A.1, I allow the response of municipal yields to monetary shocks
to differ based on whether or not the monetary shock is positive, i.e., in include
the indicator I[Shock > 0]. Table A.2 is the same as in the main body of the text,
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Table A.1: Time Series Results, Shock Direction
All GO State GO Local GO SP 500 All GO State GO Local GO SP 500
Monetary shock 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.56 0.17 0.12 0.26 0.78
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.17) (0.18) (0.23) (0.16) (0.25)
Monetary shock * I[Shock > 0] 0.09 0.10 0.09 -0.11 0.12 0.22 0.03 -0.23
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.27) (0.29) (0.32) (0.26) (0.42)
Horizon 2 days 2 days 2 days 2 days 6 days 6 days 6 days 6 days
N 2147 2147 2147 2147 2139 2139 2139 2139
Note: An observation corresponds to one day, around which a window is constructed from the previous day’s price and the price at a given horizon. Each column refers to a separate
time series regression of an index on monetary shocks. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Table A.2: Time Series Results, Controlling for S&P 500 Index
All GO State GO Local GO SP 500 All GO State GO Local GO SP 500
Monetary shock 0.22 0.24 0.23 0.50 0.24 0.24 0.28 0.66
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (0.13) (0.21)
Horizon 2 days 2 days 2 days 2 days 6 days 6 days 6 days 6 days
N 2144 2144 2144 2144 2136 2136 2136 2136
Note: An observation corresponds to one day, around which a window is constructed from the previous day’s price and the price at a given horizon. Each column
refers to a separate time series regression of an index on monetary shocks. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
but controlling for the S&P 500 index. In each of these specifications, I find no
significant differences from the baseline results reported in the paper. While the sign
of the coefficients in Table A.1 indicate the upward shocks might have larger effects,
the standard errors are large; additionally, the coefficients in Table A.2 are virtually
indistinguishable to those in Table 1.3.
A.3.3 Sector-Level Time Series
In Table A.3, I summarize estimates of Equation 1.33, computed separately for sector-
level indices.
209





































Water and Sewer 0.191
(0.080)
Note: An observation corresponds to one day,
around which a window is constructed from
the previous day’s price and the price at a
given horizon. Each column refers to a separate
time series regression of an index on monetary
shocks. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard er-
rors are reported in parentheses.
A.3.4 Government Finance Variables
In Tables A.4, A.5, and A.6, I summarize estimates of Equation 1.34, computed
separately for a number of government finance statistics. The coefficient estimates
in these tables represent the interaction between the variable and the monetary shock,
in separately estimated regressions. The tables correspond to revenues, expenditures,
and other categories, respectively.
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Table A.4: Panel Estimates: Interactions with Public Finance Revenue Variables






















Note: An observation corresponds to an FOMC date-muni bond pair. Each row
corresponds to a regression with the specified variable interacted with monetary
shocks, as in Equation 1.34. The reported coefficient is the coefficient on the
interaction term. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and are clustered
at the date level. N = 12100 for all regressions.
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Table A.5: Panel Estimates: Interactions with Public Finance Expenditure Variables
































Note: An observation corresponds to an FOMC date-muni bond pair. Each row
corresponds to a regression with the specified variable interacted with monetary
shocks, as in Equation 1.34. The reported coefficient is the coefficient on the
interaction term. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and are clustered
at the date level. N = 12100 for all regressions.
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Table A.6: Panel Estimates: Interactions with Other Public Finance Variables




Total Long Term Debt -0.173
(0.119)
Total LTD Issued -0.173
(0.119)
Total Cash and Securities -0.169
(0.117)
Total Cash and Securities (non-insurance) -0.194
(0.136)
Note: An observation corresponds to an FOMC date-muni bond pair. Each row corresponds to a regression
with the specified variable interacted with monetary shocks, as in Equation 1.34. The reported coefficient
is the coefficient on the interaction term. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and are clustered
at the date level. N = 12100 for all regressions.
A.3.5 Government Type
In addition to the heterogeneity in the body of the paper, and in order to provide a
more comprehensive view of heterogeneity in municipal bond spreads, I investigate
the response of muni yields and spreads to monetary shocks on two important dimen-
sions. The first is government type. Insofar as bonds issued by state governments are
different in terms of liquidity (or risk) than their city and county counterparts, these
bonds might respond differently to monetary shocks. In particular, if these bonds
are on average more liquid than bonds of smaller governments, we might expect
their yields to respond more strongly to monetary shocks. One piece of suggestive
evidence in this direction is the fact that state governments are disproportionately
represented in the sample of bonds which actually record a trade in the window
following a monetary shock.
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Table A.7: 2-Week Response of Muni Yields to Monetary Shocks, by Issuer Type
d yield d yield (6= 0) d spread d spread (6= 0)
Big government 0.01*** 0.06*** 0.01** 0.05***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Monetary shock 0.24*** 0.66*** 0.05 0.10
(0.06) (0.15) (0.07) (0.16)
Monetary shock * Big government -0.02 -0.21* -0.13* -0.22**
(0.09) (0.13) (0.07) (0.11)
N 74338 36747 74286 36685
Note: An observation corresponds to an FOMC date-bond pair. Each column refers to a separate regression. Standard errors are reported
in parentheses, and are clustered at the date level.
To identify what type of government issued a particular bond, I first retrieve the
bond issuer names from the Bloomberg Terminal. I then keep those issuers which
include the words “state” or “commonwealth,” and label these the “big” government
issuers.3 The estimate of interest, then, is the differential magnitude of response to
monetary shocks for these “big” governments vis-à-vis other types of governments.
Table A.7 repeats the estimation of Equation 1.34, reporting the interaction between
the estimated shock and government type.
The results lend some further insight into the pattern observed earlier, in which
the average response of muni yields to monetary shocks is made up of some bonds
that adjust and some that do not. Interestingly, while there does not seem to be any
differential response on average between bonds from big governments and smaller
governments, there is a difference conditional on adjustment. Among the bonds
which adjust price in response to a monetary shock, the bonds for state governments
adjust 45 basis points in accordance with a 100 bp shock, whereas all other bonds
3I can also break out the smaller governments by the words “city,” “county,” “town,” “village,”
etc., but the most important distinction seems to be the fifty states versus all other governments.
Surely there is heterogeneity within cities and towns; this is a potential direction for future research.
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adjust 66 basis points on average. Of course, the bonds for these bigger governments
are a larger proportion of the “responding” sample than the full sample; in other
words, their yields are more likely to respond to a monetary shock than those of
smaller governments. Because these bonds trade at a higher frequency, their price
adjustments in response to a given shock, conditional on adjustment, are smaller
than those bonds which trade at a lower frequency. The pattern for spreads exhibits
a similar pattern, in which the coefficient on the interaction term is more negative
and more precisely estimated in the reduced sample; the average response remains
zero, as before.
The second additional margin of heterogeneity involves an attempt at a compre-
hensive measure of unexplained spreads, which is made up of liquidity, risk, and tax
components. I residualize the implied spread on every transaction in the original
data by regressing out time to maturity and fixed effects at the month level. For
each bond, I take the average of its residualized (actual minus predicted) spread to
compute a time-invariant measure of unexplained spreads for each muni. If average
residuals are above zero, I code the bond as “high spread;” similarly, I code as “low
spread” those bonds for which average residuals are below zero. Of course these
unexplained spreads include liquidity, risk, and tax components, but they represent
a simple and intuitive margin of heterogeneity that does not require dropping ob-
servations yet carries some important information about the desirability of certain
types of bonds.
Table A.8 presents the results of analogous regressions, in which the more liquid
(and less risky) bonds are expected to be in the “low unexplained spread” category.
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Table A.8: 2-Week Response of Muni Yields to Monetary Shocks, by High/Low
Spreads
d yield d yield ( 6= 0) d spread d spread (6= 0)
Low spread 0.02*** 0.05*** 0.02*** 0.05***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Monetary shock 0.22*** 0.56*** -0.00 -0.02
(0.09) (0.21) (0.08) (0.18)
Monetary shock * Low spread 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.06
(0.06) (0.12) (0.06) (0.12)
N 74143 36651 74080 36596
Note: An observation corresponds to an FOMC date-bond pair. Each column refers to a separate regression. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses, and are clustered at the date level.
The “average unexplained spreads” dimension of heterogeneity seems not to have
much of an effect on the response of muni yields to monetary shocks, in either
the conditional or unconditional specifications. Note that these measures are time
invariant and the bond level; while a time-varying measure of excess spread would
be helpful, many of these bonds simply aren’t traded at a high enough frequency to
obtain a meaningful measure.
While the average spread differential doesn’t reveal a systematic response in the
same way that government type does, it may be the case that a differential response
is revealed within certain types of governments. To finish the investigation into het-
erogeneity of responses, I include both the government issuer’s type and unexplained
spreads in the regression specifications. Results are given in Table A.9.
As before, state governments respond less strongly to monetary shocks, especially
conditional on adjustment, and low unexplained spreads have zero effect on the
response of yields to a monetary shock. Note, however, the triple-difference coefficient
in these specifications. Big governments with low excess spreads do not exhibit a
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Table A.9: 2-Week Response of Muni Yields to Monetary Shocks, by Issuer Type
and High/Low Spreads
d yield d yield ( 6= 0) d spread d spread (6= 0)
Big Government 0.01 0.06*** 0.01 0.06***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Low spread 0.02*** 0.05*** 0.02*** 0.05***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Monetary shock 0.28*** 0.76*** 0.08 0.17
(0.08) (0.20) (0.08) (0.18)
Monetary shock * Big government -0.21 -0.55** -0.29** -0.50***
(0.14) (0.23) (0.12) (0.20)
Monetary shock * Low spread -0.06 -0.15 -0.04 -0.10
(0.06) (0.14) (0.07) (0.16)
Big government * Low spread 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Monetary shock * Big government * Low spread 0.29** 0.51** 0.24* 0.41*
(0.13) (0.22) (0.12) (0.22)
N 74338 36743 74264 36681
Note: An observation corresponds to an FOMC date-bond pair. Each column refers to a separate regression. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and
are clustered at the date level.
lower response to monetary shocks, even conditional on adjustment; this coefficient
almost completely negates the negative coefficient on being a state government. In
these specifications, the bonds which exhibit a lower response to monetary shocks
are only those which are issued by state governments with high excess spreads.
The results of this section, to the extent they say anything systematic about
heterogeneity in the response of municipal bond yields to monetary shocks, may be
summarized as follows. Bonds issued from state governments (“big” governments)
are traded more often, and therefore are more likely to experience a price change as
a result of a monetary shock. Unsurprisingly, the magnitude of their responses are
smaller on average. This lower response is mainly driven by state bonds with high
excess spreads, reflecting higher illiquidity or potentially higher risk premia than
other bonds from similar issuers.
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A.4 Additional Quantitative Results
A.4.1 Full Model Results
In the body of the paper, I show the effects of changing the coefficient θG on the
monetary transmission to each locality. I focused on one locality at a time for ease
of exposition. Here, I consider the full model with a large number of localities, and
confirm that monetary shocks transmit in a heterogeneous manner when localities’
financial markets differ.
In the data, I identified the municipal yield responses to monetary shocks of 41
U.S. states. In this specification, then, I set S = 41, and assign each state a θG
corresponding to one of the empirical estimates, while all other parameters remain
the same. Aggregate output is defined as total output, and aggregate inflation as
average inflation of non-tradables across localities. The risk-free rate is set according
to a Taylor rule which mimics the interest rate process in the body of the paper,
replacing yT with total output and adding in a response of inflation, where the risk-
free rate responds to a basis point of lagged inflation with a 1.5 basis point rate
increase.
Figure A.6 shows the responses of percentiles of the full economy to a 25bp
shock to the risk-free rate set in the Taylor Rule. Consistent with the results in the
paper, realistic heterogeneity in monetary passthrough to munis results in significant
transmission to U.S. localities. Here, also, we see that the difference between the 10th
percentile and the median is much greater than that between the 90th and median.
This is reflective of the asymmetry of the distribution of coefficient estimates in the
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Figure A.6: IRFs Under Muni Heterogeneity
data.
A.4.2 OTC Model Results
Here, I present some brief results from the OTC version of the model described
in Section 1.2.8 of the main paper. Calibration moves forward similarly as in the
baseline model, with a few additions. First, for simplicity I assume that financial
firms are immediately able to sell bonds on the secondary market, i.e., psell = 1.
A fuller examination of heterogeneity in muni pricing would require a more specific
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specification of the thickness of this secondary market, but in this section I will show
simply the basic results. I calibrate vH and ν to match the steady state dG and rG
from the baseline model, and set θ = 0.5 for simplicity.4
Figure A.7: IRFs, 25bp Expansionary Shock
4Monetary responses do vary with θ, but without variation in α cannot match the observed
heterogeneity in the data.
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Figure A.8: IRFs, 25bp Expansionary Shock
This model behaves similarly to the baseline model in terms of the directions of
the IRFs. Note, however, in this special case of the model, the response of government
debt and spending is much lower than the baseline model. The reason for this is the
costs involved in issuing debt: the explicit inclusion of coupon payments and debt
retirements puts upward pressure on their borrowing costs. As a result, ∂rG
∂dG
is quite
large, dampening significantly the responses to monetary shocks. In the baseline
model, this translates to a larger value for φG.
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A.4.3 Explicit Debt Constraints
This paper examines in detail the effect of municipal bond markets’ response to mon-
etary shocks on the size and potential heterogeneity in monetary policy transmission.
Another fiscal dimension on which state and local governments differ is the stringency
of balanced-budget rules, which vary across governments. Most governments have
some sort of balanced budget requirement on the books; the rules surrounding these
requirements likely result in an effective politically imposed on the amount of debt a
government can issue.
Figure A.9: The Effect of Debt Constraints
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Figure A.10: IRFs by Response Elasticity, Debt Issue Constrained
Figures A.9 and A.10 show how the results in the paper are affected by an ad-
ditional constraint on debt issued by a local government: dGit ≤ 1.025dGi,t−1. First,
note that the debt constraint dampens the transmission of monetary policy, even
relative to the already-dampened baseline case, on the order of about 10 percent
in the baseline case. This dampening seems to be stronger for the economies with
more responsive debt prices (Figure A.10), making the medium- and high- response
economies almost equal. Just as the response of borrowing costs to monetary shocks
affects monetary transmission through local fiscal policy, so too will the debt issuance
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constraints placed on these localities through various budgeting laws.
A.4.4 Steady State Government Debt
Figure A.11 shows the positive relationship between steady state local government
debt and the transmission of monetary policy in the baseline calibrated model. Here
I recalibrate the parameters of the model in the same way as the body of the paper
for a number of values for steady state local government debt as a fraction of output,
from 0.05 to 0.15. I record the on-impact transmission of monetary policy for each
of these economies in the figure.
Clearly, there is a positive correlation between the steady state level of govern-
ment debt and monetary transmission. The same percentage increase in government
spending will be more stimulative for a government which spends more in steady
state. The steady state level of government spending is one of many possible di-
mensions on which these governments may differ, and which may contribute to the
transmission of monetary policy.
A.4.5 Fiscal Policy Shocks
In the body of the paper, I explore the interactions between national monetary policy
and local fiscal policy. A natural related question is how national fiscal policy might
enter into the small open economy model, and what effects it might have given the
problems faced by the local government. Figure A.12 shows the response of the
baseline economy to two different federal government spending shocks. In the first,
public goods spending exogenously increases, but the public goods come from outside
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Figure A.11: Monetary Transmission and Government Debt
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Figure A.12: Federal Government Spending Shock (5 Percent Increase)
the local economy; i.e., the federal government does not purchase g from local goods
producers. In the second case, the federal government purchases public goods from
the local nontradable sector.
The fiscal shock in each case corresponds to a five percent (transitory) increase
over the steady state level of government spending. In both cases, federal spending
crowds out local spending as the local government simply wants to provide efficient
levels of public goods given the household’s preferences. When federal spending is
imported from elsewhere in the economy, local output decreases markedly as the lo-
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cal government decreases its spending, lowering aggregate demand and employment.
This lack of need to spend allows the local government to pay down debt, allowing
for increased spending in the future, and an expansion of local aggregate demand.
In the second case, the federal spending represents an increase in aggregate demand
on impact, as public goods are now being bought by the federal government. Sub-
sequently, local spending increases as before; the subsequent spending is muted in
this case because of the inflationary effect of the initial federal shock, which is not




B.1 Optimal Linear Taxes and Minimum Wage
When the federal government has access to linear income taxes, it will always pre-
fer linear taxes to a combination of a minimum wage and linear taxes under the
assumptions of our calibrated model.
Consider a binding minimum wage and tax policy w̄, t ≥ 0. Under the assump-
tions of our model, mainly a perfectly competitive firm, this set of policy will induce
additional unemployment over the competitive equilibrium so that l(w̄, t) low-skilled
workers are employed. The minimum wage reduced labor demand while the tax re-
duced labor supply. The workers earn w̄ and high-skilled workers earn wh(l(w̄, t)).
The high-skilled wage depends on our structural parameters and the stock of low-
skilled employed workers. Now consider t? such that l(0, t?) = l(w̄, t). It must be
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the case that t? ≥ t, as a binding minimum wage always reduces low-skilled employ-
ment, as long as l(w̄, t) > 0. Since l is the same, wl, wh, and total output are equal
across the policies. However, t? ≥ t gives that the tax alone raises more revenue.
The additional tax revenue is, on net, redistributed to lower consumption agents
through the demogrant, increasing total welfare since the social welfare function is
concave. As the tax increases, low-skilled labor supply drops, increasing the low-
skilled wage and decreasing the high-skilled wage; when it reaches 70%, only 34% of
the low-skilled workers are employed, and the low-skilled wage is higher. We may be
worried that since the low-skilled face a working cost, they can be high-income but
low-consumption and the additional redistribution is harmful for social welfare. How-
ever, at that point, income tax collected is redistributed on net to the unemployed
from the employed. Since the consumption of the unemployed is always bounded
above by the consumption of the employed, even with this tax and demogrant, the
tax policy always redistributes to the lower consumption agents.
We need to show that t? exists. As long as the low-skilled labor supply is not
perfectly inelastic, it will exist because as l → 0, the marginal product goes to infinity,
but increasing the tax rate will weakly lower labor supply. When the labor supply is
perfectly inelastic (because the low-skilled workers do not face costs from working),
then the government can implement a levelling tax, since high-skilled labor supply is
also perfectly inelastic to the economy. The value of the levelling tax is maximized
when output and labor demand is maximized, i.e. when there is no binding minimum
wage.
So the government will always prefer only a linear income tax when both a linear
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C.1 Construction of Balances Data
I obtain the data on state balances and rainy day funds from “The Fiscal Survey
of the States,” a semiannual report published by the National Association of State
Budget Officers (NASBO). When available, I use the spring edition of the report
for consistency, and I report the “actual” numbers from the previous year, not the
“estimated” number for the current year. This report surveys budget officers in U.S.
states in order to detail the fiscal health of states across various dimensions. I utilize
this specific series because it provides states with the option to report both general
fund balances and rainy day fund balances separately.
Unfortunately, the data reported in the Fiscal Survey of the States is not available
in electronic format, and must be recorded by hand for each year. The report is
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released in PDF format every year, and each report gives an end-year balance for
the general fund and the rainy day fund for all 50 states. Recording the balances
data for the states involves locating the relevant table in each document and pulling
the data for each state into a common spreadsheet for analysis. The format tends
to be similar across years, although it does change from time to time, with greater
frequency of format changes in earlier years.
The basic strategy is to record two figures: the “ending balance” for each state,
which is the surplus (or deficit) of the state’s general fund, and the rainy day fund
balance. Then “total balances” are reported as the sum of these two numbers. In
more recent documents, NASBO constructs and reports total balances but not ending
balances, so the data collection involves the collection of total balances and rainy
day fund balances. Figures C.1, C.2, and C.3 show the difference between the 2017
report and the 1996 report. In 2017, total balances are reported and therefore do
not need to be constructed; in 1996, however, ending balances are reported and total
balances need to be constructed.
Note also that certain states report the rainy day fund as a part of their general
fund. For these states, I am not able to back out the value of the rainy day fund.1
For this reason, and because a few states don’t report anything about rainy day
funds, I include total balances as a balance of interest for the analysis.
So the overall procedure for collecting the balances data is as follows. First,
collect the data for rainy day funds balances for each state/year observation, not
including the values reported in footnotes. Second, collect the ending balances, some
1Sometimes there is a footnote with the value of the rainy day fund. I include these figures with
the rainy day fund data when possible.
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Figure C.1: NASBO Data Format, Balances 2017
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Figure C.2: NASBO Data Format, RDFs 2017
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Figure C.3: NASBO Data Format, 1996
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of which include rainy day fund balances. Third, for those observations whose ending
balances include a rainy day fund balance which is reported in a footnote, subtract
this value from the ending balance data and add it to the rainy day fund series.
Next, construct total balances by adding the ending (less rainy day) and rainy day
series together. Finally, replace values in the total balances series with reported total
balances from NASBO in years for which these are reported. This is a labor intensive
process, but the only way to obtain these data, given the format in which they are
published.
C.2 Determination of Transfer Equation Using IV
Equation 3.1 relates the transfers from the federal government received by state
government i to, among other things, gross state product of state i and the sum of
the gross state products of other states −i. A clear potential source of endogeneity
in this equation is the effect of transfers on output, especially since these data are
only available at the annual frequency. As a robustness check, I instrument yi,t
and y−i,t with monetary policy shocks at the annual level. I use the annual shocks
from Weiland and Yang (2019), which correspond to the shocks in Romer and Romer
(2004), updated through 2007. These shocks are publicly available online at Johannes
Weiland’s webpage.2
Table C.1 shows the results of the instrumental variables regression. The re-
sponse of transfers to the business cycle is much greater for y−i,t, and the sign on
yi,t flips, suggesting that perhaps the main results underestimate the true difference
2https://sites.google.com/site/johannesfwieland/
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Table C.1: Determinants of State Government Receipts from Federal Government,
IV
Variable log(pop) log(GSPi), cyclical log(GSP−i), cyclical
Coefficient 0.1728* 3.314* -8.290**
(s.e.) (0.0915) (1.937) (4.128)
Note: Results from a fixed-effects instrumental variables regression with standard errors clustered at the state level. The instruments
are monetary shocks described in the text. Observations include 46 states for which holes do not exist in the Census of Governments
data from 1981 to 2012. * p ≤ 0.10, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01.
in reponses. Furthermore, the qualitative relationship between the two equations
holds: fiscal transfers from the federal government respond more strongly to aggre-
gate business cycle conditions than local conditions, even though the transfers are to
specific state governments. These regressions should be taken with a grain of salt,
however, given that the instruments may not be incredibly strong.
C.3 Extended Regression Results
This section provides the full results from the regressions provided in the main body
of the paper. The extra variables in these tables are listed and explained below:
• Log(debt): The log of a state government’s real debt
• Debt / GSP: The stock of a state government’s debt as a share of its gross
state product.
• Governor is democrat: = 1 if the state’s governor is a member of the Demo-
cratic party, reported in the Center for Poverty Research data.
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• Variance of cyclical GSP: the variance over time of the state’s HP-filtered gross
state product, a time-invariant variable for each state.
• Balanced budget strictness: measure of the strictness of the state’s balanced
budget rules, constructed from Hou and Smith (2006), which classify 9 possible
restrictions on budgets. Sums the rules each state has adopted, weighting the
‘stricter’ rules more heavily.
Table C.2: Determinants of State Government Balances
Dependent variable log(∼ Real balances) Real balances / GSP Real balances / Expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Business cycle correlation -0.0920** -0.0825* -0.0847* -0.0054*** -0.0038** -0.0038** -0.0412*** -0.0262** -0.0262**
(0.0412) (0.0466) (0.0468) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0144) (0.0128) (0.0127)
Log(GSP), cyclical 0.5505*** 0.4131** 0.1138 0.0225*** 0.0177*** 0.0167*** 0.3036*** 0.2536*** 0.2487***
(0.1886) (0.1885) (0.0789) (0.0042) (0.0050) (0.0063) (0.0377) (0.0454) (0.0547)
Log(GSP), cyclical * High correlation - - 0.9854* - - 0.0031 - - 0.0155
(0.5528) (0.0068) (0.0652)
Log(GSP) 0.0537*** 0.0570*** 0.0577*** - - - - - -
(0.0124) (0.0131) (0.0132)
Log(debt) - 0.0041 0.0020 - - - - - -
(0.0065) (0.0072)
Debt / GSP - - - - 6.29e-6 6.30e-6 - 2.76e-5 2.76e-5
(4.46e-6) (4.47e-6) (4.47e-5) (4.49e-5)
Governor is Democrat - -0.132* -0.0120* - -0.0002 -0.0002 - -0.0027 -0.0027
(0.0068) (0.0069) (0.0003) (0.0015) (0.0028) (0.0028)
Variance of cyclical GSP - 9.335** 9.572** - 0.8860*** 0.8870*** - 9.260*** 9.265***
(4.308) (4.240) (0.2214) (0.2215) (2.199) (2.199)
Balanced budget strictness - 0.0001 3.61e-5 - -5.23e-6 -5.27e-6 - 5.16e-5 5.14e-5
(0.0011) (0.0010) (4.51e-5) (4.52e-5) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Note: The sample for these regressions is 49 U.S. states (Alaska not included) for the years 1981-2012. The regressions are according
to a random effects model. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table C.3: Determinants of State Government Net Assets (Not Incl. Insurance
Funds)
Dependent variable log(∼ Real net assets) Real net assets / GSP Real net assets / Expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Business cycle correlation -1.2630*** -1.2365*** -1.2320*** -0.1168*** -0.0605** -0.0607** -1.0787*** -0.5528*** -0.5541***
(0.3325) (0.3857) (0.3845) (0.0393) (0.0267) (0.0267) (0.3393) (0.2115) (0.2118)
Log(GSP), cyclical 0.9278** 0.5754 0.0538 0.0513* 0.0581* 0.0202 0.9424*** 1.0980*** 0.9055***
(0.3416) (0.6129) (0.6406) (0.0274) (0.0328) (0.0381) (0.1349) (0.1655) (0.2011)
Log(GSP), cyclical * High correlation - - 1.8011** - - 0.1196*** - - 0.6059**
(0.7729) (0.0413) (0.2714)
Log(GSP) 0.1993** 0.3001*** 0.2979*** - - - - - -
(0.0834) (0.0857) (0.0852)
Log(debt) - -0.0761 -0.801 - - - - -
- (0.0582) (0.0578)
Debt / GSP - - - - -5.42e-6 -4.91e-6 - -0.0003 -0.0002
- (2.31e-5) (2.36e-5) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Governor is Democrat - -0.0152 -0.0135 - -0.0031 -0.0029 - -0.0205 -0.0197
(0.0482) (0.0478) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0272) (0.0272)
Variance of cyclical GSP - 41.87 41.80 - 25.64*** 25.68*** - 237.8*** 238.0***
(43.14) (42.86) (5.479) (5.486) (60.83) (60.82)
Balanced budget strictness - -0.0190 -0.0191 - -0.0018*** -0.0018*** - -0.0173*** -0.173***
(0.0119) (0.0118) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0066) (0.0066)
Note: The sample for these regressions is 49 U.S. states (Alaska not included) for the years 1981-2012. The regressions are according
to a random effects model. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
C.4 Equivalence of Central Government Budget
Models
In this section I show that the two alternatives for formulating the budget constraint
of the central government with respect to smoothing idiosyncratic shocks result in










This constraint prevents the central government from accumulating debt indefinitely.
This constraint is valid for an economy with any number of regions.
The second alternative assumes that transfers to smooth for idiosyncratic shocks




i Tit = 0 for all t, and for an infinite number of regions it is expressed
as in Equation 3.9: ∫
Titdi = 0.
Theorem C.1. If all regions are ex ante identical, then the no-Ponzi-game budget
constraint is equivalent to the period budget constraint for a continuum of regions,
as both result in the condition E0
[
T (st, θt, ft)
]
= 0.
Proof. Consider first the period budget constraint with an infinite number of ex
ante identical, but heterogeneous, regions. By the law of large numbers, in every
period the distribution over the state variables will yield densities equal to the long-
run probabilities of each state. Since the transfer policy function for idiosyncratic
shocks will be the same for every region, its distribution will also equal the long run
distribution. This results in
∫
T (sit, θit, fit)di = E0
[
T (sjt, θjt, fjt)
]
for any region j,
which, when plugged into the budget constraint yields E0
[
T (sjt, θjt, fjt)
]
= 0 for any
region j.
Now observe the no-Ponzi-game budget constraint. This allows the central gov-
ernment to hold unlimited assets At for the purposes of smoothing idiosyncratic
shocks. If regions are ex ante identical, then it is without loss of generality to con-
sider a separate fund Ait for each region for the purposes of solving for the transfer
function T (sit, θit, fit), which will be the same in each region. The law of motion for
Ait is given by Ait+1 = Ait(1 + r) + (−T (sit, θit, fit)), which can be expanded and
solved to yield Ait+1 = −
∑t
j=0 T (sit−j, θit−j, fit−j)(1+r)
j. Plugging in to the budget
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T (sit−(1+j), θit−(1+j), fit−(1+j))
]
(1 + r)(j−t) = 0.
This can only be satisfied if E0
[
T (sit, θit, fit)
]
= 0 for all regions i.
C.5 Long-Run Posterior Variance
In this section I show that a long-run stable value for the posterior variance exists
and solve for its value. First, I derive the law of motion for the posterior variance.
Beginning with posterior σ̂2µ,t in time t, the prior for next period is formed as in
Equation 3.14: σ2µ,t+1 = ρ2ε σ̂2µ,t+σ2ξε . Next period’s posterior is then formed according







. Combining these two yields the law of motion




























and taking the limit as x → ∞, it is
clear that h(x) converges to a finite value: limx→∞ h(x) = σ2ξθ . Therefore, we can
argue that σ̂2µ,t+1 = h(σ̂2µ,t) is bounded on R+. Now assume that σ̂2µ,0 is initialized
in a region such that it converges to the fixed point of h(x); this fixed point then
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Solving for the positive solution of the quadratic formula yields the result in Equation
3.15:
σ̂2µ,∞ =


















Aaronson, Daniel et al. “Industry dynamics and the minimum wage: a puttyclay
approach”. In: International Economic Review 59.1 (2018), pp. 51–84.
Adelino, Manuel, Igor Cunha, and Miguel A. Ferreira. “The Economic Effects of
Public Financing: Evidence from Municipal Bond Ratings Recalibration”. In: The
Review of Financial Studies 30.9 (2017), pp. 3223–3268.
Aguiar, Mark and Manuel Amador. “Growth in the Shadow of Expropriation”. In:
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 126.2 (2011), pp. 651–697.
Aiyagari, S. Rao. “Uninsured indiosyncratic risk and aggregate saving”. In: The Quar-
terly Journal of Economics (1994).
Allen, Stephen P. “Taxes, redistribution, and the minimum wage: a theoretical anal-
ysis”. In: The Quarterly Journal of Economics 102.3 (1987), pp. 477–489.
Amihud, Yakov. “Illiquidity and stock returns: Cross-section and time series effects”.
In: Journal of Financial Markets 5 (2002), pp. 31–56.
Amior, Michael. “Education and geographical mobility: the role of job surplus”. In:
CEP Discussion Paper (2019).
Anderson, Gareth and Ambrogio Cesa-Bianchi. “Corssing the Credit Channel: Credit
Spreads and Firm Heterogeneity”. In: Bank of England Working Paper 854 (2020).
Ang, Andrew, Vineer Bhansali, and Yuhang Xing. “The Muni Bond Spread: Credit,
Liquidity, and Tax”. In: Columbia Business School Research Paper 14-37 (2014).
Armenter, Roc and Francesc Ortega. “Credible redistribution policy and skilled mi-
gration”. In: European Economic Review 55.2 (2011), pp. 228–245.
Auer, Simone et al. “International monetary policy transmission through banks in
small open economies”. In: Journal of International Money and Finance 90 (2019),
pp. 34–53.
Baicker, Katherine, Jeffrey Clemens, and Monica Singhal. “The rise of the states: US
fiscal decentralization in the postwar period”. In: Journal of Public Economics
96.11-12 (2012), pp. 1079–1091.
244
Banzhaf, H. Spencer and B. Andrew Chupp. “Fiscal federalism and interjurisdictional
externalities: New results and an application to US Air pollution”. In: Journal of
Public Economics 96.5-6 (2012), pp. 449–464.
BEA. National Income and Product Accounts. 2018. url: https://apps.bea.gov/
iTable/iTable.cfm?isuri=1&reqid=19&step=2&0=survey.
Beetsma, Roel M.W.J. and Henrik Jensen. “Monetary and fiscal policy interactions
in a micro-founded model of a monetary union”. In: Journal of International
Economics 67 (2005), pp. 320–352.
Beraja, Martin, Erik Hurst, and Juan Ospina. “The Aggregate Implications of Re-
gional Business Cycles”. In: Econometrica 87.6 (2019), pp. 1789–1833.
Beraja, Martin et al. “Regional Heterogeneity and the Refinancing Channel of Mon-
etary Policy”. In: The Quarterly Journal of Economics 134.1 (2019), pp. 109–
183.
Bernanke, Ben S., Mark Gertler, and Simon Gilchrist. “The Financial Accelerator in
a Quantitative Business Cycle Framework”. In: Handbook of Macroeconomics 1
(1999), pp. 1341–1393.
Besley, Timothy and Stephen Coate. “Centralized versus decentralized provision of
local public goods: a political economy approach”. In: Journal of public economics
87.12 (2003), pp. 2611–2637.
Bethune, Zachary, Bruno Sultanum, and Nicholas Trachter. “Asset issuance in over-
the-counter markets”. In: Review of Economic Dynamics 33 (2019), pp. 4–29.
Bhandari, Anmol et al. “Fiscal policy and debt management with incomplete mar-
kets”. In: Quarterly Journal of Economics (2017), pp. 617–663.
Bianchi, Javier and Enrique G. Mendoza. “Optimal Time-Consistent Macropruden-
tial Policy”. In: Journal of Political Economy 126.2 (2018).
Blundell, Richard and Thomas MaCurdy. “Labor supply: A review of alternative
approaches”. In: Handbook of labor economics 3 (1999), pp. 1559–1695.
Boadway, Robin and Katherine Cuff. “A minimum wage can be welfare-improving
and employment-enhancing”. In: European Economic Review 45.3 (2001), pp. 553–
576.
Bordignon, Massimo, Paolo Manasse, and Guido Tabellini. “Optimal Regional Redis-
tribution Under Asymmetric Information”. In: American Economic Review 91.3
(2001), pp. 709–723.
Brancaccio, Giulia, Dan Li, and Norman Schúrhoff. “Learning by Trading: The Case
of the US Market for Municipal Bonds”. In: Working paper (2020).
Brown, Charles C. and Wallace E. Oates. “Assistance to the Poor in a Federal Sys-
tem”. In: Journal of Public Economics 32 (1987), pp. 307–330.
245
Brown, Jason P. Identifying State-Level Recessions. Economic Review. Federal Re-
serve Bank of Kansas City, 2017.
Bu, Chunya, John H. Rogers, and Wenbin Wu. “A Unified Measure of Fed Monetary
Policy Shocks”. In: FEDS Working Paper 2019-043 (2 2019).
Bureau, U.S. Census. Census of Governments, 1970-2016. 2012.
Cadena, Brian C. “Recent immigrants as labor market arbitrageurs: evidence from
the minimumm wage”. In: Journal of Urban Economics 80 (2014), pp. 1–12.
Calabrese, Stephen M., Dennis Epple, and Richard Romano. “Inefficiencies from
Metropolitan Political and Fiscal Decentralization: Failures of Tiebout Competi-
tion”. In: The Review of Economic Studies 79.3 (2012), pp. 1081–1111.
Caplan, Arthur J., Richard C. Cornes, and Emilson CD Silva. “Pure public goods and
income redistribution in a federation with decentralized leadership and imperfect
labor mobility”. In: Journal of Public Economics 77.2 (2000), pp. 265–284.
Carlino, Gerald A. and Robert P. Inman. “Local deficits and local jobs: Can US
states stabilize their own economies?” In: Journal of Monetary Economics 60.5
(2013), pp. 517–530.
Cashin, David et al. “Fiscal policy and aggregate demand in the USA before, during,
and following the Great Recession”. In: International Tax and Public Finance 25
(2018), pp. 1519–1558.
CBO. Federal Grants to State and Local Governments. Congrassional Budget Office,
2013.
Cengiz, Doruk et al. “The effect of minimum wages on low-wage jobs”. In: The Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 134.3 (2019), pp. 1405–1454.
Cesa-Bianchi, Ambrogio, Gregory Thwaites, and Alejandro Vicondoa. “Monetary
policy transmission in an open economy: new data and evidence from the United
Kingdom”. In: Bank of England Working Paper 615 (2016).
Chari, V.V. and Patrick J. Kehoe. “Optimal fiscal and monetary policy”. In: Hand-
book of Macroeconomics, Volume 1. 1999.
Chodorow-Reich, Gabriel. “Geographic cross-sectional fiscal spending multipliers:
what have we learned?” In: NBER Working Paper Series (2017).
— “Geographic Cross-Sectional Fiscal Spending Multipliers: What HaveWe Learned?”
In: American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 11.2 (2019), pp. 1–34.
Christiano, Lawrence J., Martin Eichenbaum, and Charles Evans. “The Effects of
Monetary Policy Shocks: Evidence from the Flow of Funds”. In: The Review of
Economics and Statistics 78.1 (1996), pp. 16–34.
Clemens, Jeffrey and Michael Wither. “The minimum wage and the Great Reces-
sion: evidence of effects on the employment and income trajectories of low-skilled
workers”. In: Journal of Public Economics 170 (2019), pp. 53–67.
246
Colas, Mark and Kevin Hutchinson. “Heterogeneous Workers and Federal Income
Taxes in a Spatial Equilibrium”. In: (2020).
Cremer, Helmuth and Pierre Pestieau. “Factor mobility and redistribution”. In: Hand-
book of Regional and Urban Economics 4 (2004), pp. 2529–2560.
Danziger, Eliav and Leif Danziger. “The Optimal Graduated Minimum Wage and
Social Welfare”. In: Transitions through the Labor Market: Work, Occupation,
Earnings and Retirement. Emerald Publishing Limited, 2018, pp. 55–72.
Debrun, Xavier. “Fiscal Rules in a Monetary Union: A Short-Run Analysis”. In: Open
economies review 11 (2000), pp. 323–358.
Dixit, Avinash and John Londregan. “Fiscal federalism and redistributive politics”.
In: Journal of Public Economics 68.2 (1998), pp. 153–180.
Dube, Arindrajit, T. William Lester, and Michael Reich. “Minimum wage shocks,
employment flows, and labor market frictions”. In: Journal of Labor Economics
34.3 (2016), pp. 663–704.
Duffie, Darrell, Icolae Garleanu, and Lasse Heje Pedersen. “Over-the-counter mar-
kets”. In: Econometrica 73.6 (2005), pp. 1815–1847.
Durdu, Ceyhun Bora, Enrique G. Mendoza, and Marco E. Terrones. “Precautionary
demand for foreign assets in Sudden Stop economies: An assessment of the New
Mercantilism”. In: Journal of Development Economics 89 (2009), pp. 194–209.
Dvorkin, Maximiliano A. “Fiscal Federalism and Optimal Income Taxes”. In: Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review (2017), pp. 319–336.
Economides, George and Thomas Moutos. “Minimum wages in the Presence of in-
kind Redistribution”. In: Working paper (2017).
Epple, Dennis and Thomas Nechyba. “Fiscal decentralization”. In: Handbook of Re-
gional and Urban Economics 4 (2004), pp. 2423–2480.
Epple, Dennis and Glenn J. Platt. “Equilibrium and local redistribution in an urban
economy when households differ in both preferences and incomes”. In: Journal of
Urban Economics 43.1 (1998), pp. 23–51.
Epple, Dennis and Thomas Romer. “Mobility and redistribution”. In: Journal of
Political Economy 99.4 (1991).
Fama, Eugene F. and James D. MacBeth. “Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical
Tests”. In: Journal of Political Economy 81.3 (1973), pp. 607–636.
Farhi, Emmanuel and Iván Werning. “Fiscal Multipliers: Liquidity Traps and Cur-
rency Unions”. In: Handbook of Macroeconomics 2 (2017), pp. 2417–2492.
Farhi, Emmanuel and Ivan Werning. “Fiscal Unions”. In: American Economic Review
107.12 (2017).
Feldhutter, Peter. “The same bond at different prices: Identifying search frictions and
selling pressures”. In: Review of Financial Studies 25.1 (2012), pp. 1155–1206.
247
Ferrero, Andrea. “Fiscal and monetary rules for a currency union”. In: Journal of
International Economics 77.1 (2009), pp. 1–10.
Fisher, Ronald C. and Robert W. Wassmer. “The Issuance of State and Local Debt
During the United States Great Recession”. In: National Tax Journal 67.1 (2014),
pp. 113–150.
Flinn, Christopher J. “Minimum wage effects on labor market outcomes under search,
matching and endogeneous contact rates”. In: Econometrica 74.4 (2006), pp. 1013–
1062.
Francis, Neville, Michael T. Owyang, and Tatevik Sekhposyan. “The Local Effects
of Monetary Policy”. In: The B.E. Journal of Macroecnomics 12.2 (2012).
Fukumura, Koichi and Atsushi Yamagishi. “Minimum wage competition”. In: Inter-
national Tax and Public Finance 27.6 (2020), pp. 1557–1581.
Galí, Jordi and Tommaso Monacelli. “Optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a cur-
rency union”. In: Journal of International Economics 76 (2008), pp. 116–132.
Gao, Pengjie, Chang Lee, and Dermot Murphy. “Municipal borrowing costs and state
policies for distressed municipalities”. In: Journal of Financial Economics 132.2
(2019), pp. 404–426.
Garrett, Daniel et al. “Tax Advantages and Imperfect Competition in Auctions for
Municipal Bonds”. In: NBER Working Paper 23473 (2018).
Gerritsen, Aart and Bas Jacobs. “Is a Minimum wage an Appropriate Instrument
for Redistribution?” In: Economica 87 (2020), pp. 611–637.
Gilchrist, Simon, Vivian Yue, and Egon Zakrajs̆ek. “U.S. Monetary Policy and In-
ternational Bond Markets”. In: Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 51 (S1
2019), pp. 127–161.
Goodspeed, Timothy. “Absorbing Shocks: National Rainy-Day Funds and Cross-
Country Transfers in a Fiscal Union”. In: FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis
72.4 (2016), pp. 407–420.
Gordon, Roger H. “An optimal taxation approach to fiscal federalism”. In: The Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 98.4 (1983), pp. 567–586.
Gordon, Roger H. and Julie Berry Cullen. “Income redistribution in a federal system
of governments”. In: Journal of Public Economics 96.11-12 (2012), pp. 1100–1109.
Gramlich, Edward M. “Subnational fiscal policy”. In: Perspectives on local public
finance and public policy 3.3-27 (1997).
Green, Richard C., Burton Hollifield, and Norman Schürhoff. “Dealer intermedia-
tion and price behavior in the aftermarket for new bond issues”. In: Journal of
Financial Economics 86.3 (2007), pp. 643–682.
— “Financial Intermediation and the Costs of Trading in an Opaque Market”. In:
The Review of Financial Studies 20.2 (2007), pp. 275–314.
248
Grigoris, Fotis. “The term structure of municipal bond yields, local economic condi-
tions, and local stock returns”. In: Working paper (2019).
Guesnerie, Roger and Kevin Roberts. “Minimum wage legislation as a second best
policy”. In: European Economic Review 31.1-2 (1987), pp. 490–498.
Gürkaynak, Refet S., Brian Sack, and Jonathan H. Wright. “The U.S. Treasury Yield
Curve: 1961 to the Present”. In: FEDS Working Paper 2006-28 (2 2006).
Hamilton, Jonathan and Pierre Pestieau. “Optimal income taxation and the abil-
ity distribution: Implications for migration equilibria”. In: International Tax and
Public Finance 12.1 (2005), pp. 29–45.
Harding, Don and Adrian Pagan. “Dissecting the cycle: a methodological investiga-
tion”. In: Journal of Monetary Economics 49 (2002), pp. 365–381.
Harris, Lawrence E. and Michael S. Piwowar. “Secondary Trading Costs in the Mu-
nicipal Bond Market”. In: The Journal of Finance 61.3 (2006), pp. 1361–1397.
Hines Jr, James R. “State fiscal policies and transitory income fluctuations”. In:
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2010.2 (2010), pp. 313–337.
Hou, Yilin and Daniel L. Smith. “A Framework for Understanding State Balanced
Budget Requirement Systems: Reexamining Distinctive Features and an Opera-
tional Definition”. In: Public Budgeting and Finance 26.3 (2006), pp. 22–45.
Hoynes, Hilary W. and Erzo FP Luttmer. “The insurance value of state tax-and-
transfer programs”. In: Journal of Public Economics 96.11-12 (2012), pp. 1110–
1128.
Hungerb uhler, Mathias and Etienne Lehmann. “On the optimality of a minimum
wage: New insights from optimal tax theory”. In: Journal of Public Economics
93.3-4 (2009), pp. 464–481.
Janeba, Eckhard and John Douglas Wilson. “Optimal fiscal federalism in the presence
of tax competition”. In: Journal of Public Economics 95.11-12 (2011), pp. 1302–
1311.
Jankowitsch, Rainer, Amrut Nashikkar, and Marti G. Subrahmanyam. “Price dis-
persion in OTC markets: A new measure of liquidity”. In: Journal of Banking
and Finance 35 (2011), pp. 343–357.
Kaplan, Greg, Benjamin Moll, and Giovanni L. Violante. “Monetary Policy Accord-
ing to HANK”. In: American Economic Review 108.3 (2018), pp. 697–743.
Katz, Lawrence F. and Kevin M. Murphy. “Changes in relative wages, 1963-1987:
supply and demand factors”. In: The Quarterly Journal of Economics 107.1
(1992), pp. 35–78.
Keen, Michael J. and Christos Kotsogiannis. “Does federalism lead to excessively
high taxes?” In: American Economic Review 92.1 (2002), pp. 363–370.
249
Keen, Michael J. and Christos Kotsogiannis. “Tax competition in federations and
the welfare consequences of decentralization”. In: Journal of Urban Economics 56
(Mar. 2004), pp. 397–407.
Kennan, John and James R. Walker. “The effect of expected income on individual
migration decisions”. In: Econometrica 79.1 (2011), pp. 211–251.
Kleven, Henrik et al. “Taxation and Migration: Evidence and Policy Implications”.
In: NBER working paper w25740 (2019).
Kline, Patrick and Enrico Moretti. “People, Places, and Public Policy: some Sim-
ple Welfare Economics of Local Economic Development Programs”. In: Annual
Review of Economics 6.1 (2014), pp. 629–662.
Ladd, Helen F. and Fred C. Doolittle. “Which Level of Government Should Assist
the Poor?” In: National Tax Journal 35 (1982), pp. 323–336.
Lavecchia, Adam. “Minimum Wage Policy with Optimal Taxes and Unemployment”.
In: McMaster University Department of Economics Working Paper (2019).
Lee, David and Emmanuel Saez. “Optimal minimum wage policy in competitive labor
markets”. In: Journal of Public Economics 96.9-10 (2012), pp. 739–749.
Lockwood, Ben. “Distributive politics and the costs of centralisation.” In: Review of
Economic Studies 69 (2002), pp. 313–338.
Lucas, Robert E. “Some International Evidence on Output-Inflation Tradeoffs”. In:
The American Economic Review 63.3 (1973), pp. 326–334.
Luque, Jaime, Massimo Morelli, and Jose Tavares. “A volatility-based theory of fiscal
union desirability”. In: Journal of Public Economics 112 (2014), pp. 1–11.
Luttmer, Erzo FP. “Does the minimum wage cause inefficient rationing?” In: The
BE Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 7.1 (2007).
McKay, Alisdair, Emi Nakamura, and Jón Steinsson. “The Power of Forward Guid-
ance Revisited”. In: American Economic Review 106.10 (2016), pp. 3133–58.
Moldogaziev, Tima T. “The Market(s) Left Behind: Price Formation in Municipal
secondary Trades”. In: Working paper (2018).
Monras, Joan. “Minimum Wages and Spatial Equilibrium: Theory and Evidence”.
In: Journal of Labor Economics 37.3 (2019).
Moretti, Enrico. “Real wage inequality”. In: American Economic Journal: Applied
Economics 5.1 (2013), pp. 65–103.
Nakamura, Emi and Jón Steinsson. “Fiscal Stimulus in a Monetary Union: Evidence
from US Regions”. In: American Economic Review 104.3 (2014), pp. 753–92.
— “Fiscal stimulus in a monetary union: Evidence from US regions”. In: The Amer-
ican Economic Review 104.3 (2014), pp. 753–792.
— “High-Frequency Identification of Monetary Non-Neutrality: The Information Ef-
fect”. In: The Quarterly Journal of Economics 133.3 (2018), pp. 1283–1330.
250
NASBO. Fiscal Survey of the States, 1979-2017. 2017.
NCSL. “NCSL Fiscal Brief: State Balanced Budget Provisions”. In: National Con-
ference of State Legislatures (2010).
Neumark, David. “The Econometrics and Economics of the Employment Effects of
Minimum Wages: Getting from Known Unknowns to Known Knowns”. In: NBER
Working Paper (2018).
Neumark, David and William L. Wascher. “Minimum wages and employment”. In:
Foundations and Trends in Microeconomics 3.12 (2007), pp. 1–182.
Oates, Wallace E. “An economist perspective on Fiscal federalism”. In: The Political
Economy of Fiscal Federalism. Ed. by WE Oates. 1977, pp. 3–19.
— Fiscal Federalism. 1972.
Oates, Wallace E. “On the evolution of fiscal federalism: theory and institutions”. In:
National Tax Journal 61.2 (2008), pp. 313–334.
Oates, Wallace E. “Toward A Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism”. In:
International Tax and Public Finance 12 (2005), pp. 349–373.
OECD. Main Economic Indicators - complete database. 2017.
Owyang, Michael T. and Sarah Zubairy. “The Regional Variation in the Response
to Government Spending Shocks”. In: Working paper (2008).
Painter, Marcus. “An inconvenient cost: The effects of climate change on municipal
bonds”. In: Journal of Financial Economics 135.2 (2020), pp. 468–482.
Philadelphia, Federal Reserve Bank of. State Coincident Indices. 2017.
Phillips, David C. “Do low-wage employers discriminate against applicants with long
commutes? Evidence from a correspondence experiment”. In: Journal of Human
Resources (2018), 1016–8327R.
Pirinsky, Christo A. and Qinghai Wang. “Market Segmentation and the Cost of
Capital in a Domestic Market: Evidence from Municipal Bonds”. In: Financial
Management 40.2 (2011), pp. 455–481.
Poverty Research, University of Kentucky Center for. UKCPR National Welfare
Data, 1980-2016. 2017.
Rigobon, Roberto and Brian Sack. “The impact o fmonetary policy on asset prices”.
In: Journal of Monetary Economics 51.8 (2004), pp. 1553–1575.
Roback, Jennifer. “Wages, rents, and the quality of life”. In: Journal of Political
Economy 90.6 (1982), pp. 1257–1278.
Rohlin, Shawn M. “State minimum wages and business location: Evidence from a
refined border approach”. In: Journal of Urban Economics 69.1 (2011), pp. 103–
117.
251
Romer, Christina D and David H Romer. “A New Measure of Monetary Shocks:
Derivation and Implications”. In: American Economic Review 94.4 (2004), pp. 1055–
1084.
Rosa, Carlo. “Municipal Bonds and Monetary Policy: Evidence from the Fed Funds
Futures Market”. In: The Journal of Futures Markets 34.5 (2014), pp. 434–450.
Rosen, Sherwin. Wage-based indexes of urban quality of life. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University, 1979.
Schmitt-Grohe, Stephanie and Martin Uribe. “Closing small open economy models”.
In: Journal of International Economics 61.2 (2003), pp. 163–185.
— “Nominal Rigidity, Exchange Rates, and Unemployment”. In: Open Economy
Macroeconomics 2 (2016).
— “Optimal fiscal and monetary policy under sticky prices”. In: Journal of Economic
Theory 114 (2004), pp. 198–230.
Schwert, Michael. “Municipal Bond Liquidity and Default Risk”. In: The Journal of
Finance 72.4 (2017), pp. 1683–1722.
Seegert, Nathan. “Optimal Taxation with Volatility: A Theoretical and Empirical
Decomposition”. In: SSRN working paper (2017).
— “The Performance of State Tax Portfolios During and After the Great Recession”.
In: National Tax Journal 68.4 (2015), pp. 901–918.
Silva, Emilson C.D. and Richard C. Cornes. “Local Public Goods, Risk Sharing,
and Private Information in Federal Systems”. In: Journal of Urban Economics 47
(2000), pp. 39–60.
Simon, Andrew. “Public Good Spillovers and Fiscal Centralization: Evidence from
Community College Expansions”. In: (2020).
Stigler, George J. “The Tenable Range of Functions of Local Government”. In: (1957).
Stiglitz, Joseph E. “Self-selection and Pareto efficient taxation”. In: Journal of Public
Economics 17.2 (1982), pp. 213–240.
Suárez Serrato, Juan Carlos and Owen Zidar. “Who benefits from state corporate tax
cuts? A local labor markets approach with heterogeneous firms”. In: American
Economic Review 106.9 (2016), pp. 2582–2624.
Tiebout, Charles M. “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures”. In: The Journal of
Policitcal Economy 64.5 (1956), pp. 416–424.
Weiland, Johannes and Mu-Jeung Yang. “Financial Dampening”. In: Working paper
(2019).
Wildasin, David E. “Income distribution and redistribution within federations”. In:
Annales d’Economie et de Statistique (1997), pp. 291–313.
— “Labor-market integration, investment in risky human capital, and fiscal compe-
tition”. In: American Economic Review 90.1 (2000), pp. 73–95.
252
Wilson, John D. “A theory of interregional tax competition”. In: Journal of Urban
Economics 19.3 (1986), pp. 296–315.
— “Optimal linear income taxation in the presence of emigration”. In: Journal of
Public Economics 18.3 (1982), pp. 363–379.
— “Tax competition in a federal setting”. In: Handbook of Multilevel Finance (2015),
p. 264.
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. 2010.
Yang, Lang. “Not All State Authorizations for Municipal Bankruptcy Are Equal:
Impact on State Borrowing Costs”. In: National Tax Journal 72.2 (2019), pp. 435–
464.
Zodrow, George R. and Peter Mieszkowski. “Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation, and
the underprovision of local public goods”. In: Journal of Urban Economics 19.3
(1986), pp. 356–370.
253
